

PLOTINUS  
AND THE STOICS

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ANDREAS GRAESER

PLOTINUS  
AND THE STOICS  
A PRELIMINARY STUDY



LEIDEN  
E. J. BRILL  
1972

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*To*  
*Harold F. Cherniss*



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University of Berne

A.G.





## PREFACE

The main reason for the treatment of the present topic rests on two major observations, both of which become evident to the reader of the *Enneades*.

One of them concerns the fact, noticed already by Porphyry, that the writings of Plotinus are “also full of hidden Stoic doctrines. . .”.<sup>1</sup> To be sure, there can be little doubt that Porphyry’s remark calls for an interpretation which can be verified and confirmed by an analysis of the writings themselves:<sup>2</sup> that is to say, Plotinus makes use of Stoic ideas, especially in the context of Theodicy and Cosmology, but also elsewhere.

This observation appears to be opposed by another still more obvious one. For Plotinus quite often attacks theories which we can more or less accurately identify as held by the Stoic school. His criticism is focussed mainly on the Stoics’ ontology in general, their views on the nature of God, Soul, and Nature, and Matter in particular.

Thus, one is confronted with the rather surprising fact that the writings of Plotinus apparently contain strong repudiation of Stoic doctrines, as well as tacit acceptance of some of them.

This being so, the mere fact that Plotinus, like Plato a systematic philosopher,<sup>3</sup> found it possible to oppose and yet, to some extent at least, to adhere to another philosophy or state of mind apparently no less systematic in its approach, that renders his work worthy of critical attention: History of philosophy, in order to provide itself with material worth discussing and analysing within the context of the tradition and adaptation of ideas, ought rightly to consider the

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<sup>1</sup> Cf. *Vit. Plot.* 14, 4-5; ‘Εμμέμικται δ’ ἐν τοῖς συγγράμμασι καὶ τὰ Στωικὰ λανθάνοντα δόγματα καὶ τὰ Περιπατητικὰ.

<sup>2</sup> For the view that Porphyry could not have been thinking of those passages offering critical accounts of Stoic doctrines see also W. Theiler, *Die Vorbereitung des Neuplatonismus*<sup>2</sup> (Berlin, 1964), p. 61 n. 1 [where he suggests that Porphyry’s statement is meant to be taken in reference to the fact, Theiler claims, that Plotinus is indebted to Posidonius], and H.-R. Schwyzer, in: *Les Sources de Plotin*, p. 89. Moreover, it is interesting that in what follows [14, 5-7] Porphyry mentions only Academic and Peripatetic treatises as having been read and explicated in the “courses”.

<sup>3</sup> P. O. Kristeller, *Der Begriff der Seele in der Ethik Plotins* (Tübingen, 1929), p. 3 speaks of an *implizite Systematik*.

peculiarities and characteristics proper to a philosophical personality of Plotinus' stature.

From this it will be clear that the *modus procedendi* in this investigation almost inevitably tends to become what must appear to be *Quellenforschung*<sup>1</sup> which, since K. Reinhardt's approach towards the *innere Form* as a literary category,<sup>2</sup> has been more or less identified with a certain state of mind, rather than with a still possibly legitimate attempt at approaching texts. However, bearing in mind the nature of the material, which accounts for almost all the extant information concerning the older Stoics, the term *Quellenforschung* must seem unintelligible. For the doxographical material certainly does not admit the character *source*; and the question whether Plotinus had read writings in the original by the older Stoics is a problem of its own.<sup>3</sup> That is to say, any result which might be achieved would have to rely on the evidence of *loci paralleli* rather than of *fontes*.

The larger part of the material to be listed and presented in PART I is basically that which has been partially considered by E. Brehier,<sup>4</sup> V. Cilento,<sup>5</sup> and by P. Henry and H.-R. Schwyzer,<sup>6</sup> in particular in the *apparatus fontium* of the *editio maior*. Invaluable help has been provided by the running commentaries of R. Harder and W. Theiler,<sup>7</sup> as well as various monographs and articles which will be referred to in the relevant place.

Finally, something should be said about the principles which determine the presentation of the *loci paralleli*. In general, the

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<sup>1</sup> For the problem of the legitimacy of *Quellenforschung*, with regard to Plotinus in particular, see the discussion of R. Harder's account [in: *Les Sources de Plotin*, pp. 327, 336] by H.-G. Gadamer, *Wahrheit und Methode*<sup>2</sup> (Tübingen, 1965), p. 474.

<sup>2</sup> K. Reinhardt (*Poseidonios* [Munich 1921]) "adopted" this category from G. Misch (*Geschichte der Autobiographie*, Vol. I [Berlin, 1907]); curiously enough, the concept of the "inward form" (Shaftesbury) was first put forward by Plotinus himself: τὸ ἐνδὸν εἶδος (I 6 [1] 3, 8).

<sup>3</sup> See above, p. XIII n. 2 and below, pp. 4-5.

<sup>4</sup> *Plotin, Ennéades*<sup>2</sup>, Vol. VI, 2 (Paris 1954), pp. 191-192.

<sup>5</sup> *Plotino, Enneadi*, Vol. III, 2 (Bari, 1949), pp. 298-302.

<sup>6</sup> *Plotini Opera*, Tomus I [*Enn.* I-III] (Paris-Bruxelles, 1953), Tomus II [*Enn.* IV-V] (Paris-Bruxelles, 1959).

<sup>7</sup> *Plotins Schriften* [see Bibliography] (Hamburg 1956-1970).

method is the one employed by P. Henry and H.-R. Schwyzer,<sup>1</sup> R. Harder, and W. Theiler, which is to say that only those texts will be pointed out that are most informative about the Stoic doctrine as referred to by Plotinus. Although many such resemblances might appear to be highly questionable, or even considered invalid, it will be the policy throughout to point out rather too much than too little.

Moreover, since this investigation is concerned with providing information about Stoic doctrines in the writings of Plotinus, it must seem reasonable to organize the material in the present work in the succession adopted in the collection of the *Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta* [= S.V.F.]. Yet, by referring to, for example, S.V.F. 1, it is certainly not claimed that Plotinus, in such a case, has to be related to Zeno etc.; in most cases it is to be considered merely a matter of convenience. A different method will be pursued in PART I, 2 i.e., as far as the middle phase of Stoicism has to be taken into consideration. Unfortunately, there is no adequate collection of "fragments" or "testimonia" of the lost writings of Posidonius.<sup>2</sup> On the other hand, since "Posidonius" is said to occur quite often in the works of, for example, Seneca and Sextus Empiricus etc., a clear attribution to either of these authors must seem difficult.

The second part, then, will consist of some essays on topics of major importance as they recommend themselves on the basis of already established textual evidence. The main concern of these studies will be to discuss both aspects, the "stoicizing Plotinus" as well as the nature of his criticism, within the range of the subject-matters particularly relevant to (the scope of) his philosophy.

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<sup>1</sup> Their *apparatus fontium*, it should be said, is far from being complete, not only in respect to the Platonic-Aristotelian tradition (cf. H. F. Cherniss, "Plotinus: A definitive Edition and a new Translation", *Rev. Metaph.* VI [1952], pp. 251-253), the same is true for the Stoic material.

<sup>2</sup> New collections are being undertaken by L. Edelstein and I. G. Kidd (University of St. Andrews), and W. Theiler (University of Berne). I would like to thank Mr. Kidd for having given to me the references to the late Professor Edelstein's *The Fragments of Posidonius*, forthcoming in the Cambridge University Press.

## ABBREVIATIONS

<i>A.J.P.</i>	<i>American Journal of Philology</i>
<i>A.d.F.</i>	<i>Archivo di filosofia</i>
<i>A.G.F.</i>	<i>Archiv für die Geschichte der Philosophie</i>
<i>C.H.L.G.E.M.P.</i>	<i>Cambridge History of later Greek and early Medieval Philosophy</i> [ed. A. H. Armstrong] (Cambridge, 1967)
<i>C.P.</i>	<i>Classical Philology</i>
<i>C.Q.</i>	<i>Classical Quarterly</i>
<i>Dox. Graec.</i>	H. Diels, <i>Doxographi Graeci</i> (Berlin, 1879)
<i>G.G.A.</i>	<i>Göttingische gelehrte Anzeigen</i>
<i>J.H.I.</i>	<i>Journal of History of Ideas</i>
<i>J.H.S.</i>	<i>Journal of Hellenic Studies</i>
<i>Les Sources de Plotin</i>	Entretiens sur l'Antiquité Classique de la Fondation Hardt, Vol. 5 (Geneva, 1960)
<i>M.H.</i>	<i>Museum Helveticum</i>
<i>P.A.P.A.</i>	<i>Proceedings and Addresses of The American Philosophical Association</i>
<i>P.Q.</i>	<i>Philosophical Quarterly</i>
<i>P.R.</i>	<i>Philosophical Review</i>
<i>R.A.C.</i>	<i>Reallexikon für Antike und Christentum</i>
<i>R.E.</i>	Pauly's <i>Real-Encyclopädie der classischen Altertumswissenschaft</i>
<i>R.I.P.</i>	<i>Revue internationale de Philosophie</i>
<i>Rev. Metaph.</i>	<i>Review of Metaphysics</i>
<i>Rh.M.</i>	<i>Rheinisches Museum für Philologie</i>
<i>R.N.P.</i>	<i>Revue Néoscolastique de Philosophie</i>
<i>S.B.Univ.Frankfurt</i>	<i>Sitzungsberichte der Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften an der Johann Wolfgang Goethe Universität-Frankfurt</i>
<i>T.A.P.A.</i>	<i>Transactions and Proceedings of The American Philological Association</i>
<i>Z.P.F.</i>	<i>Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung</i>

## INTRODUCTION

Plotinus, like Aristotle and Hegel,<sup>1</sup> must be considered as a philosopher whose system ought rightly to be taken as approximating the modern [i.e., Hegelian]<sup>2</sup> understanding of *Geschichtsphilosophie*.<sup>3</sup>

However, whereas Aristotle, as is well known,<sup>4</sup> thought that it would be his philosophy which marked the final and definite step entailed in the framework peculiar to the development of Greek thought, Plotinus intended nothing more<sup>5</sup> than a reaffirmation of that truth which—as it seemed to him and other Neoplatonists—was almost definitely revealed by Plato six centuries before.

It was thus Plotinus' chief concern, while expounding and discussing problems of current interest, to elucidate certain points of view held by Plato, and to prove them to be "still" valid, despite any objection that explicitly or implicitly might have been advanced by other schools and that might still be raised.

Among those in question, Aristotle<sup>6</sup> and the Peripatetics, the Stoics and also the Epicureans,<sup>7</sup> were the main opponents<sup>8</sup> to

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<sup>1</sup> For a good account of the relationship of the ancient to the modern philosopher, see N. Hartmann, "Hegel und Aristoteles", in: *Kleine Schriften*, Vol. II [*Abhandlungen zur Philosophiegeschichte*] (Berlin, 1957), pp. 214-251.

<sup>2</sup> See Hegel's "Einleitung zu den *Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie*" [ed. G. J. P. J. Bolland] (Leiden, 1908), pp. 1-92.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. P.-P. Matter, *Der Einfluss des platonischen "Timaios" auf das Denken Plotins* (Winterthur, 1964), pp. 3 ff.

<sup>4</sup> See esp. O. Gigon, "Die Geschichtlichkeit in der Philosophie bei Aristoteles", *A.d.F.* I (1954), pp. 129-150; see also W. K. C. Guthrie, "Aristotle as a Historian of Philosophy", *J.H.S.* LXXVII (1957), pp. 35-41, and for valuable accounts of the post-Aristotelian tradition, see O. Gigon, "Die Erneuerung der Philosophie in der Zeit Ciceros", in: *La Tradition Platonicienne* [Entr. Fond. Hardt, Tome III] (Geneva, 1955), pp. 28 ff. esp. 36 f.

<sup>5</sup> Cf. e.g., V 1 (10) 8, 10 for which see W. Theiler, "Plotin und die antike Philosophie", *M.H.* I (1944), p. 214 nn. 51-52; for a more sceptical approach, see J. M. Rist, *Plotinus: The Road to Reality* (Cambridge, 1967), p. 187.

<sup>6</sup> See e.g., J. M. Rist, *Plotinus: The Road to Reality*, pp. 178-180.

<sup>7</sup> It seems to me that R. Harder (in: *Les Sources de Plotin*, p. 90) underestimates the consideration Plotinus had for the Epicureans. More accurate is the account by J. M. Rist, *Plotinus: The Road to Reality*, pp. 50-51, 236, 259 n. 18.

<sup>8</sup> For his attitude towards Gnosticism see, besides R. Harder, "Plotins Abhandlung gegen die Gnostiker" [in: *Kleine Schriften*] (Munich, 1960),

whom Plotinus felt obliged to pay particular attention, not to mention the somewhat divergent positions within the Platonist tradition itself.

Thus, Plotinus considered all of them, but especially the Peripatetics and the Stoics, to be heretics more or less removed from the foundation of truth as it had been revealed by Plato and some "wise old men" before him.<sup>1</sup>

It is also true, however, that Plotinus came to understand that the cosmological and physical views held by Aristotle and the Stoic school were somewhat remote from Plato's opinions, as well as strangely related to them.<sup>2</sup> Roughly speaking, Plotinus' relation or attitude towards both of them can be characterized as open criticism of some doctrines and as tacit, though modified, acceptance of others. Here is not the place to outline the points in which Plotinus openly opposed Aristotle, the philosopher and critic of Plato,<sup>3</sup> for example, in VI 1 (42), 1-24 and elsewhere. That the line of discussion along which Plotinus approaches Aristotle is to a limited extent similar to the way in which the latter treated his predecessors has been observed correctly.<sup>4</sup> The very fact, however, that Plotinus [like Albinus before him] "adopts" the Aristotelian concepts, for example, of *Potentiality* and *Actuality* (the entailments of which are clearly to be understood as a fundamental attack on Plato's ontology) and integrates them into his own system, as well as the anti-Platonic distinction between ὅλη *qua* ὑποκείμενον and μορφή *qua* εἶδος, shows that Platonism must already have lost

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pp. 296-302, H. Ch. Puech, in: *Les Sources de Plotin*, pp. 161-174, and partially E. R. Dodds, *Pagan and Christian in an Age of Anxiety* (Cambridge, 1965), pp. 94-95.

<sup>1</sup> Typical also is the account by Proclus, *Plat. Theol.* 1, 3 [p. 12, 11, Saffrey-Westerink].

<sup>2</sup> Thus, Porphyry, when speaking of Peripatetic and Stoic thoughts which had been made use of by Plotinus [see above, p. XIII, n. 1], may well say that they are hidden [λανθάνοντα].

<sup>3</sup> Besides the general account by J. M. Rist [see above p. 8, n. 6], for special problems see e.g. A. H. Armstrong, in: *Les Sources de Plotin*, pp. 393-414, P. Henry, in: *Les Sources de Plotin*, pp. 429-449, and also H.-J. Blumenthal, "Plotinus Ennead IV 2, 3 and its Sources", *A.G.P.* L (1968), pp. 254-261. A more comprehensive study of the problems concerning the relation of Plotinus to Aristotle has been undertaken by F.-P. Hager (*Habilitationsschrift* [Berne, 1968]), the publication of which is eagerly awaited.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. esp. P. Henry, *Introduction to the Enneads* [Transl. by McKenna]<sup>2</sup> (London, 1964), p. LXXII.

any truly intimate awareness of its own generic roots.<sup>1</sup> It is hardly misleading to say that Platonism did not hesitate to restate its own position in a way apparently contrary to the intentions of Plato's philosophy itself [Atticus had already objected to attempts to reconcile Aristotle and Plato; but in this he was not at all successful, for Porphyry, Hierocles, and Simplicius, and perhaps Ammonius, the teacher of Plotinus,<sup>2</sup> certainly did not see any difference between Plato and Aristotle]. In any case, one has to understand to what extent Plotinus' understanding of Plato's philosophy had already been affected by Aristotelianism.<sup>3</sup>

The same is true *mutatis mutandis* of the relationship between Platonism and Stoicism, although it is, for some reason, no longer considered correct to speak or think in terms of dependence. It must be borne in mind that, from the first century B.C., there already existed something like a "stoicizing Platonism" [Antiochus of Ascalon],<sup>4</sup> on the one hand and a "platonizing Stoicism" [Posidonius],<sup>5</sup> on the other.<sup>6</sup> It might not even be surprising to find also a "stoicizing Plotinus".<sup>7</sup>

Admittedly, such a term has heuristic value only, for Stoicism in general had, in Plotinus' time, approximated what has been called the "*vergrößerte späte Spielform der klassisch griechischen Philosophie*".<sup>8</sup> And as Plotinus' attitude towards the Stoics was ambiguous, or rather, self-contradictory [see above p. XIII, 3, n. 3], one might

<sup>1</sup> For instructive examples, see Albinus, *Isagoge* X 1, 2, 3, XII 4 [ed. Louis].

<sup>2</sup> See W. Theiler, in: *Les Sources de Plotin*, p. 66 (with reference to Photius, *Cod.* 214, 172A71).

<sup>3</sup> In saying this I do not intend to question a statement such as the following: "that Plotinus' high rank as a philosopher is at least partially grounded in his success at synthesizing elements from the many preceding schools of thought without becoming entangled in their systematic difficulties" (G. H. Clark, "Plotinus' Theory of Sensation", *P.R.* LI [1942], p. 363).

<sup>4</sup> For whom see, in general, G. Luck, *Der Akademiker Antiochos* (Berne, 1953), esp. pp. 45-51.

<sup>5</sup> I understand this characterization fundamentally in reference to what has been said about Posidonius by L. Edelstein, "The Philosophical System of Posidonius", *A.J.P.* LVII (1936), pp. 286-325.

<sup>6</sup> Extremely valuable is the account by O. Gigon, in: *La Tradition Platonicienne* [above p. 1, n. 4], pp. 28 ff.

<sup>7</sup> For the use of this term in reference to W. Theiler's article [in: *Les Sources de Plotin*, pp. 65-86], see J. M. Rist, *Plotinus: The Road to Reality*, p. 174.

<sup>8</sup> R. Harder, in: *Les Sources de Plotin*, p. 329.

well consider, at least, a viewpoint such as the following: "The Stoicism that Plotinus feels obliged to attack is perhaps more a state of mind than the theories of any particular philosopher. . .".<sup>1</sup>

It must seem almost impossible to give a complete or comprehensive account of all the problems arising from the influence of Stoic philosophy on the writings of Plotinus. However, it seems necessary to point out some of those questions concerning the *material* and the *formal* aspects of this particular case of *Quellenforschung*.<sup>2</sup>

[a] When Plotinus uses what we can more or less identify as Stoic doctrines, either to criticize or to accept them, without mentioning any name, there is hardly any sign or indication as to which particular Stoic philosopher he may have in mind;<sup>3</sup> this is certainly true as far as the writings of the older Stoics are concerned.

[b] Strictly speaking, we cannot even say whether he quotes distinct passages. It is well known that no Neoplatonist would ever have worked as precisely as, for example, Aristotle or Sextus Empiricus did when presenting doxographical material. They felt free to "quote" from memory, especially as far as the dialogues of Plato are concerned; and Plotinus, whether he had read the writings of the Stoics in the original or not, is in most cases hardly likely to have relied on anything but his memory.<sup>4</sup>

Such a generalization, however, cannot be accepted as true without any qualification. The fact that Plotinus does not follow his "sources" in a way analytically definable by modern scholars,<sup>5</sup> certainly does not warrant the assumption that he did not have an intimate knowledge of texts relevant to the discussion. Indeed, the very opposite assumption is true, if one considers the kind of approach to Aristotle's *De Anima* and Alexander's works that is pursued, for example, in IV 3.<sup>6</sup> The impression that Plotinus must

<sup>1</sup> J. M. Rist, *Plotinus: The Road to Reality*, p. 174.

<sup>2</sup> See above, pp. 2-3 and n. 4.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. also H.-R. Schwyzer, *R.E.* XLI [s.v. *Plotinos*] (1951), coll. 576, 56-66.

<sup>4</sup> Porphyry's account in *Vit. Plot.* 8, 8-11 applies only to the procedure peculiar to Plotinus' lecturing [from 14, 5-7 we may infer that Stoic treatises were not read in such "courses"]; 14, 10 might be taken as supporting such an assumption.

<sup>5</sup> See H. Dörrie, in: *Les Sources de Plotin*, p. 447.

<sup>6</sup> See the brilliant analysis by P. Henry, in: *Les Sources de Plotin*, pp. 429-444, and also the article by H. J. Blumenthal referred to above, p. 2 n. 3.



have had these texts at hand when working on an account of the Peripatetic doctrines seems to be inevitable. Careful analysis might be successful in providing criteria by which Plotinus' method of working may be more clearly understood, at least in respect to the Peripatetic tradition, the basic works of which, so far as they were relevant to Neoplatonism, are extant.

The textual evidence for the rather voluminous *corpus* of writings of the older Stoics, however, is very scanty. Both collections, the one by H. von Arnim [S.V.F.] and H. Diels' *Doxographi Graeci* are far from being complete and consequently suffer from the fact that detailed information and an evaluation of the texts to be taken into account could not be provided; the state of the tradition of the older Stoics very much resembles a *Trümmerfeld*.<sup>1</sup> Thus, there cannot be any doubt that so far as the material collected and to be referred to in the S.V.F. is concerned, we certainly do not have sufficient textual evidence to enable us to say that any particular treatise now lost was likely to have been a source for Plotinus. One would not be mistaken in considering those resemblances to be *loci paralleli* rather than *fontes*.<sup>2</sup>

We do know for a fact, however, that Plotinus had read, for example, Alexander's *De Fato* and *De Mixtione*, and he might thus have been acquainted with such viewpoints as were held by Chrysippus and others.<sup>3</sup> It is certainly not without interest to observe how Plotinus in IV 7, for example, counters Stoic opinions with Peripatetic arguments, and *vice versa*, refutes the Atomists' position with Stoic objections.

[c] Plotinus' method of work, it has been said, especially when he deals with Stoic material, has the characteristics peculiar to the unhistorical approach, adopted to some extent by all Neoplatonists. That is to say, we find hardly any criteria by means of which our knowledge of the textual backgrounds of the doxographical accounts could be substantially improved or even modified. Thus, it might not even be possible to challenge the current *opinio communis* as expressed, for example, in the following statement: "*Meist wird man sich damit begnügen müssen, das eine oder andere*

<sup>1</sup> A. Graeser, *Gnomon* XLI (1969), p. 11, n. 1.

<sup>2</sup> See H.-R. Schwyzer, in: *Les Sources de Plotin*, p. 88.

<sup>3</sup> It seems that Simplicius was the first to say that Stoic books were becoming rare (*In Cat.* 63A16 [pointed out by L. Edelstein, *A.J.P.* LVII (1936), p. 323, n. 132]).

*als stoisch zu bezeichnen und die Frage nach dem ersten Entdecker offenzulassen''*.<sup>1</sup>

[d] Another problem arises in connection with the question of the extent to which Plotinus' cosmology may have been indebted to views held by Posidonius.<sup>2</sup> It is at present difficult to say in what sense Posidonius, though he was undoubtedly the most outstanding philosophical personality of the first century B.C., must also be considered the representative figure of what, since A. Schmekel,<sup>3</sup> we are accustomed to understand as the middle period of Stoicism. Could Plotinus ever have come across the writings of Posidonius? <sup>4</sup>

As a matter of fact, the *Posidonius-Question* <sup>5</sup> has not yet been solved,<sup>6</sup> and a solution is presumably still far from being reached.<sup>7</sup> Regardless of this problem, however, there is certainly considerable evidence to show, as scholars have already done, that Plotinus actually made use of doctrines which can be related to Stoicism. Whether these doctrines in question [see below I, 2] have to be attributed to Posidonius or not is a problem in itself.<sup>8</sup> A just evaluation of this particular phenomenon must necessarily appear extremely difficult; however, even if one feels reluctant about attributing to Posidonius much of importance in connection with the origin of Neoplatonism itself, it still seems justifiable to say that, with

<sup>1</sup> H.-R. Schwyzer, *R.E.* XLI (1951), col. 576, 63-66.

<sup>2</sup> For a well-balanced account of all the available attested information [confined to direct evidence] on Posidonius, see L. Edelstein, *A.J.P.* LVII (1936), pp. 286-325.

<sup>3</sup> *Die Philosophie der mittleren Stoa* (Berlin, 1892).

<sup>4</sup> W. Jaeger in *Nemesios von Emesa* (Berlin, 1914), p. 68 asserts that by the end of the IV. century nobody any longer read Posidonius and that few knew his name; see also L. Edelstein, *A.J.P.* LVII (1936), p. 323, and from the philological point of view, H.-R. Schwyzer, in: *Les Sources de Plotin*, p. 88.

<sup>5</sup> For its history, see K. Reinhardt, *R.E.* XXI, 2 [s.v. *Poseidonios*] (1956), coll. 570-623.

<sup>6</sup> Certainly not in the monograph by M. Laffranque, *Poseidonios d'Apamée. Essai de mise au point* (Paris, 1964), but consult also J. M. Rist, *Stoic Philosophy* (Cambridge, 1969), pp. 201-202.

<sup>7</sup> Cf. O. Gigon [in his review of G. Pfligersdorfer's work] *A.G.P.* XLIV (1962), p. 92.

<sup>8</sup> It must be kept in mind that the *Posidonius-Picture* as developed by W. Jaeger, *Nemesios von Emesa* [see above, p. 17, n. 33], K. Reinhardt, *Poseidonios* (Munich, 1919), *Kosmos und Sympathie* (Munich, 1921), W. Theiler, *Die Vorbereitung des Neuplatonismus*, pp. 61 ff., and R. E. Witt, "Plotinus and Posidonius", *C.Q.* XXIV (1930), pp. 198-207 is a construction which is not based on testimonia confined to direct evidence.

Neoplatonism, there arose a speculative tendency which was likely to have favoured and to have endorsed the acceptance of thoughts originally peculiar to "platonizing Stoicism".<sup>1</sup>

[e] Characteristic features of such a speculative tendency, traces of which are also to be found in the emerging Neopythagoreanism [Nigidius Figulus etc.], already apply to the beginnings of the Pre-Neoplatonism movement, to which the writings of Philo of Alexandria bear witness.<sup>2</sup> The rather controversial question [see W. Theiler in the article just mentioned] whether Philo himself was indebted to Antiochus or to Eudorus in particular, is a matter that need not be discussed here. In any case, Philo's metaphysical and cosmological views show a rather intimate affinity with Platonic doctrines, as well as with those held by the Stoic school; moreover they show some original attempts at a reconciliation of the Platonic and Stoic elements. [We observe something similar in the pseudo-Aristotelian treatise *De Mundo* <sup>3</sup> which, however, represents a "peculiar blend of Heraclitean, Stoic, and Peripatetic philosophy, in which . . . the Peripatetic point of view predominates"<sup>4</sup>.] Such an attempt had probably been made by Ammonius, the teacher of Plotinus.<sup>5</sup> It is the relation between Plotinus, Ammonius and Numenius,<sup>6</sup> on the one hand, and the relation between the latter and Philo,<sup>7</sup> on the other, that raises the question to what extent the writings of Philo could have affected the "stoicizing" of Neoplatonism also.

In any case, scholars have tried to prove that Plotinus was also

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<sup>1</sup> K. Reinhardt's account in *R.E.* XXI, 2 (1956), coll. 820, 43-821, 9 is opposed by the opinion held by L. Edelstein: "Posidonius, such as he really is, cannot influence his own or later generations to any considerable extent. . . Posidonius' philosophy is opposite to Neoplatonism" (*A.J.P.* LVII [1936], pp. 322, 324).

<sup>2</sup> See W. Theiler, "Philo von Alexandrien und der Beginn des kaiserzeitlichen Platonismus", in: *Parusia* (Frankfurt, 1965), pp. 119 ff., and "Philo von Alexandria und der hellenisierte Timaeus", in: *Philomathes* (The Hague, 1971), pp. 25-35.

<sup>3</sup> See H. Strohm, "Studien zur Schrift von der Welt", *M.H.* IX (1952), pp. 137-175 [with particular emphasis on the Platonic elements].

<sup>4</sup> P. Merlan, in: *C.H.L.G.E.M.P.*, p. 131.

<sup>5</sup> Cf. Hierocles, in Photius, *Cod.* 461A31.

<sup>6</sup> See partially E. R. Dodds, in: *Les Sources de Plotin*, pp. 3-32.

<sup>7</sup> For some characteristic tendencies of Middle-Platonism, see [besides the articles by W. Theiler (p. 7 n. 2)] H. Dörrie, in: *Les Sources de Plotin*, pp. 193-223.

influenced by Philo.<sup>1</sup> There is, however, only one slight piece of evidence that might support the rather nebulous assumption that Plotinus had actually read some Philo.<sup>2</sup> Generally speaking, the philological evidence on which philosophical criticism has to rely in such cases is very weak; and even if the assumption that Numenius knew Philo were correct, one would certainly not be allowed to conjecture that Plotinus, when studying Numenius, must have come across the writings of Philo.<sup>3</sup>

From the philosophical point of view, however, the suggestion that at least three doctrines held by Plotinus very much resemble those held by Philo<sup>4</sup> seems persuasive.<sup>5</sup> [Thus, the assumption that Plotinus could have been influenced in any way whatever by Philo's writings should not lightly be ruled out because the relevant philological evidence is lacking].<sup>6</sup> Yet, the question indicated above [p. 7] can scarcely be answered, and it will not be answered in the course of this investigation. Many of those arguments relevant, for example, to a "stoicizing theodicy" as proposed by Plotinus in I 8, II 9, III 1, III 2-3, certainly very much resemble passages from Philo's *De Providentia*. These, however, even in the time of Cicero, were almost commonplaces and might in such instances be related more especially to Chrysippus.

[f] Finally, there remains one further problem to be dealt with. It concerns the development of later Stoic philosophy. Generally speaking, it is of course true, that the "platonizing" of Stoicism continues, with the result that analysis in many cases shows a peculiar blend of old Stoicism, Plato's *Phaedo* [and presumably passages from Aristotle's lost dialogue, *Eudemos* 7] and, in partic-

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<sup>1</sup> Cf. esp. H. Guyot, *Les Reminiscences de Philon le Juif chez Plotin* (Paris, 1906).

<sup>2</sup> Cf. I 6 (1) 7-8, also VI 8 (9) 11, and Philo, *Leg. Alleg.* 2, 56, for which see E. R. Dodds, *Pagan and Christian in an Age of Anxiety*, pp. 94-95.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. H.-R. Schwyzer, *R.E.* XLI (1951), coll. 575, 29-576, 55, and W. Theiler, in: *Philomathes*, pp. 29, n. 5.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. H. Guyot, *L'infinité divine chez Plotin* (Paris, 1906), pp. 5-7, 33-35, 56-57, 60-63, 69-74.

<sup>5</sup> See, however, the well-balanced account by H.-R. Schwyzer, *R.E.* XLI (1951), coll. 575, 60-576, 55.

<sup>6</sup> Cf. A. Graeser, *Gnomon* XLIII (1971), p. 13.

<sup>7</sup> Much information can be expected from the forthcoming edition by O. Gigon; see his "Prolegomena to an Edition of the Eudemos", in: *Aristotle and Plato in the Mid-Fourth Century* [Papers of the *Symposium Aristotelicum* held at Oxford, August, 1957, edited by I. Düring and G. E. L. Owen]

ular, Posidonius' reception of Platonism and Aristotelianism<sup>1</sup>.

This phenomenon certainly deserves more specific attention than is given to it in the account by P. Merlan in *C.H.L.G.E.M.P.* (pp. 124-132).<sup>2</sup> No serious attempt has yet been undertaken to analyse the writings of Seneca, Epictetus, Marcus Aurelius, and Hierocles within the context of later Greek philosophy.<sup>3</sup> Plotinus, to be sure, had read such treatises;<sup>4</sup> and one may say with confidence, even with regard to later Stoicism, that "within the sphere of ancient thought Stoic subjectivism . . . is the presupposition of Plotinus' idealism".<sup>5</sup>

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(Göteborg, 1961), pp. 19-31, also see A. Graeser, *Probleme der platonischen Seelenteilungslehre* (Munich, 1969), pp. 96 ff.

<sup>1</sup> By this I understand, contrary to the current trend of scholarship based on the works of K. Reinhardt and W. Theiler (e.g. R. Neuenschwander, *Marc Aurels Beziehungen zu Seneca und Poseidonios* [Berne, 1958]), a peculiar interpretation of Plato and Aristotle, rather than a specific Posidonian philosophy.

<sup>2</sup> See also W. Ehrhardt's remarks in: *Gymnasium* LXXV (1968), p. 404.

<sup>3</sup> For some slight attempts within a limited aspect, see e.g. A. Bodson, *La Morale sociale des derniers Stoiciens; Sénèque, Epictète et Marc Aurèle* (Paris, 1957); a valuable work is O. Gigon's, *Die antike Kultur und das Christentum* (Gütersloh, 1966), pp. 54-69.

<sup>4</sup> This can be shown particularly with regard to Epictetus (see M. Spanneut, *R.A.C.* [s.v. *Epictetus*] Vol. V [1963], coll. 619-629), see below, part I, 3.

<sup>5</sup> L. Edelstein, *The Meaning of Stoicism* (Cambridge Mass., 1967), p. 96; see also A. H. Armstrong, in: *C.H.L.G.E.M.P.*, p. 249.



PART ONE  
PRESENTATION OF THE MATERIAL





## CHAPTER ONE

### PLOTINUS AND THE OLDER STOICS

S.V.F. 1,85

[# 1]

Plotinus apparently knows that the Stoics hold ὅλη to be ἄποιος (cf. e.g. IV 7 [2] 3,8 or II 4 [12] 1,9).<sup>1</sup> [Whether antiquity had always been aware of the fact that the ambiguity entailed in this word [“without quality” and “inert”] must have suited Zeno’s purpose well with regard to the ontological concept of πρώτη ὅλη (cf. S.V.F. Vol. I, p. 24,6-7) is a problem in itself that need not be discussed here].

In both passages referred to and elsewhere, Plotinus makes use of this doctrine in order to argue against the materialist views held by the Stoics on the nature of Soul and God. Within the context of his treatment of the Stoic categories (VI 1 [42] 25-31), Plotinus points out the systematic difficulties in which the Stoics become entangled when assuming that the principle of Being is without quality [and without form] (cf. VI 1 [42] 26,9).<sup>2</sup>

It is, however, highly interesting to realize that Plotinus himself could firmly claim that matter is without quality (cf. I 8 [51] 10, 1-16 and II 4 [12] 8, 1-14) and yet did not subscribe at all to the Stoics’ opinion. For, contrary to the Stoics,<sup>3</sup> who held that matter, though being ἄποιος and even ἄμορφος,<sup>4</sup> is of a bodily nature and capable of receiving “impressions” and “modifications” (cf. Simplicius, *In Phys.* 227, 23), Plotinus postulated that prime matter must be considered ἀσώματος, self-identical, and thus free from any kind of “affection”.

Admittedly, both the Stoics’ and the Neoplatonists’ ideas of

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<sup>1</sup> See also S.V.F. 2, 316, and M. Pohlenz, *Die Stoa*<sup>3</sup> (Göttingen, 1964), Vol. II, p. 42.

<sup>2</sup> For a more comprehensive account, see “Plotinus on the Stoic Categories of Being” in Part II.

<sup>3</sup> See the anti-Stoic account in III 6 (26) 6, 3-7 [with E. Brehier’s remarks in *Plotin, Ennéades*, Vol. III, p. 91], and VI 1 (42) 27, 2 ff., where it is said that the Stoic principle has the ontological status of absolute Non-Being.

<sup>4</sup> According to Posidonius (cf. Arius Didymus *Phys. Fr.* 20 = *Dox. Graec.* 458, = Posidonius; F 92, Edelstein-Kidd). The systematic difficulty was pointed out by R. Hirzel, *Untersuchungen zu Ciceros philosophischen Schriften*, Vol. II (Berlin, 1882), p. 756, n. 1.

ὕλη developed <sup>1</sup> out of the continuous discussion of Plato's account in the *Timaeus* of χώρα as ὑποδοχή τῆς γενέσεως,<sup>2</sup> which is supposed to be ἄπειρος. In the same sense, Democritus might have spoken about his concept of "what is not" as ἄπειρος.<sup>3</sup> However, the history of this misinterpretation of Plato's *Timaeus* 48E2 ff. [i.e. the assumption that Plato's χώρα was meant to be taken as ὕλη] was initiated by Aristotle.<sup>4</sup>

Moreover, in the Platonist tradition there arises a tendency to understand Plato's concept of "matter" approximating the notions of the Stoics (cf. Albinus, *Isagoge* 163, 5 H., also 162, 31. 35 H.; see also Plutarch, *De Is.* c. 58-59). Thus, Plotinus' views <sup>5</sup> might be taken, I presume, also as an implicit criticism of such stoicizing within the Platonist tradition.

It is necessary, however, to point out briefly another aspect of this particular problem. In post-Hellenistic Platonism, such a discussion of Plato's concept of "matter" tends to be connected with the question concerning Plato's views on the origin of "evil".<sup>6</sup> We know that Aristotle himself objected to the tendency among some Platonists to consider matter to be the primary source of "evil" (cf. *Metaph.* 1075A35, 1091B35). For example, Plutarch also, though certainly for a different reason, shares Aristotle's criticism of such a further exaggeration of Plato's concept of "hyle"<sup>7</sup> and thus employs terms like ἀδιάφορος and ἄπειρος (cf. *De An. Procr. in Tim.* 1014F, 1015A, 1015D),<sup>8</sup> which he may have adopted inten-

<sup>1</sup> See the useful account by J. Moreau, *L'Âme du Monde de Platon aux Stoiciens* (Paris, 1937), pp. 158 ff.

<sup>2</sup> For which see D. J. Schulz, *Das Problem der Materie in Platons Timaios* (Bonn, 1966), pp. 31-39.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. Plotinus' remarks in II 4 (12) 10, 5-11; for Plato, *Timaeus* 52B, see A. Graeser, *Probleme der platonischen Seelenteilungslehre*, p. 80, n. 33.

<sup>4</sup> For comprehensive accounts, see J. B. Skemp, "ΤΑΗ and ΥΠΟΔΟΧΗ", in: *Aristotle and Plato in the Mid-Fourth Century*, pp. 201-212, and D. Keyt, "Aristotle on Plato's Receptacle", *A.J.P.* LXXXI (1961), pp. 291-300.

<sup>5</sup> For fuller accounts, see e.g. J. Trouillard, *La Procession Plotinienne* (Paris, 1955), pp. 14-29, C. Rutten, *Les Catégories du Monde sensible dans les Ennéades de Plotin* (Paris, 1961), pp. 30-32, and particularly P.-P. Matter, *Der Einfluss des platonischen "Timaios" auf das Denken Plotins*, pp. 200-217.

<sup>6</sup> For a good account of the history of this discussion, see F.-P. Hager, "Die Materie und das Böse im antiken Platonismus", *M.H.* XIX (1961), pp. 73-103.

<sup>7</sup> On the basis of G. Vlastos, "The Disorderly Motion in the *Timaeus*", *C.Q.* XXXIII (1939), pp. 80-82, such an assumption does not seem wrong.

<sup>8</sup> Cf. Aristotle, *Metaph.* 1029A20.

tionally from the Stoics, in order to show that there is nothing "evil" about matter.

Plotinus, however, although speaking of matter as something ἄποιος etc., firmly holds that *hyle* is the "first evil".<sup>1</sup> Yet, speaking of matter in Aristotelian terms<sup>2</sup> as the ἔσχατον ὑποκείμενον and applying to it the idea of Non-Being, as expressed by Plato in *Republic* 477A10, with the result that *hyle* is τὸ ὄντως μὴ ὄν,<sup>3</sup> Plotinus clearly takes the Stoic term ἄποιος in a specific sense, viz. that which is implicit in ἄμορφος and ἀνείδεος (cf. I 8 [51] 3, 14. 31 and I 6 [1] 3, 13-14). That is to say, both attributes have reference to something which, so a Platonist would claim, does not share existence.<sup>4</sup> Plotinus also uses ἄμορφος and ἀνείδεος in reference to the Meta-subsistence of the One (cf. VI 9 [8] 3, 43 and 3, 39), which is considered to have transcended even the level of real existence. Thus, Plotinus concludes that the *modus essendi* of ὕλη must be that of absolute Non-Being, since the essential property of *hyle* is its incapability of receiving form [i.e. Being].<sup>5</sup> In saying this, Plotinus apparently holds a position contrary to the Stoics' point of view, according to which matter alone has real subsistence [i.e. underived Being], whereas the multiple "affections" of this one οὐσία have subsistence only in the mind. It is not at all surprising that Plotinus, charging the Stoics with confusion of the scale of ontological priority, claims that they take Non-Being as the principle from which everything comes into existence (cf. VI 1 [42] 28, 1 ff.).

S.V.F. I, 93

[ # 2 ]

Plotinus, in his treatment of *Time and Eternity* (III 7 [45]),<sup>6</sup> in

<sup>1</sup> Further, see J. M. Rist, "Plotinus on Matter and Evil", *Phronesis* VI (1961), pp. 154-166.

<sup>2</sup> For a good discussion of the tendency of Aristotle's concept, see H. F. Kriings, *Fragen und Aufgaben der Ontologie* (Tübingen 1954), p. 54, and Plotinus' remarks in II 4 (12) 10, 5-11.

<sup>3</sup> This Plotinian inference is, in view of Plato's philosophy, scarcely correct, for neither does e.g. *Republic* 477A10 apply to "matter" (but rather to the epistemological level of ἀγνώσια), nor does Plato speak in the *Timaeus* of χώρα as being something that does not have existence. See A. Graeser, *Probleme der platonischen Seelenteilungslehre*, pp. 80-81.

<sup>4</sup> To think of existence as a predicate is common to pre-Kantian ontology (for Kant himself, see *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, B 620-630). The problem, as it concerns Plato's philosophy, has been expounded by G. Vlastos, "A Metaphysical Paradox", *P.A.A.P.A.* XXXIX (1966), pp. 5-19.

<sup>5</sup> See also H.-R. Schlette, *Das Eine und das Andere* (Munich, 1966), p. 147.

<sup>6</sup> For this treatise, see G. H. Clark, "The Theory of Time in Plotinus", *P.R.* LIII (1944), pp. 337-358, H. Jonas, "Zeit und Existenz", in: *Politische*

order to interpret and to restate the famous account by Plato in *Timaeus* 37D ff.,<sup>1</sup> has to pay particular attention to the definition proposed by the Stoics: <sup>2</sup> διάστημα τῆς τοῦ κόσμου κινήσεως (cf. III 7 [45] 7, 1). For, as in the case referred to above [≠ 1], a Platonic doctrine had, within the scope of "stoicizing Platonism", become associated with an opinion held by the Stoics. The philosopher who favoured this association seems to have been Antiochus (cf. Philo, *De Op. Mundi* 26, *De Act. Mundi* 53).<sup>3</sup> In any case, the Platonists of the school of Gaius apparently relied on such an interpretation as had presumably been proposed by Antiochus (see Albinus, *Isagoge* 170, 21 H., Apuleius, *De Plat.* 1, 10 [p. 92 Thomas], and the Platonist in D.L. 3, 73), which is to say that "time" was supposed to be measurable according to the διάστημα τῆς τοῦ κόσμου κινήσεως, but that it was *indicated* merely by phases.

It might be worth-while to notice that Zeno, according to Simplicius, *In Cat.* 88, 2 [= S.V.F. 2, 510], spoke of time simply as πάσης κινήσεως διάστημα,<sup>4</sup> whereas Chrysippus, we are told, defined it specifically as διάστημα τῆς τοῦ κόσμου κινήσεως. By mentioning εἰ δὲ τῆς τοῦ παντὸς διάστημα (8, 30-31), Plotinus probably refers to the definition attributed to the latter (cf. S.V.F. 2, 509). When Plotinus proceeds to present his own account, he offers an explanation that implicitly reverses the position held by the Stoics, viz. that it is the movement of the cosmos that is measured in accordance with time. That is to say, the heavens' periodic rotation indicates and reveals (δηλοῦν: 12, 47. 59; δῆλωσις: 12, 27. 49 etc.) only the time, or rather, phase in which it happens to take place (cf. 12, 49 ff.). Thus, time is by no means primarily a measure of movement, but only *per accidens*,<sup>5</sup> (12, 40 ff., also VI 1 [42] 5, 14).

*Ordnung und menschliche Existenz* [Festgabe f. E. Vöggelin] (Munich, 1962), pp. 295-319, and particularly the commented edition by W. Beierwalters, *Zeit und Ewigkeit bei Plotin* (Frankfurt, 1965).

<sup>1</sup> For valuable remarks, see G. E. L. Owen, "Plato and Parmenides on the Timeless Present", *Monist* L (1968), pp. 317-340.

<sup>2</sup> Important testimonia are S.V.F. 2, 509, 513; for a general introduction, see V. Goldschmidt, *Le Système et l'Idée de Temps* (Paris, 1959), pp. 30-95, and also J. M. Rist, *Stoic Philosophy*, pp. 273-288.

<sup>3</sup> See P.-P. Matter, *Der Einfluss des platonischen "Timaios" auf das Denken Plotins*, p. 196.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. the discussion of S. Sambursky, *Physics of the Stoics* (London, 1959), p. 101.

<sup>5</sup> It is interesting to observe how Aristotle's theory (for which see particularly P. C. Cohnen, *Die Zeittheorie des Aristoteles* [Munich 1964], pp. 117-155) is looked upon from a new angle.

S.V.F. 1, 98

[ # 3 ]

In V 8 (31) 12, 20-21 [ὥς ποτὲ βουλευσαμένου τοῦ ποιούντος ποιεῖν] Plotinus argues against those who say that, whereas the intelligible abides, the sensible world comes into being and perishes, as if at a particular time the creator decides to create.

One may certainly conjecture that Plotinus' criticism is, as is apparent in II 9 (33) 4, 5 ff., directed against a Gnostic interpretation of Plato's *Timaeus* <sup>1</sup> [that Plato's "cosmogony" was open to various misunderstandings is indicated by the mere fact that in Plato's school there was a discussion as to whether Plato believed in a creation of the cosmos].<sup>2</sup>

For, that τοῦ νοητοῦ μένοντος can scarcely have any reference to Aristotle, is in any case evident anyhow; Aristotle, as we also know from accounts of a lost work (*De Philosophia* [?]. Fr. 19, Walzer/Ross),<sup>3</sup> may have said τίνος ἕνεκα φθερεῖ ὁ θεός, and then have raised the question as to why there should be any reason for assuming a μετένοια in the deity's mind. Plotinus' reasoning in II 9 (33) 4, 17-18 is similar. Though the conjecture that Plotinus was aiming at a paradox entailed in the Gnostics' exaggeration of Plato's *Timaeus* seems rather persuasive, one might well also think of the Stoics. Neither the extremely Platonizing context, however, nor the mentioning of the intelligible pattern, really favour this conjecture. On the other hand, the term τοῦ ποιούντος and the rather nebulous opinion held by the Stoics that the destruction and creation of the world take place κατὰ τινὰς εἰμαρμένους χρόνους (cf. S.V.F. Vol. I, p. 27, 15-16) might well fit the assumption that Plotinus was begging a question [i.e. especially with regard to the fatalistic and voluntaristic elements in the Stoics' conception of the deity]. Yet one would have to assume that Plotinus did not, even for the sake of an argument, feel hesitant about attributing to the "surviving" Stoic deity [Zeus being the πῦρ τεχνικόν] <sup>4</sup> the characteristics of an intelligible pattern. The Stoics, of course, considered the divinity to be νοερόν (cf. S.V.F. 1, 111, 120). But could Plotinus have gone so far as to accept this νοερόν as a kind of νοητόν? In view

<sup>1</sup> See W. Theiler's commentary (Vol. IIIb), p. 397.

<sup>2</sup> For an analysis of Plato's statements, see G. Vlastos, "Creation in the *Timaeus*: is it a Fiction?", in: *Studies in Plato's Metaphysics* (London, 1967), pp. 401-419.

<sup>3</sup> From Philo, *De Aet. Mundi* 8, 39-43.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. Plutarch, *De Stoic. Repugn.* 1052C [= S.V.F. 2, 604].

of Plotinus' polemics against the materialist Stoic deity <sup>1</sup> (cf. VI 1 [42] 26-27 = S.V.F. 2, 313-314, or II 4 [12] 1), such an assumption does not really seem justifiable. And yet, the way in which Plotinus customarily draws inferences, quite often amazing ones, can be of such a kind that one might well be reluctant to rule out the possibility of his attacking the Stoics, even if the approach normally taken towards them would not favour such an assumption.

S.V.F. 1, 202

[# 4]

The only Stoic theorem that Plotinus considers worthy of a separate treatise (II 7 [37]) is their doctrine of κρᾶσις δι' ὅλων.<sup>2</sup> He may have become interested in this phenomenon when reading Alexander's *De Mixtione*, parts of which are to be recognized in II 7; in the earlier treatise IV 7 (2) 8<sup>2</sup>, Plotinus had already dealt with the problem of σωμάτων κρᾶσις—in reference to the Stoics' opinion of the nature of soul.

It is understandable that the Stoics should be attached to this doctrine, not least because it could serve as a theoretical foundation for their dogma that "body" and "soul" are thoroughly intermixed (cf. Alexander, *De Mixtione* 217, 32 ff.).<sup>3</sup>

Thus, Plotinus' objection to the theory of σωμάτων κρᾶσις <sup>4</sup> [as developed in IV 2 (2) 8<sup>2</sup>, 1-22] is particularly concerned with such an identification of "soul" and "body". That is to say, Plotinus appears to be obliged to attack a Stoic notion for the simple reason that he had to refute its consequences if it was to be applied—as it was—to the relation of soul and body. It is perhaps interesting to observe that his objection in 8<sup>2</sup>, 20 [οὐ τοίνυν ὅλον δι' ὅλου χωρεῖν δυνατόν τὸ σῶμα] evokes the kind of criticism that had been put forward by Alexander (esp. cf. *De An. Mant.* 139, 30-141, 28) and was based on Aristotle's opinion that οὐδὲ γὰρ δύο σώματα ἅμα δυνατόν ἐστὶν ἐν αὐτῷ εἶναι (*De Anima* 418B17) in opposition to which the Stoic doctrine is meant to be taken.

However, the later treatise II 7 (37), although it rejects the

<sup>1</sup> Cf. W. Theiler, in: *Les Sources de Plotin*, p. 66.

<sup>2</sup> For some good remarks, consult J. Moreau, *L'Âme du Monde de Platon aux Stoiciens*, pp. 162-164; the theory makes sense if the modern concept of "field" is applied to it (cf. S. Sambursky, *Physics of the Stoics*, p. 7).

<sup>3</sup> It is also Alexander who observed (*De Mixtione* 216, 14 = S.V.F. 2, 478) the essential link between the doctrine of κρᾶσις δι' ὅλων and the theory of συμπάθεια [for which see below, pp. 68 ff.].

<sup>4</sup> It is already attested for Zeno by Arius Didymus, *Phys. Fr.* 38 [= *Dox. Graec.* 270, 4].

Stoic dogma of infinite divisibility (I, 11, 22) <sup>1</sup> and thus an essential entailment of the doctrine in question, seems to treat the problem *per se* quite favourably. In other words, Plotinus tends to justify the Stoic notion as such. It is at present, not so necessary to point out how Plotinus, facing a physical problem raised by the Stoics, suggests in a way reminiscent of Aristotle that *σωματότης* itself is *λόγος τις* or *εἶδος τι* rather than *τὸ ἐκ πασῶν τῶν ποιότητων σὺν ὅλῃ*; it is important to understand why Plotinus became interested in this problem at all. The answer to this question is twofold, both aspects of which concern problems connected with the interpretation of the philosophy of Plato himself.

[1] From Porphyry (*Vit. Plot.* 13, 11) we know that the teacher and his student were discussing the previously often raised problem,<sup>2</sup> πῶς ἡ ψυχὴ σύνεστι τῷ σώματι. Later, Porphyry himself wrote a treatise on this topic,<sup>3</sup> which had been outlined by Nemesius (*De Natura Hominis*, pp. 125-137 Matth.). The basic task, as it must have appeared to Ammonius,<sup>4</sup> Plotinus, and Porphyry, was to make sense of the implications entailed in Plato's doctrine that "soul" σώματι χρῆται <sup>5</sup> (Cf. *Enn.* I 1 [53] 1, 3; II 3 [52] 15, 24; VI 7 [38] 4, 10, 5, 27) and that "body" is in "soul", rather than "soul" in "body" <sup>6</sup> (cf. III 9 [13] 3, 2; esp. V 5 [32] 9, 29; IV 3 [27] 22, 7). In any case, for our purpose it will suffice to point to the fact that the explanation of the unity of "soul" and "body", and of the penetration of the first by the latter, tends to be given in Stoic terms, for example, ὅλη δι' ὅλου χωρεῖ (Nemesius, *De Nat. Hom.* 134, 9 Matth.), or ἀσώματος γὰρ οὖσα δι' ὅλου κεχώρηκεν [scil. "soul"] (*op. cit.* 133, 2). That is to say, the Platonists, although they object to the Stoic

<sup>1</sup> Cf. *S.V.F.* 2, 482 [for which see below, p. 40 in ≠ 36].

<sup>2</sup> Cf. e.g. Cicero, *Tusc. Disp.* 1, 71, Sextus Empiricus, *Adv. Math.* 9, 81, and Philo, *De Ebr.* 101.

<sup>3</sup> For the title of which, see the discussion by H. Dörrie, *Porphyrios' "Symmiktá Zetemata"* (Munich, 1959), p. 17.

<sup>4</sup> See Nemesius, *De Nat. Hom.* 129, 9.

<sup>5</sup> Cf. *Phaedo* 79C, *Phaedrus* 246B, *Timaeus* 30B.

<sup>6</sup> Cf. Plato's *Timaeus* 34B, 36B; see also the paraphrase in D.L. 3, 67-68, and Albinus, *Isagoge* 170, 3 ff., Porphyry, *De Abstinencia* 2, 37. Useful and still valuable is the article by H.-R. Schwyzer, "Zu Plotins Interpretation von Platons Tim. 35A", *Rh. M.* LXXXIV (1935), pp. 360 ff.; for the various applications of this idea see e.g., H. Dörrie, *Porphyrios' "Symmiktá Zetemata"*, pp. 119 ff., J. M. Rist, *Plotinus: The Road to Reality*, pp. 189-198, and particularly J. Hirschberger, "Seele und Leib in der Spätantike", *S.B.Univ. Frankfurt VIII* (Wiesbaden, 1969), pp. 5-22.

proposition that "soul" *qua* body penetrates "body", believe that a penetration of material entities by immaterial substances is possible almost in the way expounded by the Stoics (cf. IV 7 [2] 8<sup>2</sup>, 1 f.: "Ἐπεὶ εἰ σῶμα οὖσα ἡ ψυχὴ διήλθε δι' παντός, καὶ κρᾶθεῖσα ἐΐη, 8<sup>2</sup>, 20 f.: οὐ τοίνυν ὅλον δι' ὅλου χωρεῖν δυνατόν τὸ σῶμα, ἡ δὲ ψυχὴ δι' ὅλων ἁσώματος ἄρα). Thus, the Stoic doctrine had been modified in the sense that "soul", although it penetrates the "body", does not receive the attributes of the body that it affects, whereas the body does [i.e. it becomes a living body]. It seems evident that such a Platonist response to the Stoic theory of mixture must have suited well the Neoplatonist purpose of combining their doctrine of the existence of immanent ideas with the other concerning the problem of the ontological unity of the material and the immaterial entities, warranted by the unifying function of the soul.<sup>1</sup> Such a viewpoint, "*wonach ein der physikalischen Gesetzmäßigkeit vergleichbares Gesetz der metaphysischen Einigung alle Aporien löst*",<sup>2</sup> seems to have been elaborated by Ammonius (cf. Nemesius, *De Nat. Hom.* 129, 9 Matth.); we do not know for certain, however, that it was Ammonius himself who expressed the Platonists' point of view in the form of a reply to the physical doctrine held by the Stoic school.<sup>3</sup> What we read in Nemesius, *loc. cit.* "is not a 'fragment of Ammonius' but a well-known doctrine of Plotinus and Porphyry which the latter believed had already been held in substance by Ammonius".<sup>4</sup>

[2] Moreover, Plotinus presumably found in this Stoic doctrine, which was meant to apply to the phenomenon of the interaction and blending of bodily entities, a close resemblance to notions implicit in the Platonists' construction of the intelligible world; that is to say, the conditions imposed on this concept as such could be true for the Neoplatonists' speculation with regard to the level of immaterial

<sup>1</sup> For Plotinus, see VI 9 (8) 1, 42 [see also below, pp. 72 ff.]; this idea is most clearly dealt with by Proclus, *Elem. Theol.* Prop. XIII [p. 14, 24 Dodds], but see also Albinus, *Isagoge* 169, 21 H., and Plotinus IV 7 (2) 12, 10 with regard to Plato's *Timaeus* 30B.

<sup>2</sup> H. Dörrie, *Porphyrios* "Symmiktā Zetemata", p. 54.

<sup>3</sup> H. Dörrie, *Porphyrios* "Symmiktā Zetemata", p. 55, suggests: "*Es liegt ein Grundgedanke des Ammonius in der Interpretation durch Porphyrios vor*". Porphyry's own answer can be found in *Sententiae* # XXXV: οὐτε οὖν κρᾶσις ἢ μίξις ἢ σύνθεσις ἢ παράθεσις ἀλλ' ἕτερος τρόπος; for which see Th. Wittaker, *The Neo-Platonists* (Cambridge, 1902), pp. 112-113 and n. 1.

<sup>4</sup> E. R. Dodds, in: *Les Sources de Plotin*, p. 25.



[i.e. true and real] Being. On the basis of Plato's *Sophist* 248E1-249B1, the ideas were considered to be self-subsistent, static entities as well as living elements of an organic whole, which interact, share, and participate in one another, and are ontologically sustained by the *One* [the Meta-subsistence of which the Neoplatonists, relying on the literal meaning of Plato's *Parmenides*,<sup>1</sup> derived from the famous account of ἐπέκεινα τῆς οὐσίας in *Republic* 509B]. In any case, on the basis of Plato's discussion in the *Sophist*, the Neoplatonists and Plotinus in particular were very much concerned about the problem raised by the Neopythagorean interpretation of Plato's philosophy, viz. how multitude and multiplicity are related to uniqueness and singularity<sup>2</sup> (i.e. how the νοητά, being beyond space and time, constitute a level of unity, as well as of dispersion and interpenetration, and a process [ζωή] of separation as much as of unification and totalization). Indeed, the Platonic model of συμπλοκή εἰδῶν, applied to the intelligible world on the level of the second *hypostasis* within Plotinus' ontology, almost requires to be understood in terms of the physical world: the objects of the divine mind are involved in a peculiar process of blending [from V 1 (10) 9, 5-6 it would seem that Plotinus is thinking in "Empedoclean" terms].

It is quite interesting to observe that Plotinus "adopts" Anaxagoras' famous ὁμοῦ πάντα (VS 58 B 1) and assumes that it is applicable to the νοῦς and its νοητά (cf. e.g. V 3 [49] 15, 18-22; V 9 [5] 6, 9-10).<sup>3</sup> Also, the Stoic concept of κρᾶσις δι' ὅλων, which is certainly to some extent inspired by Anaxagoras' view of the precosmic state of mixture, can actually make sense for those who were convinced that the intelligible concepts, although each of them has its distinct δόναμις,<sup>4</sup> combine into classes and even function as elements of other concepts. The divine *Intelligence*, when discerning its intelligible potential, is regarded as ὁμοῦ πάντα καὶ οὐχ ὁμοῦ (cf. V 9 [5] 6, 8-9).

Thus, the assumption that Plotinus "adopts" a Stoic doctrine in

<sup>1</sup> E. R. Dodds, "The Parmenides of Plato and the Origin of the Neoplatonic One", *C.Q.* XXII (1928), pp. 129-143, is still an invaluable source.

<sup>2</sup> The best account in the present author's opinion is the one by W. Theiler, "Unbegrenzte Einheit und unbestimmte Zweiheit von Plato bis Plotin", in: *Isonomia* (Berlin, 1964), pp. 89-109.

<sup>3</sup> For Plotinus' interpretation of Anaxagoras (VS 58 B 12), see V 1 (10) 9, 1-3.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. V 9 (5) 6, 9.

order to make use of it for a reason certainly not envisaged by the founders themselves does not seem to be too far-fetched.

S.V.F. I, 120

[# 5]

In II 1 (40) 7, 10, 20-49 Plotinus seems to be making use of Zeno's doctrine [for Cleanthes, see S.V.F. I, 504] of the existence of two kinds of fire for his own metaphysical speculation.

The distinction drawn by Zeno<sup>1</sup> (πῦρ τεχνικόν — πῦρ ἀτεχνον [the first of which applies to the substance of the stars]) has to be taken as an attempt at a reconciliation<sup>2</sup> of the traditional theory of four canonic elements (cf. e.g. Arist. *Metaph.* 984A8) with the Peripatetic speculation raised by Aristotle's doctrine of a *quinta essentia*<sup>3</sup> [probably developed in his lost writing, *De Philosophia*].<sup>4</sup> In fact, it appears to be a compromise, which is meant to be taken as an acceptance of the Aristotelian view of the peculiar nature of the stars (cf. already Cicero, *De Finibus* 4, 12).

There was to be developed, however, a syncretistic conflation of the Stoic πῦρ τεχνικόν — substance and Aristotle's ether-theory in the work of Philo, in particular,<sup>5</sup> or in that of Philostratus, for example, who knows the Aristotelian doctrine of the "fifth body" (cf. *Vit. Apoll.* 3, 43 [Kayser]) and who appears to have held that at least the highest part of the soul must consist of pure ether (*Vit. Apoll.* 1, 8; 3, 42 [Kayser]). Admittedly, there exist a number analogous speculations based on Plato's, Aristotle's, and the Stoics' views of the specific element peculiar to the substance of the stars; they must have been combined to a great extent with eschatological speculations such as are to be found in the texts listed as Arist. *De Philosophia*, Fr. 27 Walzer/Ross [which are more likely to be related to the *Eudemus*].<sup>6</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Cf. J. Moreau, *L'Âme du Monde de Platon aux Stoiciens*, p. 184.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. H. and M. Simon, *Die alte Stoa und ihr Naturbegriff*, pp. 96-97, and M. Pohlenz, *Die Stoa*, Vol. I, p. 73.

<sup>3</sup> For which see the excellent article by P. Moraux, *R.E.* XXXIII [s.v. *Quinta Essentia*] (1963), coll. 1171-1263.

<sup>4</sup> See especially H. J. Easterling, "Quinta Natura", *M.H.* XXI (1964), pp. 73-85; for some systematic implications see my article "Zu Aristoteles' περὶ φιλοσοφίας", *M.H.* XXVII (1970), pp. 11 ff.

<sup>5</sup> For different types of such confusions, see, e.g. *Leg. Alleg.* 3, 161; *De Mut. Nom.* 223; *De Plant.* 18 (very important is the general account by A. J. Festugière, *La Révélation d'Hermès trismegistos*, Vol. II [*Le Dieu cosmique*] (Paris, 1949), pp. 530 ff.

<sup>6</sup> Cf. O. Gigon, in: *Aristotle and Plato in the Mid-Fourth Century*, p. 25.

What makes matters even more complicated, however, is the fact that this complex merged with Plato's symbolism of light <sup>1</sup> (cf. e.g. *Republic* 508A-509B): the eschatological myths in Plutarch, *De Gen. Socr.* 590B ff., and in Seneca, *Cons. Ad Helv.* 8, 5 ff. are important. In addition, the Neoplatonists, eager as they were to emphasize and exaggerate Plato's allegories of light,<sup>2</sup> conflated both the physical and cosmological doctrines of fire and ether and the metaphysical symbolism.<sup>3</sup>

Nevertheless, it is rather difficult to understand how Plotinus came to make use of Zeno's 'Doctrine of two fires'; that he knows the concept of πῦρ τεχνικόν may be taken for granted on the basis of III 2 (47) 4, 26. In II 1 (40) he appears to be primarily concerned to restate Plato's somewhat obscure opinion about the "created eternity" (cf. *Timaeus* 41B3-4) of the semi-bodily nature of the heavens (cf. *Timaeus* 31B4-8). Plotinus wants to prove Plato's views of the eternity of the world to be sufficient in themselves and to show that it is not even necessary to employ such an inference as was constructed upon the Aristotelian doctrine of the "fifth body" (2, 12-13). Later he again points out the special nature attributed to the stars (6, 1 ff.). By drawing particular attention to πῦρ ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ [scil. the daemons], e.i. pure fire, Plotinus indicates that there must be at least a scale of the different types of fire (cf. 7, 44 ff.). Whereas earth and the "fire above" (τῷ ἄνω πυρὶ ἐν τῇ συστάσει τῶν ἄστρων [7, 9-10]) do not blend, but do come in contact with each other in the sense of ἀπολάυνει,<sup>4</sup> the different kinds of fire have no contact whatsoever (7, 35 ff.). There is, however, another kind of fire [i.e. the sun] which has to be considered as *light* and therefore as different from the two others (7, 23-30).<sup>5</sup> From Zeno's πῦρ τεχνικόν, to which it is

<sup>1</sup> For which see R. Bultmann, "Zur Geschichte der Lichtsymbolik im Altertum", *Philologus* LXXVII (1948), pp. 1-36, and W. Beierwaltes, *Lux Intelligibilis, Untersuchungen zur Lichtsymbolik der Griechen* [Diss. Munich] (Munich, 1957), see also J. Ratzinger, "Licht und Erleuchtung, Erwägungen zur Stellung und Entwicklung des Themas in der abendländischen Geistesgeschichte", *Studium Generale* XIII (1960), pp. 368-378.

<sup>2</sup> See, e.g. G. Müller, *G.G.A.* CCLXXI (1969), p. 200, n. 18 [with regard to L. Edelstein's account of the Neoplatonists' interpretation of Plato's 7th letter].

<sup>3</sup> See particularly W. Beierwaltes, "Die Metaphysik des Lichtes in der Philosophie Plotins", *Z.P.F.* XV (1961), pp. 334-362.

<sup>4</sup> The Stoic theory of συμπάθεια has to be presupposed [for which see below pp. 68 ff., on # 82].

<sup>5</sup> For which see the reference to Plato, *Timaeus* 39B4-5, *Theaetetus* 208D2, *Republic* 616E9.

similar with regard to its θερμὸν δὲ προσηγῶς (7, 25 [cf. Plato, *Timaeus* 58C5-7]), it is different only in that it is entirely exempt from any contact (7, 35-36) with the others and in that it need not be maintained.

One may well say that Plotinus is actually doing two things: (1) being primarily concerned with a justification of Plato's cosmology in the face of Aristotle's criticism, he modifies the Aristotelian ether-theory by replacing the "fifth body" with a "third fire"; (2) in order not to become associated with Zeno's doctrine, Plotinus assumes for his "third fire" [which is not to be confused with the πῦρ ἀληθές symbolically standing for the *One*] those characteristics that Zeno's πῦρ τεχνικόν ought to have but does not, in fact, possess.

S.V.F. I, 140

[# 6]

In IV 7 (2) 8, 27-28 the statement πνεῦμά τι γὰρ ἢ αἷμά τι τὸ σωφρονεῖν appears to be an almost typically Plotinian inference from the Stoic premise σώματος ὄντος τῆς ψυχῆς in 8, 26-27. [Accounts in Plutarch, *De Stoic. Repugn.* 1034F and Stobaeus, *Ecl.* II, 68, 18 W: καθ' ὃ δὲ καὶ τὸ σῶμα πᾶσαν ἀρετὴν εἶναι . . . τὴν γὰρ διάνοιαν καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν σῶμα εἶναι, show that the Stoics themselves must have been accustomed to saying that virtue etc., is something bodily, since virtue was considered a διὰθεσις of the bodily soul]. To say that the inference is typically Plotinian is to observe that Plotinus' statement has to be taken as a polemic against the "confusion" inherent in the Stoics' viewpoint, according to which virtues must be supposed to be of bodily nature and yet λόγοι. The wording αἷμά τι, πνεῦμά τι [for which see Galen's report in S.V.F. 2, 787, Vol. II, p. 218, 37-39] proves that Plotinus (cf. 8, 28-35) probably knew the somewhat difficult opinion of the soul's nature that had been held by Zeno, Cleanthes, and Chrysippus (cf. S.V.F., Vol. I, p. 30, 32-33: τρέφεσθαι μὲν ἐξ αἵματος . . . τὴν ψυχὴν, οὐσίαν δ' αὐτῆς ὑπάρχειν τὸ πνεῦμα, and also S.V.F. 2, 777, 782).

S.V.F. I, 141

[# 7]

Plotinus, who, to some extent at least,<sup>1</sup> subscribes to the opinion held by the Stoics that perceptions *qua* judgments are to be distinguished from mere alterations of the sense-organs (cf. III 6

<sup>1</sup> From the account in S.V.F. 3, 459 it becomes clear that Plotinus tends to follow a version more likely to be related to Posidonius.

[26] 1, 1),<sup>1</sup> appears to be hesitant about rejecting the doctrines of τύπωσις and τύποι respectively. At least he does not avoid the latter term (cf. I 2 [19] 4, 23, I 1 [53] 7, 11, and esp. IV 3 [27] 26, 29: οὐδ' ὥσπερ αἱ ἐνσφραγίσεις οὐδ' ἀντερείσεις ἢ τυπώσεις).

Such a doctrine, which had originally been close to Arist. *De Mem.* 450A30-32,<sup>2</sup> was modified by Chrysippus, who objected to the notion of τύπωσιν οἷον τύπον σφραγιστήρος (cf. *S.V.F.* 2, 55). The Stoic doctrine appears to be unacceptable to Plotinus for two reasons, (1) In IV 9 (8) 2, 20-21 he simply suggests that the idea of συμπάσχειν can certainly be maintained without clinging to the [materialistic] theory of τύποι; (2) in IV 6 (41) 1, 1 ff., Plotinus states more explicitly that such a theory can by no means be considered sufficient, since it would not warrant a true representation of the objects of vision.

Plotinus' criticism is undeniably vague if one expects him to offer an alternative to the physiological doctrine held by the Stoics. From III 6 (26) 3, 27 ff. [for which see below, p. 32, in *S.V.F.* 2, 53/65] it seems clear that his intention is to keep the soul as free as possible from any sort of alteration. Tendencies like this correspond perfectly to his objections to the Stoics' view of the nature of vision and hearing [for which see below, pp. 46-48, in *S.V.F.* 2, 864, 867, 872].

*S.V.F.* 1, 142

[≠ 8]

Plotinus' polemics in IV 7 (2) 2, 4 ff., against the materialistic conception of the nature of soul [ψυχή = σῶμα] is particularly interesting, for it shows that he must have had specific information concerning the Stoics' definition of soul.

(1) To say simply that soul cannot be of bodily nature, since the body [either merely one or more] cannot have the property of life as something σύμφυτον,<sup>3</sup> is to miss the point. For the Stoics could have pointed out, as Aristotle would have done with respect to the νοῦς χωριστός . . . θύραθεν ἐπεισιών (cf. *De Anima* 413B24-27, *De Gen.*

<sup>1</sup> For which see also *S.V.F.* 2, 854, which, however, must not be confused with the other theorem [Τὰ πάθη κρείσσεις], cf. *S.V.F.* 2, 456.

<sup>2</sup> According to Alexander, this comparison is not to be taken in the literal sense, *In De An.* 72, 12.

<sup>3</sup> The Platonists [in reference to Plato, *Phaedo* 105C9-10 and *Phaedrus* 246B6, and elsewhere] were accustomed to say that life is a property of the soul, i.e., σύμφυτον (cf. e.g. Albinus, *Isagoge* 177, 17; 178, 18 H.).

*Animal*. 736B22-29), the peculiar nature of the body of which the soul consists: σῶμα λεπτομερὲς ἐξ αὐτοῦ κινούμενον κατὰ λόγους σπερματικούς (cf. *S.V.F.* 2, 780).

(2) It is highly probable, however, that Plotinus also had this objection in mind, for his statement ἄλλα δὲ παρὰ ταῦτα σώματα οὐκ ἔστι (2, 13-14), seems to be directed against such attempts to attribute to the soul a special body different from the ordinary elements. Such an objection is in accordance with the line of argument pursued against Aristotle's doctrine of the fifth element [for which see above, p. 22]. The Stoics, however, could have replied that the material of the soul is at least as much alive as the substance attributed to the nature of the stars (cf. *II* 1 [40] 7, 9-10).

*S.V.F.* 1, 150

[# 9]

τὰ φωνήεντα in *III* 3 (48) 5, 9 may be taken in a sense approximating the "organ for vowels".<sup>1</sup> One suspects however, that τὰ φωνήεντα is the object of ἐφθέγγατο and that πληγέντα agrees with the subject.<sup>2</sup> In this case, τὰ φωνήεντα would resemble τὸ φωνᾶεν in *Dox. Graec.* 411 (= *S.V.F.* 1, 150), which [ἔστι πνεῦμα διατεῖνον . . .] is certainly not the "*vokalischen Organe*" but . . . δ καὶ φώνην καλοῦσιν.<sup>3</sup>

*S.V.F.* 1, 183

[# 10]

At the end of the first chapter of treatise *I* 4 (46) Plotinus criticizes in passing some traditional accounts of εὐδαιμονία, for example, the opinions of Aristippus,<sup>4</sup> Epicurus,<sup>5</sup> and the Stoics. The chief concern of Plotinus is not to refute their definitions. He simply wishes to show that they are not sufficient as far as man's happiness is concerned. For, if εὐδαιμονία is based on the equation τὸ εὖ ζῆν = τὸ κατὰ φύσιν, the Stoics' account can certainly not have reference to human beings alone,<sup>6</sup> and therefore it is not specific enough.

<sup>1</sup> Cf. W. Theiler's commentary (Vol. Vb), p. 364.

<sup>2</sup> This construction was suggested to me by Professor Cherniss.

<sup>3</sup> The account of C. Rutten, *Les Catégories du Monde sensible dans les Ennéades de Plotin*, p. 84, n. 5 can hardly be correct.

<sup>4</sup> Diog. Laert. 2, 88

<sup>5</sup> Diog. Laert. 10, 128

<sup>6</sup> In so far as only human beings can have εὐδαιμονία, a Platonist would follow Aristotle (cf. *E.N.* 1178B24 ff.).

S.V.F. 1, 202

[ # 11 ]

When discussing the problem of the soul's unity (IV 8 [8] 3, 25-26), Plotinus implicitly denies the orthodox Stoic position, according to which λογικόν and ἄλογον or παθητικόν are not separate and distinct (cf. S.V.F. 3, 459, also 2, 849). In doing so, if he is not simply following Plato's dialogues or the Academic tradition,<sup>1</sup> Plotinus might be related to Panaetius<sup>2</sup> or, which is more likely, to Posidonius' criticism of Chrysippus'<sup>3</sup> intellectualism [see also below, p. 63f. in # 75].

S.V.F. 1, 211

[ # 12 ]

The first line in I 1 (53), mentioning the main classes of πάθη, does not require a Stoic source, for the classification of πάθη adopted in 1, 1 ff., appears to have become a commonplace soon after Plato (cf. *Republic* 429C-D, *Phaedo* 83B, esp., *Timaeus* 69D, *Laws* 864B, also see Arist. *De anima* 408B2). The reason the doxographical account should nevertheless be mentioned here is that the discussion following must be understood to be based to some extent on Posidonius' criticism of the older Stoics<sup>4</sup> (cf. 1, 6 [δοξαζόμενα]); Posidonius' main concern was to keep the "true soul" [i.e. the ἡγεμονικόν which replaces the θεῖον ἡγεμονοῦν of Plato's *Timaeus*] free from any disturbance.<sup>5</sup> The word ἄτρεπτος,<sup>6</sup> which Plotinus uses, is not attested, however, in the case of Posidonius: he may have said ἀπαθής [F 163, Edelstein-Kidd, from Galen, *De Hipp. et Plat. Plac.* 409, 1 Mü.].

Plotinus speaks in a similar fashion in III 6 (26) 5, 1, and his own account, especially in 9, 21 ff., may well be based on an interpretation of Plato's *Timaeus* similar to that pursued by Posidonius<sup>7</sup> against orthodox Stoicism. The latter's notion of νοῦς, however, as

<sup>1</sup> For which see D. A. Rees, "Bipartition of the Soul in the Early Academy", *J.H.S.* LXXVII (1957), pp. 73-95.

<sup>2</sup> For whom see A. Schmekel, *Die Philosophie der mittleren Stoa*, p. 198.

<sup>3</sup> See G. Nebel, "Zur Ethik des Poseidonios", *Hermes* LXXIV (1939), p. 56.

<sup>4</sup> Besides the articles by G. Nebel [above n. 3], see A. Modrzejewski, "Zur Ethik und Psychologie des Poseidonios", *Philologus* LXXXVII (1932), pp. 305 ff.

<sup>5</sup> Cf. H.-R. Schwyzler, in: *Les Sources de Plotin*, p. 367.

<sup>6</sup> Cf. also Marcus Aurelius 7, 16, 1; for which see the important account by W. Theiler in: *Die Vorbereitung des Neuplatonismus*, p. 88.

<sup>7</sup> For a valuable account of this complex, see J. M. Rist, *Stoic Philosophy*, pp. 215-216.

well as the Aristotelian doctrine of νοῦς χωριστός, Plotinus would consider as only marking a step in the direction indicated by himself.<sup>1</sup>

S.V.F. I, 234

[# 13]

Another implicit criticism of the older Stoics' position as regards the problem of division [or distinction of different functions] of soul is to be found in III 6 (26) 1, 14. The question πότερα καὶ τοῦτο [= τὸ παθητικὸν τῆς ψυχῆς] shows that Plotinus may have been aware of Posidonius' opinion that only the highest part of the soul is immutable [see above, p. 27 on # 12].

With regard to the question with which Plotinus is concerned, Zeno, who certainly did not employ the Aristotelian or Platonic distinction [see above p. 51, n. 67] between ἄλογον and λογικόν, would have replied: οἷον ἐν βύθῳ γαλήνης ἀκλύστου καταφανεῖ διαλάμπει τῆς ψυχῆς τὸ φανταστικὸν καὶ διακεχυμένον ὑπὸ λόγου (S.V.F. Vol. I, p. 56, 17-19). It was thus Posidonius who objected to such a possibility as that envisaged by the older Stoics and who claimed, as Plotinus does, that it can be only the purest part of the soul that is exempt from any disturbance and "affection" (cf. F 184, Edelstein-Kidd, from Seneca, *Epist. Moral.* 90, 10); <sup>2</sup> for Plotinus, see also I 8 (51) 15, 13; II 1 (40) 7, 19.

S.V.F. I, 374/377

[# 14]

One implication of the Stoics' conception of the nature of the soul is the point of view ascribed to Aristo of Chios, viz. that the soul is revealed in τὰ λογικά (S.V.F. Vol. I, pp. 86, 30-87, 2).

For the Neoplatonist tradition, it must seem that the Stoics hold λόγος to be later than ψυχή. Yet, the Stoics would merely have said that the λόγος in the soul is later than Λόγος itself (cf. S.V.F. 2, 835 from Jamblichus, *De Anima* [at Stob. *Ecl.* I, 317, 21-24], which apparently contains such a Neoplatonist supposition).

In any case, for the Neoplatonist tradition, such a concept must of course seem open to attack,<sup>3</sup> all the more so since the Platonists

<sup>1</sup> Cf. W. Theiler's commentary (Vol. Vb), p. 447.

<sup>2</sup> W. Theiler (in: *Les Sources de Plotin* p. 78) indicates section 92, 8-10. However, as regards direct evidence, only # 10 can be taken into consideration.

<sup>3</sup> Plato had already accused some Presocratics [Anaxagoras, Diogenes of Apollonia, and presumably Democritus] of confusion on the priority-scale (cf. *Laws* X, 892 and XII, 968).



had become accustomed to combining Plato's views of *ontological priority* with the Aristotelian idea of the *ἐνέργεια* — *δύναμις* structure of *πρότερον* and *ὑστερον* (cf. e.g. *Metaph.* 1019A2 f.), as may be seen especially from Albinus, *Isagoge* 164, 16 [H.]: *ἐπεὶ δὲ νοῦς ἀμείνων νοῦς δὲ ἐν δυνάμει ὁ κατ' ἐνέργειαν πάντα . . . νοῶν*.<sup>1</sup>

In his attack upon the Stoics in V 9 (5) 4, 4 [ψυχὴ νοῦν τε θεωθεῖσα γεννᾷ],<sup>2</sup> Plotinus relies on a Platonic-Aristotelian premise of this kind: *τὸ κρεῖττον φύσει πρότερον* (cf. *De Caelo* 269A19-20).<sup>3</sup> Even more outspoken is the criticism expressed in IV 7 (2) 8<sup>3</sup>, 6-9: *συμβαίνει οὖν αὐτοῖς τὸ χεῖρον πρῶτον ποιεῖν καὶ πρὸ τούτου ἄλλο ἔλαττον ἢν λέγουσιν ἕξιν, ὁ δὲ νοῦς ὑστατος ἀπὸ τῆς ψυχῆς δηλονότι γενόμενος*. Alexander's statement is similar: *τὸν νοῦν ἐν τοῖς φαινοτάτοις εἶναι θεῖον ὄντα* (= *S.V.F.* 2, 1038).

Plotinus feels free to conclude that God, accordingly, cannot be either *ψυχὴ* or *νοῦς* (8<sup>3</sup>, 11-13), but merely *ὅλη πῶς ἔχουσα* (II 4 [12] 1, 13-14). It is also interesting to observe how Plotinus in his criticism, makes use of the Stoics' account of the degrees of Being [i.e. *ἕξις*, *φύσις*, and *ψυχὴ*, for which see *S.V.F.*, Vol. II, p. 302, 36-37]. For the Stoics, *νοῦς* or God, must by inference, be identical with something that had originated from *ἕξις* (cf. VI 1 [42] 27, 1 ff.). That is to say (in Platonist terminology) that the Stoics would hold Non-Being to be the principle from which all things, whatsoever, come into existence (cf. VI 1 [42] 28, 1 ff.).

Plotinus' criticism is certainly not just, not only so far as the erroneous identification of Platonic *νοῦς* and Stoic *λόγος* is concerned,<sup>4</sup> but also with respect to the scale of priority. For Plotinus' criticism relies on the Aristotelian proposition that "potential Being" is posterior to "actual Being" and it does not even take into account the fact that the *πῦρ τεχνικόν* [which survives the process of

<sup>1</sup> Cf. also, e.g. Maximus of Tyrus 138, 19 [Holbein], for which see W. Theiler, *Die Vorbereitung des Neuplatonismus* p. 58, and, for a general account, H.-J. Krämer, *Der Ursprung der Geistmetaphysik*, pp. 131-137.

<sup>2</sup> The account by P.-P. Matter, *Der Einfluss des platonischen "Timaios" auf das Denken Plotins*, p. 83, is worth reading.

<sup>3</sup> Important is the account of Arist. *Περὶ Φιλοσοφίας* in Simplicius, *In De Caelo* 288, 18-289, 15 [in reference to Arist. *De Caelo* 270A30]; for a general introduction, see G. Mainberger, *Die Seinsstufung als Methode und Metaphysik* (Fribourg, 1959), and H.-J. Krämer (*loc. cit.* [above, p. 29, n. 1]).

<sup>4</sup> By inference one might say that *λόγος* is occasionally also called *νοῦς*, for *θεός* is said to be *νοῦς*, or rather, *νοῦς* is said to be *θεός*, and both are said to be one (cf. D.L. 7, 135 and Epiphanius, *Adv. Haer.* 3, 2, 9 = *S.V.F.* 1, 146).

ἐκπύρωσις]<sup>1</sup> is actually the first principle from which the regeneration of the *cosmos* begins.

S.V.F. I, 484 [see above, p. 24 in # 7]

S.V.F. I, 495 [cf. 2, 774] [ # 15]

The older Stoics especially held the opinion, already foreshadowed to some extent by Anaxagoras (VS 59, B 12 *fin.*) and Alcmaeon of Croton (VS 24, A 12), but chiefly elaborated by Plato, that the human mind, or rather the soul, has some sort of consubstantial identity with the world-soul,<sup>2</sup> or . . . ἐκ τῆς τοῦ παντὸς ψυχῆς καὶ τὰς ἡμετέρας εἶναι, as Plotinus expresses their view (IV 3 [27] I, 17-18).

Plotinus, although he knows that Plato's dialogues (which the Stoics claim as confirmation of this doctrine) do not support their idea of the identity of ὅλον and μέρος, is hardly likely to criticize the Stoic concept as such. This must become clear from the kind of tacit acceptance evident in IV 9 (8) I, 10 [to which πάλιν ἐπανιοῦμεν in IV 3 (27) I, 16 might refer], and also even in II 3 (52) 9 [where the highest component of the soul is regarded as ἡ ἑξω ψυχῇ].<sup>3</sup> Admittedly, no Platonist, particularly one since the time of Posidonius,<sup>4</sup> would doubt that the human soul and the world-soul have a common origin<sup>5</sup> (cf. e.g., Albinus, *Isagoge* 178, 15 [H.]; much more correct from the historical point of view is the account by Galen, *In Platonis Tim.* Fr. 10, 8 [Schröder] in connection with 12, 5 ff. [Schr.]).<sup>6</sup> Even Aristotle's lost dialogue *Eudemus*, shadows of which

<sup>1</sup> See above, pp. 17-18 in # 3.

<sup>2</sup> See especially Plato, *Timaios* 90C5 (for A6 see A. Graeser, *Probleme der platonischen Seelenteilungslehre*, p. 85, n. 9); for an analysis of *Timaeus* 35A1-B2, see A. Graeser *op. cit.* pp. 74-76.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. P. O. Kristeller, *Der Begriff der Seele in der Ethik Plotins*, p. 35.

<sup>4</sup> What is difficult to believe is that Posidonius claimed, as it appears from Hermias, *In Plat. Phaedr.* 102 [Couvreur], that Plato regarded only the world-soul as immortal (= F 290 Edelstein-Kidd); however, see J. M. Rist, *Stoic Philosophy*, p. 216.

<sup>5</sup> Such a viewpoint is probably indebted to Posidonius' interpretation of Plato's *Timaeus* 35A to which Plutarch refers in *De An. Procr.* *In Plat. Tim.* 1023B: if soul is a mathematical, it must then have intermediate status, since mathematical have their place between the first *intelligibilia* and *sensibilia* (cf. P. Merlan, *From Platonism to Neoplatonism* [The Hague, 1953] p. 32).

<sup>6</sup> For some further remarks on this discussion, see H. Dörrie, *Porphyrios' "Symmiktá Zetemata"*, pp. 128, 154, 170, 193.

are to be seen in Cicero, *Tusc. Disp.* I, and elsewhere, might have favoured such an idea.

Plotinus' own opinion of the peculiar difference between the ontological status of the world-soul and that of the human soul can best be found in the statements in IV 8 (6) 8, 1; IV 7 (2) 13, 12 and in IV 3 (27) 9, 34: the world-soul transcends the *cosmos* in the same way as the human soul transcends the body.

Yet Plotinus found it sufficiently interesting to point out the fact that the Stoics were apparently not aware of the question to what extent a part [which is for a Platonist in any event "weaker" than the whole, cf. *Laws* 903B] can share the characteristics peculiar to the whole. Moreover, Plotinus, when he says that the identification proposed by the Stoics (ὡς ὁμοειδῆ [1, 18-20]) ought not be valid, relies on the Platonists' concept of the hierarchy of Being. Thus the solution Plotinus is about to offer in 4, 14 ff., appears to be an attempt to reconcile both the Platonic viewpoint and the Stoic idea of the ὁμοπάθεια of all souls.<sup>1</sup> In fact, such an idea does not, for Platonists at least, require the Stoic inference that the individual soul is ὁμοειδὲς τῷ παντί (cf. Sextus Empiricus, *Adv. Math.* 7, 130).<sup>2</sup> Nevertheless, how close Plotinus is to the Stoic viewpoint can be inferred from IV 7 (2) 3, 5 f., where, arguing against the Materialists' [i.e. Epicurus' and perhaps Democritus'] views of the nature of soul, he does not hesitate to base his refutation of them on the Stoic idea of ὁμοπάθεια (cf. also 3, 6 ψυχὴ δὲ αὐτῇ συμπαθήσκει).

S.V.F. I, 518

[≠ 16]

One of Plotinus' chief concerns, whenever he discusses fatalistic or deterministic theories, which assume man to be integrated into the course of external necessities, is to preserve, as far as possible, the individual's freedom,<sup>3</sup> i.e. the true ἐφ' ἡμῶν [for which see Part II, 3].

In saying [in III 1 (3) 5, 28] that children in most cases inherit τινὰ τῶν ἀλόγων τῆς ψυχῆς παθῶν from their parents, he comes near to a doctrine attributed to Cleanthes in S.V.F., Vol. I, pp. 116,

<sup>1</sup> Similarly one receives the impression that elsewhere Plotinus (IV 2 [4] 2, 13, for which see below, p. 38 in ≠ 30) is inclined to accept the συνέχεια-theory, if this concept were to be applied to the Platonic model of the "divided-undivided soul".

<sup>2</sup> K. Reinhardt, *Kosmos und Sympathie*, pp. 193 ff. argues for the Posidonian character of this theory. I do not find this convincing.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. P. O. Kristeller, *Der Begriff der Seele in der Ethik Plotins*, p. 79.

33-117, 2; 117, 8-10.<sup>1</sup> By pointing to τινὰ τῶν . . . παθῶν, however, he appears to remain at some distance from Cleanthes' version.<sup>2</sup> That is to say, Plotinus, who believes, as Plato did, in the soul's immortality, in divine revenge and punishment, and the possibility of reincarnation on a lower level,<sup>3</sup> must have been concerned about keeping the soul exempt, as far as possible, from such eternal factors as, for example, inheritance.<sup>4</sup>

S.V.F. 2, 49

[# 17]

I 3 (20) 5, 9-10 shows a case of peculiar coincidence of Platonic intention and Stoic dogmatism. For Plotinus, when discussing the relation between dialectics and philosophy, claims: ἡ φιλοσοφίας μέρος τὸ τίμιον. Οὐ γὰρ δὴ οἰητέον ὅργανον τοῦτο εἶναι. This is a position apparently held by the Stoics (cf. S.V.F., Vol. II, p. 19, -311, 5-16).<sup>5</sup> The younger Peripatetics did not find an appropriate place for Logic within the philosophical system of Aristotle and thus considered Logic merely as an instrument of philosophy (cf. Alexander, *In An. Pr.* 1, 9 [= S.V.F. 2, 49a]).<sup>6</sup> Plotinus might have found in the Stoics' reply a convenient position on the basis of which he could defend his conception of Plato's understanding of dialectics.

S.V.F. 2, 53/65

[# 18]

When concerned with the question to what extent the soul itself is subject to alteration, Plotinus rejects in III 6 (26) 3, 27 ff., the opinion that any of the functions or activities proper to the soul is to be considered ἀλλοίωσις, as Chrysippus would presumably have indicated in his lost *De Anima* (cf. S.V.F. 2, 55). On the contrary, he claims that soul ὡσαύτως ἔχειν τῷ ὑποκειμένῳ καὶ τῇ οὐσίᾳ (3, 31-32). From the phrase οὐδὲ τὰς φαντασίας ὡς ἐν κηρῷ τυπώσεις (3, 29-30), it is clear that Plotinus must have been thinking of an opinion such as was apparently held by Chrysippus (S.V.F., Vol. II, p. 21, 13-14

<sup>1</sup> From Tertullian, *De An.* 5, Nemesius, *De Nat. Hom.* 32 [Matth.].

<sup>2</sup> Cf. R. Harder's commentary (Vol. Ib), p. 416.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. e.g. III 2 (47) 13, 1 ff.; IV 3 (27) 8, 9; III 4 (15) 2, 17 ff. and VI 7 (38) 6, 21, for which see W. Theiler, "Tacitus und der antike Schicksalsglaube", in: *Phyllobolia* (Basel, 1948), pp. 77 ff.

<sup>4</sup> See, however, V 7 (18) 2, 1-23.

<sup>5</sup> The division into six parts, as reported for Cleanthes by D.L. 7, 41 [= S.V.F. 1, 482], can easily be reduced to one, which would speak of three parts (D.L. 7, 39 [= S.V.F. 1, 49]).

<sup>6</sup> Cf. R. Harder's commentary (Vol. Ib), p. 576.

[for the phrase, οὐ τύπους ἐναποσφραγιζομένους, see *S.V.F.*, Vol. II p. 24, 12-14 and p. 25, 42; also see above, pp. 24-25 in # 7]).

*S.V.F.* 2, 71

[# 19]

At the beginning of III 6 (26), as has been said above [pp. 24-25 on # 7], Plotinus subscribes to a Stoic doctrine (I, I, for which see also *S.V.F.* 2, 854). It might be interesting to know whether the term used in this context (ἐνέργεια) can also be considered Stoic (cf. *S.V.F.*, Vol. III, p. 111, 36 and D.L. 7, 52).

*S.V.F.* 2, 78

[# 20]

In I 8 (51) 15, 18 Plotinus, when saying that φαντασία δὲ πληγὴ ἀλόγου ἔξωθεν, more or less closely subscribes to an opinion held by the Stoic school (cf. *S.V.F.*, Vol. II, p. 21, 23-24). The term ἀλόγου, however, does not imply for Plotinus a model of classification of δόξαι such as was adopted by the Stoics (cf. e.g., *S.V.F.*, Vol. II, p. 24, 21-22 and p. 25, 26). That the basis for Plotinus' understanding of epistemology is in all respects the Platonic ontology, which accounts for a conception of two worlds different from each other in the *modus essendi* and the *ratio cognoscendi*, is made clear by such a statement as the one concerning δόξα in 15, 21 [τῷ μὴ εἶναι καθαρῶ].

*S.V.F.* 2, 88

[# 21]

Plotinus, when speaking about the immanence of the intelligible objects in the sphere of the mind,<sup>1</sup> almost in passing attacks (V 9 [5] 6, 16) the Stoic doctrine according to which any νόησις must originate from sense-perception or at least is inconceivable without it (cf. Sextus Empiricus, *Adv. Math.* 8, 56).

*S.V.F.* 2, 132/166

[# 22]

For a moment, when discussing the relation between the mind and its intelligible objects,<sup>2</sup> Plotinus becomes involved in an argument with the Stoics (V 5 [32] 1, 37 ff.).<sup>3</sup> It is presumably Plotinus' purpose to show that what the Stoics understood as the

<sup>1</sup> See A. H. Armstrong, in: *Les Sources de Plotin*, pp. 393-413.

<sup>2</sup> For valuable accounts of this complex, see A. H. Armstrong, in: *C.H.L.G.E.M.P.*, pp. 236 ff.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. also C. Rutten, *Les Catégories du Monde sensible dans les Ennéades de Plotin*, p. 38.

νοούμενον πρᾶγμα, the λεκτόν in particular, cannot fulfil the criteria of what the Platonists take to be an intelligible concept [νοητόν].

It must appear that the Stoics, who held any ἐπιστήμη to be the πῶς ἔχον ἡγεμονικόν [i.e., a certain disposition of the bodily soul], claimed that ἀλήθεια, since it is a subjective condition of this bodily soul, is a body too (cf. Sextus Empiricus, *Adv. Math.* 7, 38), whereas the *true thing* referred to in a statement is ἔν and ἄσώματον. The σημαίνόμενα, however, as opposed to the σημαίνοντα, being merely concepts, do not have what the Platonists would call real existence,<sup>1</sup> which is confined for the Stoics to the concrete material entity (cf. Alexander, *In Top.* 301, 19 [Wal.] = *S.V.F.* 2, 329).<sup>2</sup> And yet, from Stobaeus, *Ecl.* I, 136, 21 ff. [= *S.V.F.*, Vol. I, p. 19, 21-24] and Aetius, *Plac.* 1, 10, 5 [= *S.V.F.*, Vol. I, p. 19, 27-28], it is clear that the Stoics meant their νοούμενον πρᾶγμα to be taken as equivalent to the Platonic *ideas*, at least so far as their function as mental concepts is concerned.<sup>3</sup>

Thus, it is not at all difficult to see why Plotinus, when considering the alternative possibility that the transcendental objects might be ἀνόητα [i.e. not free from matter], feels obliged to rule out the assumption that they can be regarded as equivalent to what other philosophical schools take προτάσεις, ἀξιώματα and λεκτά to mean.<sup>4</sup> For the λεκτόν [in scholastic terms *nomen*] has existence only as a mental construct, "used both for word and meaning conveyed by the word";<sup>5</sup> the Stoics say that the λεκτόν is that which subsists in conformity with a rational presentation, and a rational presentation is one in which what is presented can be conveyed in speech (Sextus Empiricus, *Adv. Math.* 8, 70).

The Platonists' νοητά, however, since they are meant to be understood as logico-metaphysical<sup>6</sup> causes, do have some sort of

<sup>1</sup> For which see G. Vlastos, "A Metaphysical Paradox", *P.A.A.P.A.* XXXIX (1966), pp. 5-16, and "Degrees of Reality in Plato", in: *New Essays on Plato and Aristotle* (London, 1967), pp. 1-20.

<sup>2</sup> See also the references in M. Pohlenz, *Die Stoa* Vol. II, p. 37.

<sup>3</sup> The Platonic ideas have a quasi-existence, cf. *S.V.F.* 1, 65.

<sup>4</sup> The first two of these had a systematic place in Aristotle's *Organon* (cf. e.g. *An. Pr.* 24A16, 72A17 ff.). The Stoics, we are told by Proclus (*In Eucl.* 193, 20), held them to be identical [ἅπαντα λόγον ἀπλοῦν ἀποφαντικὸν ἀξιῶμα προσαγορεύειν], for which see also D.L. 7, 68; Galen, *Inst. Log.* 4, 19, and Plutarch, *Plat. Quaest.* 1009C. Moreover, they stated τὸ ἀξιῶμα λεκτόν, τὸ λεκτόν ἄσώματον (cf. Sextus Empiricus, *Adv. Math.* 7, 38) and might even have applied to it the attribute νοητόν (id. *Adv. Math.* 8, 110).

<sup>5</sup> G. Watson, *The Stoics' Theory of Knowledge* (Belfast, 1966), p. 42.

<sup>6</sup> In the use of this wording I am referring to the analysis given by G.

absolute existence, which is to say that a reference to them is not, as it is in the case of the Stoics' λεκτά, a mere [nominalistic] denotation. Thus, the Stoic λεκτόν, even if it were supposed to be νοητόν or ἀσώματον, cannot be considered for the kind of νοητόν sought.

S.V.F. 2, 135

[# 23]

Plotinus occasionally employs the distinction, maintained in particular by the Stoic school, between λόγος προφορικός and λόγος ἐνδιάθετος<sup>1</sup> (cf. V 1 [10] 3, 7-8 and I 2 [19] 3, 29). For Plotinus, however, this doctrine does not seem to have the fundamental importance that is to be observed, for example, in Philo (cf. *De Abrah.* 2, 13; I, 447; *Vit. Mos.* 3, 2, 154).<sup>2</sup> It is used more as a convenient illustration of the analogous relation between the world-soul and the Mind and their respective objects.<sup>3</sup> Plotinus would even say that intelligence is the λόγος of the One, and that Soul is the λόγος of Intelligence (cf. V 1 [10] 6, 45 or 3, 8). That is to say, λόγος appears to be placed on every level<sup>4</sup> as an expression of the preceding level respectively.<sup>5</sup> However, λόγος is surely not a *Hypostasis*; from II 9 (33) 1, 32 and V 1 (10) 3, 21, 6, 49 it would seem that Plotinus is concerned to avoid any expression that might be taken as a step in such a direction.

S.V.F. 2, 299/300

[# 24]

The first chapter of treatise II 1 (40),<sup>6</sup> which is a discussion of the meaning of the perpetuity of the *cosmos* implied in Plato's *Timaeus* 41B3 (cf. also 43A2, D2), might be taken—though very hesitantly—as some sort of tacit dialogue with the Stoics. From

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Vlastos, "Reasons and Causes in the *Phaedo*", *P.R.* LXXVIII (1969), pp. 291-324.

<sup>1</sup> As R. Harder (see his commentary [Vol. Ib], p. 497) justly observes, M. Pohlenz' account of this (*Die Stoa*, Vol. I, p. 39) is not really correct, since the distinction was actually developed by classical philosophy (cf. Arist. *An. Post.* 76B24, and Plato, *Sophist* 263E).

<sup>2</sup> For which see M. Heinze, *Die Lehre vom Logos*<sup>2</sup>, (Aalen, 1961), pp. 230-231.

<sup>3</sup> See H. F. Müller, "Die Lehre vom Logos bei Plotin", *A.G.P.* XXX [N.F. XXIII] (1917), pp. 39-40, and R. E. Witt, "The Plotinian Logos and its Stoic Basis", *C.Q.* XXV (1931), p. 106.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. E. R. Dodds, in: *Les Sources de Plotin*, p. 99.

<sup>5</sup> See further J. Trouillard, *La Procession Plotinienne*, (Paris, 1955), p. 78, and also P. Henry, in: *Les Sources de Plotin*, p. 98.

<sup>6</sup> For this treatise, see G. H. Clark, "Plotinus on the Eternity of the World", *P.R.* LVIII (1949), pp. 130-140.

their point of view, the ἀρχαί alone are to be considered everlasting and, moreover, incorporeal, whereas the στοιχεῖα are not only due to a continuous process of change and corruption but will actually be annihilated in the process of ἐκπύρωσις (cf. *S.V.F.* 2, 408). Moreover, Plotinus, in order to maintain the Platonic opinion that the *cosmos* as such is eternal, suggests that it is eternity of the kind that is meant to be implied by such a concept. The Stoics, thinking of the world in terms of παλιγγενεσία and ἀποκατάστασις [for which see *S.V.F.* 2, 623-632], held that the individuals of different periods of the world are identical [ἀπαράλλακτος].

*S.V.F.* 2, 307/316

[ # 25]

The reference in II 4 (12) 1, 9 that those who hold that matter is substance [οὐσία] is certainly meant to refer to the Stoics, as it is in VI 1 (42) 2, 12; yet such an opinion can already be found in Aristotle (cf. *Metaph.* H. 1, *Phys.* A 9).

*S.V.F.* 2, 309/326

[ # 26]

Plotinus quite often criticizes the Stoics' view of matter<sup>1</sup> (cf. II 4 [12] 1, 12-14, or III 6 [26] 6, 5), but particularly in contexts where such a criticism could be connected with an attack upon inferences built on this doctrine, i.e. the Stoics' materialistic conception of God.<sup>2</sup>

Such an example occurs, for instance, in the first chapter of II 4 (12), part of which (1, 6-14) had been included in the *S.V.F.* [i.e., 2, 320], where Plotinus, as also VI 1 (42) 26 ff. [i.e. *S.V.F.* 2, 314, 315, 319, 376, 400],<sup>3</sup> builds some inferences upon the Stoics' ideas concerning οὐσία, ὕλη, and θεός.<sup>4</sup> In II 4 (12) 1, 13 his criticism amounts to the statement that God must accordingly be considered merely ὕλη πως ἔχουσα<sup>5</sup> (see also VI 1 [42] 27, 4).

Such an inference appears to be peculiar to the Platonists'

<sup>1</sup> See above, pp. 13-15 in # 1.

<sup>2</sup> See above, pp. 28-30 in # 14.

<sup>3</sup> See below, pp. 87-100.

<sup>4</sup> In that they assume a bodily nature for the rational principle the Stoics are also (according to D.L. 7, 136, and Alexander, *De Mixtione* 224, 32) to be distinguished from the Platonists and the Peripatetics; thus God, being this principle and yet a bodily substratum, is regarded as the substantial reality of this world (cf. e.g. D.L. 7, 148; Cicero, *De Nat. Deor.* 2, 15, 39).

<sup>5</sup> Alexander comes to the conclusion that God must be a δύναμις τῆς ὕλης (*De Mixtione* 226, 10 ff.).



tradition (cf. Plutarch, *De Comm. Not.* 1085B, τὸν μὲν θεὸν . . . νοῦν ἐν ὕλῃ ποιοῦντες οὐ καθαρὸν οὐδ' ἀσύνθετον [i.e., *S.V.F.* 2, 313], or Origen. *C. Cels.* 4, 14E. and Chalcidius c. 294 . . . *opinionones . . . impias deum scilicet hic esse quod silva sit etiam qualitatem inseparabilem silvae*).

Even more Plotinian, as it may also appear from VI 1 (42) 27, 1 ff., is the account given in IV 7 (2) 4, 8-18, where it is suggested that God, for the Stoics, is either corporeal or a mere name; this inference is built upon the Platonic presupposition that the Stoics ought to say that πῶς ἔχον is either an entity or a mere name. If it is an entity [τι τῶν ὄντων], it must be a body.

*S.V.F.* 2, 330

[ # 27]

In II 4 (12) 5, 20 Plotinus offers another account of the Stoics' opinion οὐσίαν τὴν ὕλην [scil. εἶναι].<sup>1</sup> The comment he makes appears to be almost ironical: the Stoics' views were to be considered correct only if this identification was meant to apply to intelligible matter (5, 22 τὸ γὰρ ὑποκειμένον ἔκεῖ οὐσία).

*S.V.F.* 2, 413

[ # 28]

When speaking about the privileged nature of "fire" and "light" in relation to the other three elements (I 6 [1] 3, 19-23), Plotinus seems to subscribe to a *consensus omnium*. Yet the view expressed resembles very closely the opinion ascribed to Chrysippus (cf. *S.V.F.*, Vol. II, p. 136, 11-13 [for στοιχεῖον κατ' ἐξοχὴν, see Vol. II, p. 155, 32 from Philo, *De Conf. Ling.* 184]).

Plotinus' appreciation of the "Stoic doctrine" must be understood in connection with his adherence to light-symbolism<sup>2</sup> [see above, pp. 23-24 in # 5].

*S.V.F.* 2, 433

[ # 29]

In II 1 (40) 6, 21 ff. Plotinus seems to be questioning the Stoic theory<sup>3</sup> according to which all the elements are completely mixed up and cannot maintain an independent subsistence (cf. Seneca, *Nat. Quaest.* 3, 10, 4). The word κόλλαν in 6, 26 probably refers to a Posidonian account as given, for example, in Seneca, *Nat. Quaest.*

<sup>1</sup> See above, p. 36 in # 25.

<sup>2</sup> See especially W. Beierwaltes, *Z.P.F.* XV (1961), pp. 334-362.

<sup>3</sup> See, however, already VS 59 B 1 [for which see Simplicius, *In De Caelo* 85, 10 ff.].

2, 1, 4 or Philo, *De Op. Mundi* 38.<sup>1</sup> In contrast to Aristotle, the Stoics ascribed only one essential [i.e. characteristic] attribute to each element (cf. *S.V.F.* 2, 580) and explained the fact that elements take over properties which are *per se* not peculiar to them by the theory of the "*elementorum mutua inter se commutatio* <sup>2</sup> *communione eorum*" (*n.V.F.* 2, 561, Vol. II, p. 177, 2-4).

Plotinus' own account is after all not really in opposition to the view held by the orthodox Stoics. By saying, for example, that any element existing in the *cosmos* ἀπολαύειν something from the others (7, 10 ff.),<sup>3</sup> his position becomes perfectly clear in 7, 14-19: ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὴν ἐν κόσμῳ κοινωνίαν ὃν ὁ ἐστὶ λαβεῖν οὐκ αὐτὸ ἀλλὰ τι αὐτοῦ οἶον ἄερα ἀλλ' ἄερος τὴν ἀπαλότητα καὶ τὴν γῆν πυρὸς τὴν λαμπρότητα, τὴν δὲ μῆξιν πάντα διδόναι καὶ τὸ συναμφοτέρον τότε ποιεῖν, οὐ γῆν μόνον καὶ τὴν πυρὸς φύσιν τὴν στερεότητα ταύτην καὶ πυκνότητα.

That is to say, Plotinus proposes some sort of an affinity between what he took to be Plato's theory of elements (5, 1 ff.), and the Hellenistic view of the community of all parts of the *cosmos*.

*S.V.F.* 2, 441

[# 30]

Plotinus, who has a great affection for Plato's supposed conception of the soul as being divisible and yet indivisible [Plotinus is thinking, of course, of *Timaeus* 35A-B; <sup>4</sup> however, this is not in fact what *Timaeus loc. cit.* says or means], which he takes to support his own idea of the besouled universe, feels obliged to say that the Stoics' doctrine of συνέχεια <sup>5</sup> can certainly not compete with the conception he found implicit in Plato's abovementioned view. For if it were to be applied to a multiplicity of πνεῦμα-souls [where πνεῦμα is the most σκεδαστόν entity that one could think of],<sup>6</sup> it would become clear that the name itself is merely a meaningless term

<sup>1</sup> For which see K. Reinhardt, *Kosmos und Sympathie*, p. 387.

<sup>2</sup> For the Stoics' account of the change of the elements [cf. Arist. *De Gen. et Corr.* B 1-6], see *S.V.F.* 1, 102; 2, 405, 420, 561.

<sup>3</sup> See above, p. 23, n. 4 (in # 5).

<sup>4</sup> For Plotinus' interpretation, see H.-R. Schwyzer, "Zu Plotins Interpretation von Platons Tim. 35A", *Rh.M.* LXXXIV (1935), pp. 360-368, and P. Merlan, *From Platonism to Neoplatonism* (The Hague, 1953), p. 33, and P.-P. Matter, *Der Einfluss des platonischen "Timaios" auf das Denken Plotins*, pp. 26 ff.

<sup>5</sup> For which cf. Plutarch, *De Comm. Not.* 1085C-D, Sextus Empiricus, *Adv. Math.* 9, 81, and C. Bäumker, *Das Problem der Materie in der griechischen Philosophie*, pp. 352.

<sup>6</sup> Cf. IV 7 (2) 5, 27 ff.

(IV 2 [4] 2, 12). It is in this context, too, that Plotinus criticizes the “διαδόσει-argument” [for which see below, p. 46, in # 50.]

S.V.F. 2, 444

[# 31]

In his critical account of the Pythagorean theory of the nature of the soul, as it is reported in Plato's *Phaedo* 86B-C, and Aristotle's *De Anima* 407B30 [see also *Eudemus* Fr. 7 Walzer/Ross],<sup>1</sup> Plotinus blends the Pythagorean illustration *περὶ χορδᾶς ἁρμονία* with a physical concept held by the Stoics: *κρᾶσις ἀνομοίων* (IV 7 [2] 8<sup>4</sup>, 8 [for which see S.V.F., Vol. II, p. 146, 35]).

S.V.F. 2, 458 [see above, pp. 24-25 in # 7, and pp. 32-33 in # 18].

S.V.F. 2, 463

[# 32]

Plotinus, when expounding the aspects of the Stoics' and the Peripatetics' views concerning the conception of *κρᾶσις δι' ὅλων* (II 7 [37] 1, 8), is likely to have followed such an outline as is here given by Galen.

S.V.F. 2, 471

[# 33]

Plotinus' exposition of the topic referred to above [# 31] touches slightly on the differentiation elaborated by Chrysippus:<sup>2</sup> *παράθεσις, μῖξις, κρᾶσις*. The account in Alexander, *De Mixtione* 216, 17, is more detailed.

S.V.F. 2, 477

[# 34]

Plotinus' wording *οὐ κατὰ μέγαρα* in IV 7 (2) 8<sup>2</sup>, 12 suggests an acquaintance with the account of the Stoic theory as given by Alexander, *De An. Mant.* 140, 10 [= S.V.F., Vol. II, p. 156, 41-43]. S.V.F. 2, 478 [= Plot. *Enn.* II (37) 1, see above, pp. 18-22].

S.V.F. 2, 480

[# 35]

Plotinus refers in II 7 (37) 1, 15 to the Stoic doctrine according to which the volume of a blend of two bodies does not exceed that of the larger of the two bodies thus mixed; for Chrysippus' famous example [“a drop of wine penetrates the whole ocean”] the reader is referred to Plutarch, *De Comm. Not.* 1078E and D.L. 7, 15 [= S.V.F. 2, 479].

<sup>1</sup> That Plotinus had read the *Eudemus* was asserted by W. Jaeger, *Aristotle*<sup>2</sup> (Oxford, 1962), p. 44, n. 3.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. K. Reinhardt, *Kosmos und Sympathie*, p. 17.

S.V.F. 2, 486

[# 36]

Plotinus rejects the Stoic doctrine of the *τομὴ ἀκαταληκτός*,<sup>1</sup> i.e., that any body is infinitely divisible, in II 7 (37) 1, 11. 22 ff. (cf. also Alexander, *De Mixtione* 224, 4 ff., and 221, 35).

S.V.F. 2, 506

[# 37]

εἰ τόπος διδάστημα in IV 3 (27) 20, 24 suggests "stoicizing"; διδάστημα is a technical term in Arist. *Phys.* 209B7 as was also κενόν (20, 29 [for which see Arist. *Phys.* 208B27]), and was then employed by the Stoics (cf. Themistius, *Paraphr. Arist. Phys.* IV 4, 268 [Spengel]).

S.V.F. 2, 509

[# 38]

In III 7 (45) 10, 1 Plotinus [in reference to 7, 26] discusses the Epicurean definition of time (cf. Fr. 294, Usener). The term παρακολουθοῦν is also important, for example, for Chrysippus' understanding of Zeno's idea of "extension of movement"<sup>2</sup> (cf. S.V.F., Vol. II, p. 164, 16-17).

S.V.F. 2, 510 [see above, p. 17 in # 3].

S.V.F. 2, 514

[# 39]

For the attribution of οὐ πᾶσαν κίνησιν in III 7 (45) 7, 25, the reader is referred to S.V.F., Vol. II, p. 165, 15-16 [see also above, p. 16 in # 2].

S.V.F. 2, 522

[# 40]

Plotinus' account of the limited-unlimited<sup>3</sup> intelligible world in V 8 (31) 4, 1 ff. (which is perhaps more indebted to Numenius than might seem from the resemblance to *Test.* 33 L.)<sup>4</sup> appears to be, although not really perspicuous, an almost playful comment on the Stoics' distinction between τὸ πᾶν and τὸ ὅλον. That is to say, such a differentiation as elaborated by the Stoic school must necessarily

<sup>1</sup> See also Plutarch, *De Comm. Not.* 1079A, 1080D, and Sextus Empiricus *Adv. Math.* 10, 142; 11, 229. For the discrepancy between Aetius, 1, 16, 4, [= *Dox. Graec.* 315] and D.L. 7, 150, see C. Bäumker, *Das Problem der Materie in der griechischen Philosophie*, p. 345, n. 6.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. J. M. Rist, *Stoic Philosophy*, p. 275.

<sup>3</sup> For this doctrine see especially W. N. Clark, "Infinity in Plotinus. A. Reply", *Gregorianum* XL (1959), pp. 79-98, and also C. De Vogel, "La théorie d'ἄπειρον chez Platon et dans la tradition platonicienne", *Revue philosophique de la France et de l'Etranger* CXLIX (1959), pp. 21-39.

<sup>4</sup> See E. R. Dodds, in: *Les Sources de Plotin*, p. 23.

lose its sense if it were applied to the Platonic level of "reality".

S.V.F. 2, 528

[ # 41 ]

Plotinus' characterization of Intelligence as νομοθέτης πρῶτος in V 9 [5] 5, 28 [though ultimately to be related to Plato, *Laws* 713E-714A, also 957E, and *Epinomis* 982B]<sup>1</sup> bears strong traces peculiar to the Stoics' "Law of Being"<sup>2</sup> (cf. e.g., S.V.F. 1, 162),<sup>3</sup> which is represented by the λόγος (e.g., ὅς ἐστι φύσει νόμος, [S.V.F., Vol. II, p. 169, 29]), being the rational aspect of the forces of order in this world.

Such tendencies to apply legal concepts to cosmology [which are known, of course, since Anaximander] are manifest, for example, in Ps. Arist. *De Mundo* 400B13 ff., or Philo, *De Providentia* 2, 82,<sup>4</sup> In the work of Plotinus, this leads to the idea of a *Weltplan* (cf. III 2 [47] 14, 25, or IV 4 [28] 39, 11,<sup>5</sup> also IV 3 [27] 24, 8 and IV 4 [28] 45, 27), the concept of which appears to be a kind of revival of the old idea of νόμος on the basis of the Stoic notion of world-soul.<sup>6</sup> Plotinus, whom we see applying the Stoics' conception of λόγος even to the level of the ὑποστάσεις, so that the respective ὑποστάσεις must be considered the λόγος of the one prior to it [see above, p. 35 in # 23], integrates this Stoic concept into his own ontology by calling, for example, the One the νόμος of all things (VI 7 [38] 1, 57 and VI 8 [39] 10, 34).

S.V.F. 2, 543-546 [on συμπάθεια, see below, pp. 68 ff.]

S.V.F. 2, 717

[ # 42 ]

One of the Stoic doctrines that Plotinus found most apt for the purpose of giving a "Platonic" account [i.e., in the way Plato speaks in the *Timaeus* of the ὁρατὸς θεός] is the theory of the λόγοι σπερματικοί,<sup>7</sup> which may well be considered a nominalist transformation of the Aristotelian εἶδος.<sup>8</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Cf. W. Jaeger, *Aristotle*, p. 154.

<sup>2</sup> See the account by J. Moreau, *L'Âme du Monde de Platon aux Stoiciens*, p. 185.

<sup>3</sup> For which see E. Zilsel, "The Genesis of the Concept of Physical Law", *P.R.* LI (1942), p. 251.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. R. E. Witt, *C.Q.* XXV (1931), p. 104.

<sup>5</sup> See the discussion by V. Schubert, *Pronoia und Logos* (Munich, 1968), pp. 114 ff.

<sup>6</sup> Cf. W. Theiler, *M.H.* I (1944), p. 219.

<sup>7</sup> For which see C. Bäumker, *Das Problem der Materie in der griechischen Philosophie*, pp. 356-359, M. Heinze, *Die Lehre von Logos*, pp. 107 ff., and H. Meier, *Geschichte von den Keimkräften* (Bonn, 1924), pp. 1-26.

<sup>8</sup> See H. F. Müller, *A.G.P.* XXX [N.F. XXIII] (1917), p. 55.

Plotinus, like the Neoplatonist tradition before him, had not only to face the question as to what the ideas stand for [i.e., thoughts in the mind of God], but even had to find an answer to the problem never explicitly dealt with by Plato himself, i.e., in what sense can the ideas be supposed to function as *agentia* in the sensible world.<sup>1</sup> It was Plotinus' rather peculiar view of *Nature* in its relation to the intelligible universe<sup>2</sup> that made him reflect on the question as to how the Platonic ideas or their immanent aspects could be linked with what the Stoics called λόγοι σπερματικοί (for the intention underlying the Stoic conception of the λόγοι σπερματικοί, see Proclus, *In Parm.* IV col. 887, 36 ff. [Cousin]).

From the exposition of the problem as well as from what has already been said with regard to Plotinus' adaptation of the Stoic "Law of Being" [see above, pp. 35 in # 23 and pp. 41 in # 41], it is fairly clear that this Stoic doctrine could serve Plotinus' purposes merely as a substructure. For λόγος in Plotinus' system stands for the relationship between entities placed on different levels or degrees of Being: as the λόγος νοητὸς ἄυλος (V 8 [31] 1, 18-19, cf. also II 3 [52] 17) usually stands for the causal relation between Intelligence and Soul, so the λόγος ἔνυλος (I 8 [51] 8, 15, as also II 7 [31] 3, III 2 [47] 4, III 6 [26] 15, 5 ff.) is supposed to relate the sensible world to the world-soul [for Plotinus each bodily entity is a compound of ὕλη and λόγος].<sup>3</sup> It is one λόγος νοητὸς ἄυλος that creates the objects of this sensible world (III 6 [26] 19, 28-30; III 2 [47] 2, 36). However, there exist as many λόγοι as one cosmic period contains individual beings<sup>4</sup> (besides IV 4 [28] 36, 1 ff., see especially

<sup>1</sup> The most important contribution after P. DeLacy, "The Problem of Causality in Plato's Philosophy", *C.P.* XXXIV (1939), pp. 97-115. H. F. Cherniss, "The Philosophical Economy of the Theory of Ideas", in: *Studies in Plato's Metaphysics* [ed. R. E. Allen] (London, 1965), pp. 1-12, and H.-P. Stahl, "Ansätze zur Satzlogik bei Platon", *Hermes* LXXXVIII (1962), pp. 409 ff. is the article by G. Vlastos referred to above, p. 34, n. 6.

<sup>2</sup> In Plotinus the (Aristotelian) conception of an impersonal φύσις is subordinated to a teleological pattern, which transcends the empirical world.

<sup>3</sup> See also H. Meier, *Geschichte von den Keimkräften*, pp. 61-62.

<sup>4</sup> In holding this opinion, Plotinus was probably influenced by Stoicism. In any case, the question whether or not there exist ideas of individuals appears to have interested Plotinus considerably more than any other Platonist we know of (cf. Albinus, *Isagoge* IX [p. 163 Hermann]). Since this is not the place to enter into the discussion of V 9 (15) 12, on the one hand, and V 7 (18) 1, on the other, (for which see e.g. J. M. Rist, "Forms and Individuals in Plotinus", *CQ.* [N.S.] XIX [1963], pp. 223-231, and H.-J. Blumenthal, "Did Plotinus believe in Ideas of Individuals", *Phronesis* XI [1966], pp. 61-80, A. H. Armstrong, in: *C.H.L.G.E.M.P.* p. 249), the reader

V 7 [18] 1, 32-34). Not only the entities themselves, but also their specific properties, are considered to be λόγοι τινές καὶ μορφαί, and if not [of course] εἶδη or λόγοι, then at least εἶδους καὶ λόγου μεταλήψεις (VI 1 [42] 9, 10). It is thus in respect to organic and inorganic nature that Plotinus makes use of the Stoic λόγοι σπερματικοί,<sup>1</sup> in the sense that they are to be considered δυνάμεις,<sup>2</sup> or rather ποιήσεις (περὶ σῶμα καὶ σωμάτων ποιήσεις καὶ λόγοι VI 3 [44] 16). Nevertheless, one must bear in mind the fundamental difference as regards the conception of both the Stoics and Plotinus: γίνεται τοίνυν τὰ ἐν παντὶ οὐ κατὰ σπερματικούς ἀλλὰ κατὰ λόγους περιληπτικούς καὶ προτέρους ἢ κατὰ τοὺς τῶν σπερμάτων (IV 4 [28] 39, 5-8; cf. also V 9 [5] 6, 9-19).

Roughly speaking, the λόγοι σπερματικοί of the Stoics function as the mechanical agencies warranting the [Λοιπὸν] . . . τὴν ἐπιπλέκουσαν . . . ἀρχήν . . . (III 1 [3] 7, 1 ff.), whereas Plotinus takes them to be merely the energetic aspects of the rational plans, which themselves are subject to the indispensable will of *Providence* reflecting the intelligible pattern.

S.V.F. 2, 743

[# 43]

In V 9 (5) 6, 20 f. (φύσιν δέ τινες αὐτὴν [scil. ψυχὴν κρείττονα] ὀνομάζουσιν τὴν ἐν τοῖς σπέρμασιν) there is apparently a reference by Plotinus' to a viewpoint attributed to Chrysippus in S.V.F., Vol. II, p. 216, 5-8. Plotinus' criticism is perfectly in accord with his [very peculiar] understanding of *Nature's contemplation* [for which see below, pp. 53 f. in # 58] and with his account of the λόγοι σπερματικοί in IV 4 (28) 39, 5-8 and in particular in V 9 (5) 6, 9-19.

S.V.F. 2, 750

[# 44]

The explanation given for the creation of twins and triplets in

is referred to a correct exposition of this "problem" as it was given by H. Cherniss, *Aristotle's Criticism of Plato and the Academy*, Vol. I (Baltimore, 1944), p. 508: "The Individuals for which Plotinus posits ideas are not the particular phenomena, but only living organisms, and these 'ideas of individuals' are simply the individual *souls*; as particular rather than universal, however, not Socrates but only 'man' has an idea". Plotinus' understanding of Plato's philosophy is apparently affected by Aristotelianism (see H. Cherniss, *op. cit.* pp. 506 ff. [Appendix V]).

<sup>1</sup> They are also called λόγος ὁ ἐν τῷ σπέρματι (V 3 [49] 8, 7-9), λόγοι γεννητικοί (II 3 [52] 16, 20), αἱ ἐν σπέρμασι δυνάμεις (V 9 [5] 6, 15); further see M. Heinze, *Die Lehre vom Logos*, pp. 63-64.

<sup>2</sup> The term δύναμις is also applied to the ideas (cf. e.g. VI 2 [43] 21, 8 [see already Philo, *Spec. Leg.* 1, 42.329]).

IV 7 (2) 5, 42-45 and in V 7 (18) 2, 12 [*if*  $\chi\acute{o}\rho\alpha$  is to be understood, as it is by Volkmann, Harder, Cilento, and Page, to mean *matrix*] resembles very closely the one attributed to the Stoics in *Dox. Graec.* 422, 8-10 (from Aetius, 5, 10, 4).

S.V.F. 2, 774 [ # 45]

In IV 7 (2) 4, 3 f. [i.e., within the context of the criticism of the materialist doctrine of the soul held by the Stoics] Plotinus refers to their view that the soul has to be considered  $\piνεῦμα νοερόν θερμόν$  (from Aetius 4, 3, 3; see also Porphyry, *De Anima* [at Eus. *P.E.* XV, 813C = S.V.F. 2, 806, especially Vol. II, p. 223, 2-3]).

S.V.F. 2, 780 [ # 46]

In IV 7 (2) 2, 13-14 the passage  $\alpha\lambda\lambda\alpha\ \pi\alpha\rho\acute{\alpha}\ \tau\alpha\upsilon\tau\alpha\ \sigma\acute{\omega}\mu\alpha\tau\alpha\ \omicron\upsilon\kappa\ \xi\sigma\tau\iota$  probably refers back to 2, 5 [ $\tau\iota\ \sigma\acute{\omega}\mu\alpha\ \delta\ \lambda\acute{\epsilon}\gamma\omicron\upsilon\sigma\iota\nu\ \psi\upsilon\chi\acute{\eta}\nu$ ] and has thus to be taken in reference to the Stoics' opinion that the soul consists of body, though of a special substance (cf. S.V.F. 1, 142 [for which see above, pp. 25-26 in # 8]).

S.V.F. 2, 786-787 [ # 47]

The allusion to the Stoic  $\piνεῦμα$ -soul in IV 7 (2) 5, 27 appears to be particularly interesting. For it is connected with the kind of criticism offered in IV 2 (4) 2, 13 with respect to the "vain belief" in the theory of  $\sigmaυνέχεια$  [for which see above, pp. 38-39 in # 30]. There it was said that this theory could accomplish nothing unless it were to rely on the concept of the indivisible-divisible soul, as Plotinus thought was proposed by Plato in *Timaeus* 35A. Now, Plotinus criticizes the Stoics' assumption that soul consists of  $\piνεῦμα$ ,  $\piνεῦμα$ , since it is the most  $\sigmaκεδαστόν$  bodily entity one can conceive of, is certainly not able to sustain the *cosmos* as the Platonic world-soul does.

S.V.F. 2, 799 [Plot. *Enn.* IV 7 (2) 8<sup>2</sup>, 1-22, see above, pp. 18 ff.]

S.V.F. 2, 804 [ # 48]

In IV 7 (2) 8<sup>2</sup>, 1-6, when discussing aspects of the Stoics' view concerning the nature of the soul, Plotinus refers to the doctrine that an unborn child is considered to have only some kind of vegetative life and that, in the process of birth, a "shock incident" upon coming from the warmth into the cold creates the soul (for



στομωθεῖσαν see also *S.V.F.* 2, 805-808).<sup>1</sup> A criticism of this kind was already to be observed in the statement ὥσπερ ἄνευ πυρὸς καὶ πνεύματος οὐ δυναμένης (4, 4-5). Admittedly, the Stoic theory referred to has to be understood within the context discussed above, pp. 28-30.

*S.V.F.* 2, 809

[ # 49 ]

In IV 7 (2) 12, 1 ff. Plotinus points out the paradox entailed in the Stoics' opinion of the immortality or the mortality of the soul.<sup>2</sup>

Plotinus' account, though it is certainly not meant to be taken as an analysis, is not really correct for orthodox Stoicism did not espouse personal immortality in the sense that the Platonists did. That is to say, Platonists must assume that the soul is, after all, exempt from the course of history. The Stoics held that all souls undergo corruption in the process of ἐκπύρωσις. Thus, it is merely physical death that some souls can survive, i.e., those of the philosophers according to Chrysippus, whereas other souls do not even last until the ἐκπύρωσις. Apart from this individual, or rather personal, immortality presumably does not occur in the Stoic school earlier than its later period [*S.V.F.* 2, 813 from Lactantius. *Div. Inst.* 7, 20 can hardly claim to be a trustworthy report of the opinions held by the older Stoics].<sup>3</sup>

In any case, what is interesting to observe is the fact that Plotinus, in IV 7 (2) 12, 1-3, criticizes two Stoic opinions which differ from each other in that [according to the latter] the world-soul at least was regarded as immortal [ἀθάνατος, as opposed to φθαρτή]. But which of the Stoic philosophers could Plotinus have had in mind? This question cannot be answered. All that can be given is a kind of hypothesis: according to a passage in Hermias (*Comm. in Phaedr.* 102 [Couvreur]), Posidonius claimed that Plato considered only the world-soul to be immortal [= F 290, Edelstein-Kidd]. Yet it is obvious that such a viewpoint is impossible for Plato, and there is perhaps no better way of making sense of this statement than by

<sup>1</sup> See also O. Rieth, *Grundbegriffe der stoischen Ethik* (Berlin 1933), p. 125.

<sup>2</sup> Cleanthes seems to have held that all souls last until the ἐκπύρωσις, whereas Chrysippus believed that only the philosophical souls do so (Cf. *S.V.F.* 2, 836).

<sup>3</sup> As far as direct evidence is concerned, there is no indication that Posidonius regarded the human soul as immortal (*Contra* see K. Reinhardt, *R.E.* XXII, 1 [1953], coll. 778-791).

assuming that this opinion was attributed to Plato by a man who himself believed this to be the case.<sup>1</sup>

*S.V.F.* 2, 835 [for Plotinus' criticism of the Stoics' view that "mind is later than soul" see above, pp. 28-29 in # 14].

*S.V.F.* 2, 849 [see above, p. 27 in # 11]

*S.V.F.* 2, 854 [ # 50]

It has been said that Plotinus has a rather favourable attitude towards the principle employed in the Stoics' distinction between judgments *qua* perceptions and mere alterations of the sense-organs [see above, pp. 24-25 in # 7]. In IV 7 (2) 7, 1 ff., Plotinus, as one might expect, criticizes the Stoic doctrine, which does not take into consideration a distinction between the recognition of a sense-perception (pain *etc.*)<sup>2</sup> and perception itself. That is to say, the Stoics held (7, 7) that recognition in the ἡγεμονοῦν [i.e. the ἡγεμονικόν] took place by means of a διάδοσις, i.e., some sort of transmission from limb to limb and organ to organ.

Plotinus criticizes the διαδόσει-theory also in IV 2 (4) 2, 13 in connection with the συνέχεια-argument [see above, pp. 38-39 in # 30]. The word διάδοσις (for the verb see Plato, *Timaeus* 42D2, 63B3, Aristotle, *De Anima* 435A1, *De Insomn.* 459B3) does not occur in the *S.V.F.* at all, however, and is not to be found earlier than in a passage of Epictetus (*Diss.* 1, 14, 9), which might be Posidonian.

Plotinus claims that a transmission in the way supposed by the Stoics (a) must be unreasonable, since it follows that the leading part would have to "recognize" multiple pains at the same time [i.e. the limb experiences the pain of the finger *etc.*], (b) cannot even work, since the soul's leading part, which the Stoics take to be of bodily nature too, can itself recognize pain no more than the organs themselves, which are only capable of feeling affections.

Plotinus himself suggests that the recognition of πάθη takes place in what he calls the αἰσθητικὴ ψυχὴ (cf. IV 4 [28] 19, 5).

*S.V.F.* 2, 864 [ # 51]

νόττοι in IV 5 (29) 1, 18 is a Stoic term (besides Alexander, *De*

<sup>1</sup> See J. M. Rist, *Stoic Philosophy*, p. 216.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Seneca, *Epist. Mor.* 113, 23 = *S.V.F.* 2, 836.

*An. Mant.* 130, 13, see *Dox. Graec.* 406). The intention is slightly modified by Plotinus through the qualification of *κατὰ συμβεβηκός*, so that he can use it for the purposes of his own thesis against the Stoics' opinion of the process of vision <sup>1</sup> (cf. *S.V.F.* 2, 866).

What Plotinus finds most open to attack in the Stoics' viewpoint is their theory [see already Arist. *De Anima* B 7] of a *physical medium*, i.e., the mechanical production of, for example, vision by a physical medium such as air (cf. *S.V.F.* 2, 864, 866, 868 [see also Theophrast, *De Sensu* 57, and Lucretius 2, 244-255]). Plotinus' own solution, which is already indicated in 1, 35, focuses on the concept of *συμπάθεια*.<sup>2</sup> Accordingly, all sensation is to be understood as an instance of *συμπάθεια*, for there is no medium between organ and object, since the organ functions as the *medium* between the soul and its objects.

It is clear that Plotinus had to oppose the mechanical explanation proposed by the Stoics for mainly two reasons: (a) one of them concerns the fact, already pointed out, that Plotinus is accustomed to arguing against any tendency on the part of the Stoics to assert that the *ἡγεμονικόν* is subject to alterations [see above pp. 24-25 in # 7, pp. 32-33 in # 18], that is to say, Plotinus objects to their idea of the *ἡγεμονικόν* *πῶς ἔχον* [see above, p. 34 in # 22]; (b) Plotinus holds that *sensation* is an activity rather than something passive.

*S.V.F.* 2, 867

[ # 52 ]

*βακτηρία*, (IV 5 [29] 4, 29): Plotinus also rejects the Stoics' view that air is not so much a medium as a kind of stick with which "a blind man touches his surroundings in order to form a picture of them" (besides Alexander, *De Mixtione* 130, 17; 131, 24; 133; 32, see also D.L. 7, 157, and Epictetus, *Diss.* 2, 23, 3). An anti-Stoic account is also to be found in Galen, *De Hipp. et Plat. Plac.* 625, 5.]

<sup>1</sup> See G. H. Clark, *P.R.* LI (1942), pp. 357-382.

<sup>2</sup> For which see K. Reinhardt, *Kosmos und Sympathie*, p. 187 ff.; K. Reinhardt claimed that the theory to which Plotinus is referring in IV 5 (29) 4 can be proved to be Posidonian (see also I. Heinemann, *Poseidonios' metaphysische Schriften*, Vol. I [Breslau, 1922], pp. 456-457). H. F. Cherniss [R. M. Jones], "Galen's and Posidonius' Theory of Vision", *A.J.P.* LIV (1933), pp. 154-161 [also L. Edelstein, *A.J.P.* LVII (1936), p. 318 n. 125] asserted that there is nothing in Galen's report that need be explained otherwise than as an interpretation of Plato's *Timaeus* 45 C-D, which was influenced in one detail by Aristotle.

S.V.F. 2, 872

[# 53]

A similar criticism of the Stoics' view of the process of hearing is given in IV 5 (29) 5, 8-9. According to this, air is only incidentally an *interpositum* (cf. 1, 18 and 4, 4).

S.V.F. 2, 917

[# 54]

Plotinus, when discussing the nature of εἰμαρμένη,<sup>1</sup> refers to two Stoic opinions, neither of which occurs elsewhere as a separate doctrine; but Plotinus may have come across these accounts referred to as different versions of the same thing by authors of the first century A.D.<sup>2</sup> Yet the possibility has to be considered that Plotinus himself tried to make differentiations in the Stoics' attempts to give a satisfactory account of *freedom* and *necessity* (see S.V.F. 2, 916 [and Plotinus' remarks in III 1(3) 1, 36-39 and 7, 41]).

In any case, one of them, which is characterized in 1, 30 ff.,<sup>3</sup> concerns the idea of an unbroken series of causes, i.e., "*ab aeterno tempore fluentibus in aeternum*" (Cicero, *Tusc. Disp.* 5, 70). From what we know, it appears likely that this theory of a "*sempiterna et indeclinabilis series rerum et catena volvens semetipsa*" (Gellius, *Noct. Att.* 7, 2, 1) was formulated by Chrysippus.<sup>4</sup> In the light of such a συνδεσμός, συμπλοκή and εἰρμός of external causes, man would seem to be nothing more than a necessary event.<sup>5</sup>

Plotinus, though giving some credit to the intention of this doctrine (7, 6-8),<sup>6</sup> objects that the doctrine as such must be con-

<sup>1</sup> For a survey of the discussion of fatalism in antiquity, see W. C. Greene, *Moirai. Fate, Good and Evil in Greek Thought* (Cambridge Mass. 1944), and D. Amand, *Fatalisme et Liberté dans l'Antiquité grecque* (Louvain, 1945), and above all W. Theiler, "Tacitus und die antike Schicksalslehre", in: *Phyllobolia* [Festschrift für P. v. d. Mühl] (Basel, 1946), pp. 35-60. For Plotinus, in particular, see P. Henry, "Le Problème de la Liberté chez Plotin", *R.N.P.* XXXIII (1931), pp. 50-79, 180-215, 319-339, and J. M. Rist, *Plotinus: The Road to Reality*, pp. 66-83, 130-138.

<sup>2</sup> See W. Theiler, in: *Phyllobolia*, p. 44, n. 4.

<sup>3</sup> H. von Arnim was somewhat mistaken when considering the whole section 1, 11-37 as evidence for an "*infinita series causarum*" (S.V.F. 2, 946, Vol. II, pp. 273-274), for in 4, 1 ff. Plotinus deals with the view referred to in 1, 17-25 as a "separate theory".

<sup>4</sup> See W. Theiler, in: *Phyllobolia*, pp. 44-45, nn. 5.1.

<sup>5</sup> Cf. L. Edelstein, *The Meaning of Stoicism*, p. 29.

<sup>6</sup> From 7, 6-8 it is not clear what Plotinus had particularly in mind. I conjecture that he might have been thinking of Chrysippus' attempt to argue against Diodorus' formula, according to which: μηδὲν εἶναι δυνατόν, ὃ οὔτε ἐστὶ ἀληθές, οὔτ' ἔσται (Epictetus, *Diss.* 2, 19, 1); see S.V.F., and Origen in Eusebius, *P.E.* 6, 11, or Cicero *De Fato* 13.

trary to the Stoics' ideas of τὸ ἐφ' ἡμῶν (7, 15), for men—so it appears—would be nothing more than animals subject to their ὁρμαί and, moreover, at the mercy of a blind succession of external causes.

By saying so, Plotinus comes rather close to the kind of criticism that has been put forward by Alexander, *De Fato* 181, 13 ff. [= *S.V.F.* 2, 979, Vol. II, pp. 285, 1-286, 4], especially 183, 21 ff. [= *S.V.F.* 2, 981]. However, Plotinus' treatment of the Chrysippean account of *Fate* is far from being accurate. For, when, asserting, for example, that the Stoics consider πράξεις to be necessitated simply by the preceding φαντασία (7, 13-15), Plotinus omits to call attention to the fact that Chrysippus and Antipater of Tarsos, when arguing against objections on the part of the Academy, explicitly held that there is no action caused except by an autonomous act of συγκατάθεσις (cf. Plutarch, *De Stoic. Repugn.* 1057A, *Adv. Colot.* 1122A), or as Cicero puts the Stoic view: "*necesse est ad sensationem viso commoveri* [scil. *extrinsecus*]". That is to say, the Stoics could easily counter Plotinus' point by asserting that any φαντασία, with which an action is supposed to be in accordance, is dependent upon συγκατάθεσις<sup>1</sup> [hereby the Stoics would also meet Plotinus' "criterion" of free action as expressed in 4, 24-27].

Moreover, from the kind of criticism offered in 7, 15-20, one cannot but receive the impression that Plotinus is distorting the differentiation which is implied in the account of the nature of ὁρμαί (cf. e.g. Seneca, *De Ira* 2, 1, 4). For Plotinus, when calling attention to the fact that the Stoics assume a sort of immediate causation of an action by φαντασίαι,<sup>2</sup> must be thinking of their notion of an (involuntary) *impetus simplex*,<sup>3</sup> which the Stoics did apparently distinguish from the (voluntary) *impetus compositus* which results from συγκατάθεσις.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Thus, a συγκατάθεσις must be considered the very *last link* in the series of causes. Hence, the Stoics, when asserting that action is an autonomous act (cf. Sextus Empiricus, 7, 237, who speaks of κατάληψις and ὁρμή in terms of ἐνεργείαι), attempted, as did Epicurus [see D. J. Furley, *Two Studies in Greek Atomism* (Princeton, 1967), pp. 161-237, especially p. 232], to relate their idea of autonomy to the Aristotelian criterion of voluntary action.

<sup>2</sup> Plotinus, as it appears from Plutarch, *De Repugn. Stoic.* 1057A, *Adv. Colot.* 1122A, would be right if his criticism were directed against the opinion held by the Academic school.

<sup>3</sup> See also Epictetus in Gellius, *Noct. Att.* 19, 1, 15 ff. [= Fr. IX Schenkl].

<sup>4</sup> For this distinction [which must have some bearing on such a report as was given by Aetius, *Dox. Graec.* 369, 3], see especially E. Holler, *Seneca und die Seelenteilungslehre und Affektpsychologie der Mittelstoa* (Diss. Munich, 1934), p. 22.

There is, however, another point which, although of less importance, should not be overlooked. In 7, 12-13 Plotinus speaks of the Stoics' idea of universal causation in terms of one ultimate principle upon which all events depend. This account would be appropriate only if it were meant to apply to the kind of understanding of εἰμαρμένη to which Plotinus refers as a separate theory [see below # 55].

First, as concerns the idea of an unbroken series of causes, it is certainly not correct to infer, as Plotinus does, that someone who subscribes to such a theory also holds that there is one principle which adequately accounts for all events that are fated, or rather necessitated. For the conception of jointly dependent events (*confatalia*), which in Chrysippus' system turned on the distinction between a proximate and a sufficient cause<sup>1</sup> (cf. Cicero, *De Fato* 41 ["*adjuvans*", "*proxima*", "*perfecta*", "*principalis*"]),<sup>2</sup> served as one of the chief arguments in support of such a conception of freedom which "avoids necessity but retains fate",<sup>3</sup> and was meant to explain how "everything is ruled by fate, but that we nevertheless have some control over our conduct".<sup>4</sup> Curiously enough, Plotinus, when asserting ἔστι μὲν οὖν καὶ αὕτη ἡ δόξα ἐγγύς ἐκείνης τῆς πᾶσαν . . κίνησιν . . ἐκ τῆς τῶν ὅλων ψυχῆς ἡκείν . . (7, 4-6), gives some credit to the aim of the idea of an *infinita series causarum* (εἰ καὶ βούλεται τι ἡμῖν καὶ ἐκάστοις χαρίζεσθαι εἰς τὸ παρ' ἡμῶν ποιεῖν τι, [7, 6-8]). Yet from what follows one cannot but receive the impression that Plotinus does not want to enter into the discussion of the distinction drawn by Chrysippus. Neither does he go into an analysis of the somewhat complex relationship between *Fate* and *Necessity*, nor does he actually represent Chrysippus' conception of mutually dependent events [for III 1 (3) 7, 13-15, see p. 49 of the present work].

Second, Plotinus, when rendering the Stoic conception of interdependent events by τοιαῦτα δὲ ὄντα ὡς ἀπὸ μιᾶς ἀρχῆς ὠρμημένα ἡμῖν οὐδὲν καταλείψει, ἣ φέρεσθαι ὅπη ἂν ἐκεῖνα ὠθῇ (7, 11-13), fails to point out that this unbroken series of linked causes was regarded as "*ab aeterno* [i.e., *fluens*] *in aeternum*" (Cicero, *Tusc. Disp.* 5, 70 [also

<sup>1</sup> For a valuable account of the *testimonia*, see O. Rieth, *Grundbegriffe der stoischen Ethik*, pp. 135-155.

<sup>2</sup> For other terms to characterize types of causality, see *S.V.F.* 2, 351, 354.

<sup>3</sup> Cicero, *De Fato* 41; see W. C. Greene, *Moirai. Fate, Good and Evil in Greek Thought*, p. 349.

<sup>4</sup> Gellius, *Noct. Att.* 7, 2, 15 [quoting from a lost part of Cicero's *De Fato*].

see Gellius, *Noct. Att.* 7, 2, 1], above, p. 48). Chrysippus, however, clearly wished to avoid the Platonic-Aristotelian notion of “ultimate principle”, for it could hardly be reconciled with the Stoic ideas of ἀποκατάστασις and παλλιγγενεσία.<sup>1</sup>

S.V.F. 2, 928

[ # 55]

In his other account of the Stoics’ ideas of εἰμαρμένη, Plotinus emphasizes the monistic aspect of the Stoic interpretation of this world in terms of universal causation. According to this theory, fate would be identical with the all-penetrating *causa movens* and *creans*: διὰ πάντων φοιτήσασα αἰτία . . . κινουῖσα . . . καὶ ποιουῖσα, as Plotinus puts their view (III 1 [3] 2, 19 [= S.V.F. 2, 946, see also 4, 1 ff. = S.V.F. 2, 934]).<sup>2</sup> Similar to the criticism offered with regard to the “version” which assumes a network of an unbroken sequence of causes is Plotinus’ assertion that an identification of εἰμαρμένη with διὰ πάντων φοιτήσασα αἰτία must lead to an annihilation of τὸ ἐφ’ ἡμῶν (4, 20-24). That is to say that man’s action, as well as his reasoning, since both are to be taken as necessary events, must be considered the *property* [ἔργον] of something else [i.e., the active principle (?)].

It is interesting to observe that Plotinus is not merely misrepresenting the Stoics’ conception of a “rigid necessity” (4, 9-11), but that he is arguing from a point of view that is likely to have been held by someone who adhered to a certain extent, at least, to Chrysippus’ notion of universal causation. For Plotinus, when asserting that the Stoics [Cleanthes?] consider any event (i.e. E<sub>1.2.3.4.</sub> etc.) to be necessitated by the one all-penetrating force, presumes that they actually failed to realize the necessity of differentiating between the various types of causality: for example, a cause *a* can be held responsible only for E<sub>1</sub>, and E<sub>4</sub>, in order to take place, has to be caused by a cause *d*, which itself must be an entailment of E<sub>3</sub> (cf. 4, 12 ff.). This is exactly the kind of criticism offered by Alexander, *De Fato* 175, 7 ff. [= S.V.F. 2, 936], to whom Plotinus, in this particular case, may well be related. The point which Plotinus makes is not really appropriate, however, for from his account one is forced to infer that the Stoics did not distinguish

<sup>1</sup> The kind of misunderstanding on the part of the Platonic-Aristotelian tradition is obvious e.g. in Alexander’s criticism (*De Fato* 196, 1 ff. [= S.V.F. 2, 949]).

<sup>2</sup> The sentence in 2, 21, as is evident from its grammatical structure, presents Stoic opinion and cannot be taken as a critical account.

between events and their actual causes, whereas Alexander, taking such a differentiation for granted, simply objects to the Stoics' notion of *necessity*: to him it seems incomprehensible to speak of an event, for example, E<sub>8</sub> [e.g., τὴν δακτύλου τινὸς ἔκτασιν] as fated, in the sense that such an event is necessitated by the will of God, see also Plutarch, *De Comm. Not.* 1076E).

It is likely that Plotinus, when referring to a distinct Stoic doctrine which considered one universal act of causation only, had in mind Cleanthes' *Hymn to Zeus* (S.V.F. 2, 537). In fact in the light of this peculiar treatise it might well seem as if Plotinus were absolutely right in assuming that the Stoics must have held the sum of particular events to be the "work" of something else, so that "neither are we ourselves, nor is there any function which is ours" (4, 20-21).

There is no evidence for the assumption, however, that Plotinus is erroneously exaggerating the point of view held by Cleanthes. Nevertheless, from the critical account that follows in 4, 24-28, it seems possible to infer that Plotinus was hardly aware of the implications of Cleanthes' idiosyncratic opinion of the relation between πρόνοια and εἰμαρμένη [i.e., that a fated event is not necessarily providential]. For it is on the basis of their supposed premise that there is no such thing as an independent human action or function that the Stoics, so Plotinus claims, are inclined to lay on the deity itself the blame for anything bad. This is quite incorrect. For even Chrysippus is determined "not to admit that God can be responsible for anything shameful";<sup>1</sup> but it is true that Zeno and Chrysippus, since they strongly asserted that there is no event which is incompatible with the deity's providence, had to face the problem of how to maintain the former [i.e., that there *are* shameful events] without giving up the latter [i.e., the equation of fate, God nature, and providence] (cf. e.g. S.V.F. 2, 1183 and 2 1178, for which see also Cicero *De Nat. Deor.* 2, 167, where the Stoic is speaking of physical evils [see also below, p. 56 in # 61]).

Cleanthes' point of view is quite different. Finding it impossible to admit that physical evil and moral evil are brought about by the divine will, he distinguished, or rather, differentiated (a) those events of providential origin which are also fated, (b) those events that, though fated, need not be providential (cf. Chalcidius, *In*

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Plutarch, *De Stoic. Repugn.* 1049E [= S.V.F. 2, 1125], and W. C. Greene, *Moirai. Fate, Good, and Evil in Greek Thought*, p. 346.



*Timaëum* 142 [= *S.V.F.* 2, 933]; for Plotinus' conception of *Fate* see below pp. 101-111).

*S.V.F.* 2, 974

[ # 56]

Plotinus' reference to the distinction to be employed between sufficient and proximate causes (III 1 [3] 1, 24 f.) suggests acquaintance with the scheme proposed by Chrysippus (cf. Plutarch *De Stoic. Repugn.* 1056B). *προσεχεῖς* corresponds to *proximae* in Cicero, *De Fato* 41; see also 7, 14 [τοῖς προηγγησαμένοις . . .]

*S.V.F.* 2, 1013

[ # 57]

The distinction of different types, or rather, degrees of beings in terms of *ἐξίς*, *φύσις*, and *ψυχή*,<sup>1</sup> to which orthodox Stoicism had become accustomed<sup>2</sup> (cf. *S.V.F.* 2, 714-716, especially Sextus Empiricus, *Adv. Math.* 9, 78 ff. [= *S.V.F.*, Vol. II, p. 302, 36 ff.]), is mentioned by Plotinus with a polemical intention in V 9 (5) 5, 25 and IV 7 (2) 8<sup>3</sup>, 8 [here *ἐξίς*; for which see above, p. 57 in # 14].

Indeed, Plotinus' criticism is not directed against the principles of this distinction.<sup>3</sup> It is rather that he understands this scheme to be a genuine expression of the Stoics' perverse ontology, assuming *ψυχή* to be posterior to matter and *λόγος* or *νοῦς* posterior to *ψυχή*. From V 9 (5) 5, 25-26 it seems that Plotinus, when saying *δυνάμει γὰρ ταῦτα*, expresses his doubts as to what extent *ἐξίς*, *φύσις*, and *ψυχή* can be considered sufficient linking factors of the objects which they control. That is to say, the Stoics fail to posit *transcendental* formal principles [see below, p. 72].

*S.V.F.* 2, 1016

[ # 58]

The most original and striking doctrine ever proposed by Plotinus is that of the *Contemplation of Nature* (III 8 [30]).<sup>4</sup> It is Plotinus'

<sup>1</sup> H. Dörrie, in: *Les Sources de Plotin*, p. 114 suggests that this series was meant to be taken as '*parataktische Reihe*'.

<sup>2</sup> J. M. Rist, *Stoic Philosophy*, p. 210 is quite right in asserting that there is no good reason for attributing the passage in Sextus Empiricus (*Adv. Math.* 9, 78-81) to Posidonius in particular; see, however, the different accounts by K. Reinhardt, *Kosmos und Sympathie*, pp. 34. 41-43, and R. E. Witt, *C.Q.* XXIV (1930), p. 203.

<sup>3</sup> See below, pp. 72 in # 83.

<sup>4</sup> For a general introduction consult J. A. Deck, *Contemplation and the One* (Toronto, 1967), pp. 64-72. 82-92. 110-117, and V. Schubert, *Pronoia und Logos*, pp. 48-51.

concern to prove that the whole of nature as such <sup>1</sup> is engaged in θεωρία. In other words, Plotinus wants to show that nature's mode of being is *activity* which is, however, founded on a perpetual act of contemplation.

It is evident that Plotinus, from the historical point of view, is concerned with an application of Aristotle's distinction between θεωρεῖν and πράττειν <sup>2</sup> to what he considers the totality of Being: "As Soul returns upon Intellect in contemplation, and consequently produces, so Nature returns in contemplation upon the higher Soul".<sup>3</sup>

The point that Plotinus wishes to make is that φύσις [in the sense of *natura naturans*], which, he claims, the Stoics, regard as ἀφανταστικόν (cf. *S.V.F.*, Vol. II, p. 304, 11), is capable of possessing a kind of self-consciousness (4, 22 ff.) and that it actualizes its state of being in the activity of spontaneous ποίησις, which itself is founded on contemplation. That is to say, nature creates εὐμηγάνως by imitating those rational entities whose rational forms [i.e., λόγοι ἐνυλοὶ or σπερματικοί] are inherent in itself (cf. IV 3 [27] 11, 8 ff.).

However, Plotinus' critical account in III 8 (30) 1, 22, ἣν ἀφανταστικόν φασιν καὶ ἄλογον εἶναι, and in 4, 21-23,<sup>4</sup> presuming that the Stoics did not know any better than to say that nature is without imagination, is not entirely correct. For this reference to the Stoics' conception of φύσις would be appropriate only if it were meant to apply to their conception of nature in the narrow sense,<sup>5</sup> i.e., the second member in the series ἔξις, φύσις, and ψυχή [see above, pp. 53-108 in # 57]. It must be this unintelligent kind of nature of which Sextus Empiricus is speaking (*Adv. Math.* 9, 114 [= *S.V.F.*, Vol. II, p. 204, 11]). This is not the place to discuss how it came about that the Stoics believed they had to separate certain concepts which had been combined in Aristotle's notion of φύσις. With regard to

<sup>1</sup> For the range of application of the term φύσις in Plotinus' system, see H. F. Müller, "Physis bei Plotinos", *Rh. M.* LXXXL (1916), pp. 232-245.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. *E.N.* 1095B4, 1177B19, 1178A9, also Iamblichus, *Protr.* 42, 25 Pistelli].

<sup>3</sup> A. H. Armstrong, in: *C.H.L.G.E.M.P.*, p. 254.

<sup>4</sup> The interpretation given by A. C. Drews, *Plotin und der Untergang der antiken Weltanschauung* (Jena 1907), p. 141 is entirely misleading, since it is based on a mistranslation of the text.

<sup>5</sup> See K. Reinhardt, *Kosmos und Sympathie*, p. 98, also H. and M. Simon, *Die alte Stoa und ihr Naturbegriff*, pp. 94-119.

Plotinus' criticism, however, it is of some importance to call attention to the fact that the Stoics' conception of *Natura artifex*<sup>1</sup> satisfied the criteria established by Plotinus for the idea of nature as craftsman. The main difference between Plotinus and the Stoics is that the Platonist posited an intelligible transcendent pattern after which nature creates its objects, whereas the Stoics, taking nature to be the creative aspect of God's activity, held that the rational pattern is inherent in φύσις itself.

What remains doubtful, however, is whether or not Plotinus' criticism would be meaningful even if it were directed against the *unintelligent* φύσις. Admittedly, φύσις, which in Plotinus' system is almost identical with the lower part of the world-soul or its immanent aspect, has the weakest of all possible powers of contemplation. That is to say, φύσις is almost unconscious and has the unawareness that as one might have when asleep (III 8 [30] 4, 31-47; 6, 1-10).<sup>2</sup>

S.V.F. 2, 1028 = Enn. VI 1 (47) 27 [see above, pp. 36-37 in # 26]

S.V.F. 2, 1163

[# 59]

Within the context of any anthropocentric theodicy, the problem of the justification of, for example, the existence of animals was given much attention (see Pease's commentary on Cicero, *De Nat. Deor.* 2, 39 [= S.V.F. 2, 1153]).

Plotinus does not in general consider this a problem in itself. Nevertheless, in passing, he occasionally makes comments that are rather "Stoicizing" in their intention, as, for example, the remark that animals are the embellishment of the earth (cf. Plutarch, *De Stoic. Repugn.* 1044C) and that the use of most animals is rather obvious (III 2 [47] 9, 31 ff. [cf. Cicero, *De Nat. Deor.* 2, 37, 64, 160]). However, in the same context, he strongly rejects the kind of exaggeration implied in the extreme anthropocentric approach, as for instance, the famous explanation of the existence of κόρεις, which Chrysippus said existed in order to εὐχρήστως ἐξυπνίζειν (Cf. also II 3 [52] 18, 4).

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<sup>1</sup> For some good accounts, see E. Grumach, *Physis und Agathon in der alten Stoa* (Berlin, 1932), pp. 45-71, and F. Solmsen, "Nature as Craftsman in Greek Thought", *J.H.I.* XXIV (1963), pp. 332-335, especially pp. 354-355.

<sup>2</sup> See also J. A. Deck, *Contemplation and the One*, p. 71.

S.V.F. 2, 1169

[ # 60]

The argument employed by Plotinus for the necessity of the existence of evil in III 3 [48] 7, 2 ff. [πῶς τὸ βέλτιον μὴ χείρονος] is exactly that reported by Gellius, *Noct. Att.* 7, 1, to be held by Chrysippus.

It is worth-while pointing out that Plotinus, like the Stoics, presumably combined two ideas that are different in kind. (a) One concerns the idea implied already in Heraclitus (e.g. V.S. 22 B 10), "*nullum contrarium est sine contrario altero*" (cf. Arist. *Cat.* 10). (b) The other referred to by Plotinus' use of comparatives [βέλτιον — χείρον] has to be related to the Aristotelian "*argumentum ex gradibus entium*" (cf. *De Caelo* 270A30, and Simplicius, *In De Cael.* 288, 18-289, 15),<sup>1</sup> which was adopted by the Stoics (cf. S.V.F. 1, 529 [attested for Cleanthes by Sextus Empiricus, *Adv. Math.* 9. 88], see also Cicero, *De Nat. Deor.* 2, 33-36, especially 35).

S.V.F. 2, 1170

[ # 61]

Plotinus alludes to the Stoic theory according to which evil has no existence outside the soul itself (III 3 [48] 5, 20).<sup>2</sup> He appears to take a rather favourable attitude towards the Stoic view that ills [i.e., sickness *etc.*] must be considered events κατὰ παρακολούθησιν (cf. Gellius, *Noct. Att.* 7, 1, 7). Incidentally, such a view is connected with the cosmological theory according to which matter has its own causality (cf. Seneca, *Nat. Quaest.* 6, 3). It is understandable that this theory was found to suit the purpose of those who attempted to limit the range of application of *Providence*, in order not to lay the blame for all harmful events on the deity itself (cf. Plutarch, *De Stoic. Repugn.* 1051B). On the basis of the assumption that matter has a kind of causality of its own, it therefore became possible to argue that *Providence* is not responsible for the existence of earthquakes or of those animals that appear after big storms . . . (cf. Philo, *De Providentia* II).

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<sup>1</sup> Besides the literature referred to above (p. 29, n. 3), see J. Moreau, *L'Âme du Monde de Platon aux Stoiciens*, p. 185, n. 5, and P. Wilpert, "Die Stellung der Schrift über die Philosophie in der Gedankenentwicklung des Aristoteles", *J.H.S.* LXXVII (1957), pp. 159 ff.

<sup>2</sup> For the Stoics' opinion, see A. A. Long, "The Stoic Concept of Evil", *P.Q.* XVIII (1968), pp. 329-343.

S.V.F. 2, 1172

[# 62]

In III 2 (47) 9, 32 ff., Plotinus employs the objection raised by the Stoics against those who claimed that there are animals whose usefulness to man is not apparent; in a way similar to that of the Stoics, Plotinus says that time will show, as it has done before, the use of even the animals in question (cf. Lactantius, *De Ira* 13).

S.V.F. 2, 1175

[# 63]

Plotinus seems to be inclined to agree in principle with the Stoics (e.g. Seneca, *De Providentia* 2, 1 and 4, 8) that many ills and so called evils function in a way that is rather useful to man (III 2 [47] 5, 15-21).

Yet, he would not say, as appears from this account, and in spite of 5, 21-23, that such things exist *per se* for this purpose, as Chrysippus obviously held when saying that evil has to be considered an instrument in the hands of God for the education of man (cf. Plutarch, *De Stoic. Repugn.* 1035F, see also Philo, *De Providentia* II).<sup>1</sup> Nevertheless, in IV 8 (6) 5, 25 ff., Plotinus proposes an idea which makes great use of the Stoics' anthropocentric concept when he suggests that it is the ills of this world that make the divine soul aware of its inconceivable abilities. Consequently, one might gather that Plotinus thought of the corporeal existence of souls as mere exercise. This idea would fit rather neatly the metaphor of the world-drama, in which the individual plays out the rôle assigned to him [see below, pp. 80 ff.].

S.V.F. 2, 1181 [for the theatre-comparison, see below pp. 73 ff., in # 83].

S.V.F. 3, 3/65

[# 64]

The wording τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν . . . τὸ ἔσχατον τῶν ὀρεκτῶν in I 4 (46) 1, 10-12 shows that Plotinus is "stoicizing", although there is nothing peculiarly Stoic about the context in which it occurs.

S.V.F. 3, 13/16

[# 65]

At the beginning of I 7 (54), which resembles in some way that of I 4 (46), Plotinus sets out to give a fairly general description of the good that is proper to a being. By saying that such a good consists in ἡ κατὰ φύσιν τῆς ζωῆς ἐνέργεια [or even, more specifically, with

<sup>1</sup> Cf. C. de Vogel, *Greek Philosophy*<sup>2</sup>, Vol. III (Leiden, 1959), p. 77.

regard to the soul: ψυχῆς δὲ ἐνέργεια τὸ κατὰ φύσιν ἀγαθὸν αὐτῆς], he summarizes loosely a position formulated by Aristotle, for example, *E.N.* 1098B14-16, 1178A12-17. Plotinus speaks in terms of ἐνέργεια οἰκεία κατὰ φύσιν, of οἰκεῖον ἔργον and of the κατὰ φύσιν ἔργον.

It is not at all difficult to see that Plotinus, although having Aristotle in mind, comes close to the fundamental viewpoint presumably maintained by the Stoics (cf. Stobaeus, *Ecl.* II, 76, 32 [= *S.V.F.* 3, 12], Cicero, *De Finibus* 4, 14 [= *S.V.F.* 3, 13]).<sup>1</sup> There is nothing specifically Stoic, however, about the statements made by Plotinus in this general outline.

*S.V.F.* 3, 17

[# 66]

Even the identification of εὖ ζῆν and εὐδαιμονεῖν, as emphasized in I 4 (46) 1, 1 [which is mentioned by Plotinus in order to point out the ἀπορία which a Platonist has to face] tends to be a commonplace, for Aristotle had already considered it to be a *consensus omnium* (cf. *E.N.* 1095A19, 1098B20), and from Michael's commentary [*Comm. Graec.* Vol. XX] we learn that this definition has been held by the Stoics and also the Epicureans (cf. *In Eth. Nic.* 598, 20 ff., 599, 6 ff.).

It is thus difficult to decide against whom Plotinus is actually arguing. Even though the ἀπορία indicated in 1, 1-2 can be meant, of course, to be taken in reference to Aristotle, *E.N.* 1178B24<sup>2</sup> [such is also Michael's opinion], all that actually matters is the explication of τὸ εὖ ζῆν. That is to say, that, in order to give a precise definition of what they consider happiness to be, the different schools had to substitute the expression εὖ ζῆν in different ways. From what follows [for which see below, pp. 65 ff., in # 79] it is clear, however, that Plotinus is mainly concerned with the substitution proposed by the Stoics.

*S.V.F.* 3, 29

[# 67]

The well-known equation of καλόν and ἀγαθόν, which was intellectualized not earlier than the time of Democritus (*V.S.* 68 B 69), had become a fundamental *condicio sine qua non* in the Stoics'

<sup>1</sup> For the discussion, see now particularly H. Reiner, "Der Streit um die stoische Ethik", *Z.P.F.* XXI (1967), pp. 261-287, and "Die ethische Weisheit der Stoiker heute", *Gymnasium* LXXVI (1969), pp. 330-356.

<sup>2</sup> W. Himmerich, *Eudaimonia*, p. 19, n. 2 [p. 163] asserts that Plotinus is concerned with Aristotle.

ethical conception (cf. *S.V.F.*, Vol. III, pp. 9-11 [ἔτι μόνον τὸ καλὸν ἀγαθόν]).

Such reasoning seems to underlie Plotinus' statement in I 6 (1) 6, 22-25. It must be understood, however, that for Plotinus, especially at a time when he was rather inclined to identify καλὸν and ἀγαθόν, and to regard them as one ὑπόστασις, such a proposition can make sense only if the meaning assumed for ἀγαθόν is that required in the Platonists' point of view. From V 9 (5) 1, 10-12 it may be inferred that Plotinus would strongly have objected to this equivocation if proposed by the Stoics, since Plotinus claims that their notion of καλόν, equals more the Epicurean conception of ἡδύ than what a Platonist would consider to be the real level of ἀγαθότης (cf. also Plutarch, *De Comm. Not.* 1075D).

*S.V.F.* 3, 54

[≠ 68]

I 5 (36) offers an interesting account of the nature of happiness. When Plotinus says that happiness cannot be increased ἐν παραθέσει χρόνου, he apparently subscribes to the δόγμα formulated by Chrysippus.<sup>1</sup> The Stoics' viewpoint has to be understood, so it appears from *S.V.F.* 3, 585, as an explicit objection to the opinion given by Aristotle [i.e. *E.N.* A] in his statement that εὐδαιμονία can be fulfilled only ἐν βίῳ τελείῳ (cf. *E.N.* 1098A11, 1099B10, see also Arius Didymus in Stob. *Ecl.* II, 132, 3 f.). This is not the place to outline all the respects in which the Stoics had to oppose the account of *happiness* which Aristotle gives in *E.N.* A; some of the arguments which Plotinus raises against Aristotle (I 5 [36] 2-6) are likely to have been employed by the Stoics as well. In principle, they all amount to the assumption that Aristotle failed to consider happiness to be a quality in itself, to which the category of more and less does not apply, and that he, when saying that happiness can only be fulfilled in a complete life, assumed an increase of happiness (6, 19-23).<sup>2</sup>

Yet Aristotle, however full of inconsistencies his views on εὐδαιμονία may be, is not liable to this charge, at least not in the sense the Stoics thought him to be [From *E.N.* 1097B16-18 it is

<sup>1</sup> Cf. M. Pohlenz, *Die Stoa*, Vol. I, p. 396, Vol. II, p. 192.

<sup>2</sup> The 'quotations' in 3, 1-2 and 6, 19-20 cannot be verified. It is possible that Plotinus is referring to so-called exoteric writings of Aristotle. It must be borne in mind, however, that there existed numerous Hellenistic treatises dealing with this particular problem.

clear that happiness is meant to be taken as something whose value cannot be increased by the addition of another good. That is to say, the value of happiness for whose sake men do everything else is not influenced by the accumulation of experiences or things regarded as being conducive to happiness]. With respect to the Stoic proposition that someone [i.e., the Stoic Σοφός] who endures and overcomes τὰ Πριαμικά must be considered εὐδαίμων (cf. *S.V.F.* 3, 585), Aristotle would have said that such a man is unlikely to recover from his ills unless he is granted a full span of life (*E.N.* 1101A10-13).

The argument which Plotinus considers to be most effective against the assumption that happiness may be increased, is the fact that εὐδαιμονία cannot be related to πρᾶξις (I 5 [36] 10, 10-23). Relying on what Plotinus understands to be the Platonic imperative, viz. "that we must not link Being with non-Being, and time—even everlasting time—with eternity" (7, 24-27), he claims that εὐδαιμονία, which for a Platonist is essentially linked with the contemplative life, is *a priori* not related to time.

Now, it is interesting to observe that Aristotle, when arguing that true happiness can be achieved only through the κατὰ νοῦν βίος [= βίος θεωρητικός], was apparently aiming at such a conception of happiness: contemplation of the eternal as perpetuation of the timeless present. Plotinus, I wish to argue, firmly believing in Plato's conception of ὁμολώσις θεῶν, adopts the Stoic objection to the supposed Aristotelian account in *E.N.* A, in order to make a case for such an idea as had been proposed by Aristotle himself in *E.N.* K 7-8, according to which true happiness [which for a Platonist must be founded on an ἀγαθῷ ζῶν] <sup>1</sup> consists in the contemplation of the intelligible world which cannot be measured on a time-scale.<sup>2</sup>

*S.V.F.* 3, 64

[# 69]

From V 9 (5) 1, 10-15 it may appear that Plotinus, though himself holding that happiness must be linked with virtue (I 5 [36] 10, 20-23, also 7, 20-21), is criticizing the Stoics for saying that virtue itself is sufficient for the achievement of happiness.<sup>3</sup> Admit-

<sup>1</sup> For Plotinus' understanding of the 'good life', see P. O. Kristeller, *Der Begriff der Seele in der Ethik Plotins*, pp. 77.

<sup>2</sup> See J. M. Rist, *Plotinus: The Road to Reality*, p. 152, and his *Eros and Psyche* (Toronto, 1964), p. 89.94.

<sup>3</sup> From D.L. 7, 128 we learn that this [orthodox] dogma was not maintained by Panaetius and Posidonius.



tedly, this criticism is here not outspoken, for Plotinus simply denies that what the Stoics consider to be virtue can ever lead to wisdom. Considering, however, that Plotinus is examining the Stoics' notion of virtue, and that we know of other accounts of the Stoic doctrine in question, to which the exposition given by Plotinus is rather similar, the assumption that Plotinus, *virtualiter*, is making a case against this orthodox Stoic dogma does not seem to be too far-fetched.

In any event, Plotinus points out that the Stoics, since their ἐκλογὴ of "goods" conducive to virtue concerns solely τὰ ἐκεῖ [i.e., the sensible world], as does their sphere of moral activities [πραΐξεις], must have a false understanding of what virtue really is. By holding firmly to the opinion that virtue is concerned with the selection of empirical goods [the Stoics would have said those which are λεκτά], they must deprive themselves of the possibility of achieving true wisdom. Moreover, for Plotinus there can be no doubt that the Stoics' notion of value is determined by the fact that they are not aware of the logico-metaphysical relation between wisdom and virtue, on the basis of which the Neoplatonists cannot think of "value" except in terms of that which is conducive to the ὁμοίωσις θεῷ. Thus it appears from 1, 10-12 that Plotinus must be inclined to deny the Stoics the right to assign a value-reference to their "ἀγαθά", since a thing's being worthy of esteem for its own sake must mean, in the Neoplatonists' point of view, that its intrinsic value is determined by the degree to which the good in question matters *sub specie aeternitatis*.

It is not at all surprising that Plotinus, though his definition of virtue is quite similar to the one held by the Stoics (S.V.F. 3, 197, cf. I 5 [36] 10, 13. 19), should consider the Stoics' conception of ἀρετή as falling under a kind of φυσικὴ ἀρετή (cf. I 1 [56] 10, 1-15).<sup>1</sup> It is therefore interesting to observe that here, as elsewhere, a Stoic viewpoint is attacked simply because Plotinus realized very well that it might virtually appear to be a candidate for the truth.

S.V.F. 3, 117

[# 70]

In his anti-Gnostic treatise (II 9 [33]) Plotinus adopts (cf. 9, 1) the attitude of a Stoic Σοφός, who attaches no importance to what people would consider a just distribution of worldly goods (cf. also

<sup>1</sup> For which see P. O. Kristeller, *Der Begriff der Seele in der Ethik Plotins*, pp. 32-33.

IV 4 [28] 43, 1 ff., which differs in certain respects from the above-mentioned passage). The Stoic-Cynic attitude is allied to the state of mind characterized by the Socratic-Platonic διττός βίος (9, 6 [cf. Plato, *Gorgias* 500D], see also III 2 [47] 5, 6 and 13, 6).

S.V.F. 3, 178 ["συναίσθησις", see below, pp. 126 ff.].

S.V.F. 3, 278

[# 71]

Plotinus, when dealing with the question "what is the nature of the beautiful?" (I 6 [1]), refers to the Stoic definition that beauty consists in the harmonious relation of the various parts to one another and to the whole, and that beauty also depends upon a certain excellence of colour (I 6 [1] 1, 21). [For the Stoic doctrine of symmetry, see Stobaeus, *Ecl.* II, 62, 15 = S.V.F. 3, 278, *Ecl.* II, 68, 30-34 = S.V.F. 3, 279; Cicero, *Tusc. Disp.* 4, 30-31, and Galen, *De Hipp. et Plat. Plac.* 342, 5 = S.V.F., Vol. III, p. 122, 23-24].

Although there is little evidence, I should like to suggest that Plotinus may be thinking of Panaetius' theory of aesthetics.<sup>1</sup>

S.V.F. 3, 295/299

[# 72]

In I 2 (19) 7, 28-29 Plotinus relates his own idea of the *mutua virtutum conjunctio* to the well-known doctrine employed especially by the Stoics (for which see D.L. 7, 125 = S.V.F. 3, 295, and Plutarch, *De Stoic. Repugn.* 1046E). There is nothing peculiarly Stoic about this doctrine, however, as far as Plotinus' understanding is concerned, for his viewpoint is apparently dependent upon supposedly Platonic premises (cf. 7, 29-30).

S.V.F. 3, 305

[# 73]

In IV 7 (2) 8, 1 ff., Plotinus argues particularly against those implications of the Stoics' theory of soul which would seem to require attack by anyone who is a Platonist.

The argument that *thinking* must be impossible if the soul is a body or a bodily entity (see also 8, 27-28 [for which see Stobaeus, *Ecl.* II, 68, 18, and above, p. 24 in # 6]) recalls the kind of criticism made by Aristotle of those who, he claimed, did not distinguish between νοεῖν and αἰσθάνεσθαι (cf. *Metaph.* Γ [in the context of the discussion of the law of non-contradiction], and also in *De Anima* 404A27 ff., etc.). With regard to the passage referred to

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Panaetius, Fr. 107 van Straaten.

in 8, 27-28, it is worth-while noticing the statement that virtue, of which the Platonists posit an intelligible archetype, would then also be merely a bodily condition, which is in fact an exact interpretation of the Stoics' position.

S.V.F. 3, 386

[ # 74 ]

In IV 4 (28) 8, 19 it is said that πάθη, without any qualification, belong not to the soul, but rather to a συναμφοτέρον<sup>1</sup> of soul and body, or as it is said in I 4 (46) 19, 5, πάθη take place in the body, whereas the recognition of them is considered to be a function of the αἰσθητικὴ ψυχὴ [see above, pp. 46 in # 50].

It seems that, Plotinus would agree with the Stoics that the source of παραχῇ has to be attributed to the soul itself<sup>2</sup> and that some of man's reflective opinions, as well as any δόξα ἄλογος come into being in the παθητικόν (III 6 [26] 4, 1 ff.).<sup>3</sup>

S.V.F. 3, 459

[ # 75 ]

In the same treatise, III 6 (26) 1, 1 ff., Plotinus states that sense-perceptions *qua* judgments must be distinguished from mere alterations of the sense-organs.

This is a typically Stoic doctrine (cf. S.V.F. 2, 854, see also IV 7 [2] 7, 3: above, pp. 24-28 in # 7). What Plotinus tends to suggest, however—and here he comes closer to Posidonius<sup>4</sup>—is that the true [i.e., divine] soul is not at all affected by any kind of bodily alteration,<sup>5</sup> but that it is ἄτρεπτος [see above, pp. 27-28 in # 12]. That Posidonius is very likely to have held the ἡγεμονικόν to be ἀπαθές can be inferred from F 163, 184 [Edelstein-Kidd].<sup>6</sup> In doing so he opposed the older Stoics, especially Chrysippus, who did not employ the Platonic distinction of παθητικόν and ἄλογον from λογικόν (cf. S.V.F. 1, 202; 2, 849; 3, 459).<sup>7</sup> For Plotinus such

<sup>1</sup> For which see W. Theiler, in: *Les Sources de Plotin*, p. 79.

<sup>2</sup> This idea links up with Plotinus' opinion that it is the soul's own τόλμα which causes it to fall. The best analysis that I know of is the one by E. R. Dodds, *Pagan and Christian in an Age of Anxiety*, pp. 24-26.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. H.-R. Schwyzer, in: *Les Sources de Plotin*, p. 169.

<sup>4</sup> See H.-R. Schwyzer, in: *Les Sources de Plotin*, p. 367.

<sup>5</sup> Cf. W. Theiler, in: *Les Sources de Plotin*, p. 81.

<sup>6</sup> For further discussion of Galen, *De Hipp. et Plat. Plac.* 409, 1 and Seneca, *Epist. Mor.* 92, 10, see W. Theiler, *Die Vorbereitung des Neuplatonismus*, pp. 85 ff.

<sup>7</sup> A. Schmekel, *Die Philosophie der mittleren Stoa*, p. 198, and A. Modrzejewski, *Philologus* XXVII (1932), p. 305, claimed that Panaetius adhered to a dichotomic conception.

a distinction must have been important (cf. IV 9 [8] 3, 19).<sup>1</sup>

The difference between the Stoics' and Plotinus' opinions of ἀπάθεια appears to be that the former considered ἀπάθεια to be a continuous task and effort, while the latter thought of it as the genuine condition of an entity belonging to a level different from the mundane world.<sup>2</sup>

The only problem that arises here is that Plotinus had to attribute to the vegetative part some kind of passive function; the solution proposed in III 6 (26) 4, 21 tends to make use of the Aristotelian concept of εἰδός τι.

S.V.F. 3, 474/475

[# 76]

Chrysippus wrote a θεραπευτικὸς λόγος (cf. Origen, *C. Celsum* I, 64; 8, 51, and Galen, *De Hipp. et Plat. Plac.* 383 [= S.V.F. 3, 475]), in which he spoke of a complete extinction of the πάθη<sup>3</sup> ("extirpari posse . . ." [Hieronymus, *Ep.* 132 = S.V.F. 3, 447]).

Plotinus, when referring to the genuine [Socratic] task of philosophy, may be alluding to this famous Chrysippean treatise (II 9 [33] 15, 32). Therefore, against the Stoic notion of the extinction of the πάθη, Plotinus probably combined the Socratic requirement with the supposedly Platonic notion of κάθαρσις.

S.V.F. 3, 605

[# 77]

Plotinus, we learn from the biographical account in Porphyry, *Vit. Plot.* 15, also took a considerable interest in astrology and mantics.<sup>4</sup> He always maintained a somewhat hesitant attitude, however, towards those who held that future events are caused or influenced by the heavenly bodies (cf. Cicero, *De Nat. Deor.* 1, 36 [= S.V.F. 1, 165]). It seems that he held that the stars, by virtue of being integrated in the *cosmos*' sympathy,<sup>5</sup> are to be taken as γράμματα that indicate future events (II 3 [52] 7, 1 ff.). Plotinus thinks of mantics in the same way as of reading γράμματα (III 3 [48] 6, 19). In this his opinion is related to the idea that the world-

<sup>1</sup> Cf. W. Theiler, in: *Les Sources de Plotin*, p. 80: "Freilich erst Plotin hebt die wahre Seele ganz aus der Körpergebundenheit heraus. Eine solche Seele ist fehlerlos".

<sup>2</sup> Cf. P. O. Kristeller, *Der Begriff der Seele in der Ethik Plotins*, p. 43.

<sup>3</sup> See M. Pohlenz, *Die Stoa*, Vol. I, p. 150.

<sup>4</sup> See the valuable account in W. Theiler's commentary (Vol. Vb), pp. 448 ff.

<sup>5</sup> See the remarks of W. Theiler in: *Les Sources de Plotin*, p. 83.

soul functions as an *interpres* (IV 3 [27] 11, 13; V 8 [31] 7, 15 and IV 7 [2] 13, 17).

In any case, the sentence in II 3 (52) 7, 11 ff. [μεστὰ δὲ πάντα σημείων καὶ ὁ σοφὸς τις ὁ μαθὼν ἐξ ἄλλων ἄλλο] somewhat resembles a Stoic attitude expressed by Stobaeus, *Ecl.* II, 114, 16.

S.V.F. 3, 660

[ # 78 ]

In his treatise against the Gnostics, Plotinus polemizes against any kind of *τὸ κόσμου καταφρονῆσαι* (II 9 [33] 16, 1 ff.), holding that atheism endorses moral evil. The same argument was often employed by Stoic philosophers.

S.V.F. 3, 687

[ # 79 ]

Plotinus, as has been said [see above, pp. 58 in # 66], when pointing to the *ἀπορία* concerning the commonly accepted identification of *εὐδαιμονία* with *τὸ εὖ ζῆν* (I 4 [46] 1, 1 ff.), wishes to call attention to the fact that this definition makes sense only if a meaningful substitution of *τὸ εὖ ζῆν* is provided.

That there is need for some clarification is obvious from 1, 15-30. For even the substitution of *εὖ ζῆν* for *κατὰ φύσιν* does not provide a distinctive account of what *man's* happiness is supposed to mean. [In so far as only human beings can have *εὐδαιμονία*, a Platonist would follow Aristotle, *E.N.* 1178B24 ff.: see above, pp. 26, n. 6 in # 10]. In other words, whoever maintains that man's happiness consists in *τὸ εὖ ζῆν* ought to specify *τὸ εὖ* in such a way that *life* is not referred to in an absolute sense (*οὐχ ἀπλῶς ζῶν* [2, 32]).

Thus, *prima facie*, it must seem that the Stoics, when substituting *τὸ εὖ ζῆν* for *τὸ κατὰ λόγον* (2, 33-35),<sup>1</sup> do in fact overcome the difficulty pointed out by Plotinus. But does this mean that the Stoics, when relating happiness to *λογικῇ ζωῇ*, also avoided the synonymous notion of life (*οὐκ ἐν τῇ κοινῇ* [3, 11])? Apparently not. In the eyes of Plotinus, who asserted that happiness *qua* *λογικῇ ζωῇ* must be related to another *kind of life* (*ἄλλο εἶδος* [3, 16]), the Stoics' substitution was questionable. First, they ought to have realized that "*λογικόν*", to which they relate happiness, is an ac-

<sup>1</sup> From D.L. 7, 130 we can infer that the Stoics held that happiness is related to the *βίος λογικός*. We do not know, however, whether they expressly said that a *βίος λογικός* is conducive to happiness, or even held that happiness consists in the *βίος λογικός*.

cessory quality (3, 21-14). Secondly, when taking λογική ζωή [i.e., the synonymous notion of life] as the substratum [ὑποκείμενον] of happiness, the Stoics fail to observe that the *kind of life* in question is different from that to which they refer; it is different not in the sense that a *species* falls under its *genus*, but in that it is ontologically prior to the latter (3, 12-31).<sup>1</sup>

This ἀγαθὴ ζωή to which Plotinus draws attention is referred to as τέλεια ζωή. By proposing this substitution, Plotinus not only believes that he is providing sufficient clarification of what ἀγαθὴ ζωή is supposed to mean for the Platonists, but also presumes that the sensualism of the Stoics had once more been refuted by Platonic philosophy, which posits a principle superior to λόγος.

S.V.F. 3, 768

[# 80]

It is in the very small treatise I 9 (16)<sup>2</sup> that Plotinus enters into the discussion of suicide.<sup>3</sup> It seems that he is inclined to agree with the Stoics<sup>4</sup> that suicide ought to be considered a legitimate possibility for man in the case of his experiencing the beginnings of insanity (for I 9 [16] 11, see S.V.F., Vol. III, p. 191, 8-9). Yet insanity, according to the Stoic doctrine (cf. S.V.F. 1, 216; 3, 570), does not befall the Σπουδαῖος (I 9 [16] 11-12).

From other passages it might appear, however, that Plotinus may well be thinking of various circumstances which may justify suicide (cf. I 4 [46] 7, 31 [for which see Epictetus, *Diss.* 1, 28, 26]; 16, 18; II 9 [33] 8, 43 [perhaps ironical]).<sup>5</sup>

Antipater of Tarsus, Fr. 57 [S.V.F., Vol. III, p. 252]

[# 81]

In VI 8 (39) 5, 5 [οὐ γὰρ ἡμεῖς τοῦ τυχεῖν κύριοι] and in I 4 (46)

<sup>1</sup> For further analysis, see W. Himmerich, *Eudaimonia*, pp. 33-29, and J. M. Rist, *Plotinus: The Road to Reality*, pp. 139-152.

<sup>2</sup> For which see P. Courcelle, *Les Lettres grecques en occident* (Paris, 1948), pp. 26-28, also P. Henry, *Plotin et l'Occident* (Louvain, 1934), pp. 103-182.

<sup>3</sup> For a comprehensive account of the history of this discussion, see R. Hirzel, "Der Selbstmord", *Archiv für Religionswissenschaft* XI (1908), pp. 75-104, 243-284, 417-476.

<sup>4</sup> J. M. Rist, *Stoic Philosophy* (chapter 13: Suicide) is probably correct in observing: "There is . . . no single Stoic theory of suicide though we can recognize a number of largely unformulated assumptions common to many of the Stoics" (p. 254).

<sup>5</sup> W. Theiler, in: *Les Sources de Plotin*, p. 84 summarizes Plotinus' point of view as follows: "Selbst den stoischen Weg des Freitodes hat sich Plotin offen gehalten".

2, 40 [τύχουεν], Plotinus appears to be alluding to the problems concerning the *Telos-Formula* held by Antipater (cf. Stobaeus, *Ecl.* II, 76, 13 [= S.V.F., Vol. III, pp. 252, 37-253, 2];<sup>1</sup> see also below, p. 113 n. 4).

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<sup>1</sup> For a general introduction, see M. Soreth, "Die zweite Telos-Formel des Antipater von Tarsos", *A.G.P.* L (1968), pp. 48-72, and A. A. Long, "Carneades and the Stoic Telos", *Phronesis* XII (1965), pp. 79 ff.

## CHAPTER TWO

### PLOTINUS AND POSIDONIUS? <sup>1</sup>

Συμπάθεια

[# 82]

The theory of συμπάθεια is the Stoic doctrine which must have exercised an influence that can scarcely be overestimated on Plotinus' understanding of Plato's conception of cosmos.<sup>2</sup> Wherever this idea—applied to cosmology—may have originated,<sup>3</sup> the theory of συμπάθεια in the form in which it occurs, for example, in Sextus Empiricus, *Adv. Math.* 9, 78, Cicero, *Nat. Deor.* 2, 19 (also 3, 28), Cleomedes I, p. 8 [Ziegler], Pliny, *Nat. Hist.* 2, 109, 212-221, tends to be linked, since the appearance of K. Reinhardt's studies, almost exclusively with the name of Posidonius.

It is true, however, that the idea as such was not only older than orthodox Stoicism itself,<sup>4</sup> but that it had also been applied on the cosmological level by Chrysippus himself. This is evident from Alexander, *De Mixtione* 216, 14 [= *S.V.F.* 2, 473],<sup>5</sup> Ps. Plutarch, *De Fato* 547D [= *S.V.F.* 2, 912, Vol. II, p. 264, 7-8],<sup>6</sup> and Cicero, *De Fato* 4, 7.<sup>7</sup>

<sup>1</sup> This section is not meant to be taken as a reply to the detailed analyses of Hellenistic and post-Hellenistic texts that have been given by W. Theiler in Part II and Part III of his *Die Vorbereitung des Neuplatonismus*, pp. 61-153. Most of Th's observations are invaluable and certainly correct. Yet, in view of the material confined to direct evidence I cannot but doubt the tenability of Th's reconstruction of Posidonius' physical system. Professor Theiler's main thesis is that "the Posidonian conception of the sensible world as maintained in being by its unity . . . provided the first model for Plotinus' "Hinterwelt", the unextended variety-in-unity which lies behind phenomena" (E. R. Dodds, *Gnomon* VII [1931], p. 309). I do not find this convincing but rather tend to agree with e.g. H.-J. Krämer, *Der Ursprung der Geistmetaphysik*, p. 311 that the structure of the Plotinian "Hinterwelt" calls for an understanding as [illegitimate] interpretation of Plato's *Sophist* 248E-249A etc., (see A. H. Armstrong, in: *Les Sources de Plotin*, pp. 393-425).

<sup>2</sup> Cf. e.g. *Timaeus* 92C.

<sup>3</sup> In a paper, seldom referred to by the author himself, M. Pohlenz ("Stoa und Semitismus", *Neue Jahrbücher* [1926], p. 266) argued for a Semitic-magic origin of this idea.

<sup>4</sup> See A. Röhr, *Der okkulte Kraftbegriff im Altertum* (Leipzig, 1923) [*Philologus* Suppl. XVII], pp. 34 ff.

<sup>5</sup> For which see M. Pohlenz, *G.G.A. CLXXXVIII* (1926), p. 276, and R. Philippson, "Cicero, *De Natura Deorum* II und III", *S.O.* XXI (1941), p. 22.

<sup>6</sup> Cf. M. Pohlenz, *G.G.A. CLXXXVIII* (1926), p. 276.

<sup>7</sup> The context clearly points to Chrysippus, so K. Reinhardt (*Kosmos und*



According to the information in these accounts concerning the scope of συμπάθεια in the system of Chrysippus, orthodox Stoicism must have found the notion valuable and useful in explaining how the divine πνεῦμα so penetrates the cosmos as to keep the whole and its parts, which move both centripetally and centrifugally, in a state of τόνος, which produces unity and coherence. That Alexander mentions this concept of sympathy in the context to be dealt with, κρᾶσις δι' ὅλων,<sup>1</sup> is not surprising,<sup>2</sup> for it is the idea of infinite divisibility and continuity (cf. *S.V.F.* 2, 482-491) that must account for the theoretical ground on which the Stoic doctrines of God, Fate (cf. *S.V.F.* 2, 475), and thus the idea of the sympathy of the whole (cf. *S.V.F.* 2, 543-546) must be based.

In the case of Posidonius it is difficult to prove in what respect his idea of an “*einheitlich durchfluteter Weltorganismus*”<sup>3</sup> differed<sup>4</sup> from that which can be traced back with some assurance to the older Stoics.<sup>5</sup>

As far as Neoplatonism is concerned, the idea of sympathy occurs mainly in three contexts, all of which bear traces peculiar to Stoicism, and yet there can be no doubt that the underlying ideas for which the doctrine of sympathy is employed must be related to Plato himself. Some fairly good examples may be found in Proclus.

(1) The idea expressed in *In Tim.* Vol. II, p. 53, 18-19 [Diehl] (ὁ δὲ κόσμος δι' ἀναλογίας καὶ συμπαθείας ἑαυτῷ φίλος ἐστίν. ἑαυτὸν ἄρα σώζει) shows, for example, how an originally pre-Socratic concept had been blended with Platonic philosophy (cf. *Laws* 903B) and the Hellenistic idea of friendship<sup>6</sup> [see also e.g. Marcus Aurelius 9, 9].<sup>7</sup> In his interpretation of Plato, *Timaeus* 32C, Proclus

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*Sympathie*, p. 248 n. 2) has to face the ‘problem’ that the preferred Latin term for rendering Posidonius’ συμπάθεια (see also W. Theiler, in: *Les Sources de Plotin*, p. 83) occurs in this text. On *De Fato* 3, 5, see R. Philippson, *S.O.* XXI (1941), p. 22 [also on *De Div.* 2, 32, and *Nat. Deor.* 3, 28].

<sup>1</sup> See also *De Mixtione* 223, 29 f., 227, 5 f., and Philoponus, *In Phys.* 113, 6.

<sup>2</sup> See, however, K. Reinhardt [i.e. his reply to R. Philippson], *R.E.* XXII, 1 (1953), col. 654, 31-41.

<sup>3</sup> W. Theiler, *M.H.* I (1944), p. 213, with reference to K. Reinhardt, *Kosmos und Sympathie*, pp. 115 ff.

<sup>4</sup> See M. Pohlenz, *G.G.A.* CLXXXVIII (1926), p. 277, and e.g. M. Neuen-schwander, *Mark Aurels Beziehungen zu Seneca und Poseidonios*, p. 15.

<sup>5</sup> Cf. L. Edelstein, *A.J.P.* LVII (1936), p. 324.

<sup>6</sup> See also C. W. Müller, *Gleiches zu Gleichem* (Wiesbaden, 1964), p. 191, n. 50.

<sup>7</sup> For which see M. Neuen-schwander, *Mark Aurels Beziehungen zu Seneca und Poseidonios*, pp. 15-16.

himself is certainly not aware that he is "stoicizing", but would claim that he was merely making explicit the implications of the Platonic doctrine itself.

(2) Another account of *Timaeus* 31C-32A in *In Tim.* Vol. II, p. 24, 4-7 [Diehl] (Μία τις ἐστὶ ζωὴ καὶ λόγος εἷς διὰ πάντων καὶ ἑαυτὸν μὲν πρώτως, ἔπειτα δὲ ἑκαῖνα συνέχων . . . καθ' ἣν καὶ ἡ συμπάθεια γίνεται) may be taken to resemble closely a tendency peculiar to the Stoics, viz. to link the concept of sympathy with the all-penetrating power that administers the universe (cf. Plotinus' wording in III 1 [3] 2, 19 [= S.V.F. 2, 934]). It is, however, to the context of Plato's *Phaedrus* 246B6 (and, to a greater extent to *Laws* X) that the viewpoint here expressed is ultimately related. In Stoicism, as well as in the Platonist tradition, the idea expressed in Plato, *Phaedrus* 246B f., and *Laws* 903B, tends to be connected with another expressed in *Timaeus* 30D3-31A1 (. . . ζῶν ἐν πάνθ' ὅσα . . . ζῶν ἐντὸς ἔχον αὐτοῦ . . .), so that Proclus can say: ἐν ἐστὶ ζῶν τὶ πᾶν ὑπὸ μίας ζωῆς συνεχόμενον. Μὴ γὰρ οὔσης ταύτης κοινῆς οὐκ ἂν εἴη συμπάθεια τῶν ἐν αὐτοῖς μερῶν (*In Tim.* Vol. I, p. 412, 20-22 [Diehl]). Proclus is again "stoicizing", although this description does not do full justice to his intention.

(3) A third aspect of the application of the idea of sympathy concerns the influence of the divine, heavenly sphere on the mundane world in particular.<sup>1</sup> Such ideas we find, for example, in Sextus Empiricus, *Adv. Math.* 9, 78-84, Cicero, *De Nat. Deor.* 2, 19, *De Div.* 2, 89 and frequently elsewhere, as in Proclus, *In Remp.* Vol. II, p. 258, 10-15 [Kroll]. This application is apparently eminently Stoic, although it can easily be explained as an exaggeration of Plato's account of the λοξὸς κύκλος and Aristotle's notion of the *sphairai* in *Metaph.* A 8.

Now, to turn to Plotinus: he is certainly fascinated by the picture painted of the *living God* in Plato's *Timaeus* (cf. e.g., 30B, 31B, 92C)<sup>2</sup> and "holds that the animate universe demonstrates a harmony and wondrous symphony".<sup>3</sup> It is on the basis of *Timaeus* 30D3-31A1 (cf. IV 4 [29] 32, 4-5) that he says: Συμπαθεὶς δὲ πᾶν

<sup>1</sup> With regard to Cicero's relating tides etc. to the position of the moon, K. Reinhardt (*Kosmos und Sympathie*, p. 246) has claimed this as a discovery of Posidonius. One has to bear in mind that, according to Aetius 3, 17, 4, Pythias of Massilia anticipated Posidonius, so that Chrysippus could already have known this theory.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. W. Theiler, in: *Les Sources de Plotin*, p. 75.

<sup>3</sup> R. E. Witt, *C.Q.* XXIV (1930), p. 203.

τοῦτο ὡς ζῶον καὶ τὸ πόρρω δὴ ἐγγύς . . . (32, 13 f.), thus giving an interpretation which, according to K. Reinhardt, must be indebted to Posidonius.<sup>1</sup> This last assertion cannot be proved, however, although Plotinus is certainly “stoicizing”; even if he is doing nothing but interpreting Plato, *Timaeus* 30D3-31A1, as he himself would have maintained.

Of particular interest is IV 4 (28) 32, 20-21: ζώου τε ὄντος καὶ εἰς ἐν τελοῦντος οὐδὲν οὕτω πόρρω τόπῳ ὡς μὴ ἐγγύς εἶναι τῇ . . . φύσει. Similar to this is Proclus, *In Remp.* Vol. II, p. 258, 26-29: Εἰ δὲ τοῦτο [scil. συμπαθῆς ὁ κόσμος] δύνανται πάντως αἱ ἄλλων κινήσεις εἰς ἄλλα διαβαίνειν καὶ ποιεῖν εἰς ἐκεῖνα καὶ ὁπωσοῦν ἔχῃ διαστάσεως. Εἶναι γὰρ τὴν μίαν ζώην τὴν διαπορθμεύουσαν τὰς ποιήσεις. Here the objection is met that distance might be considered an obstacle to the theory of sympathy. It is just by means of sympathy, however, that incantations and invocations etc., are thought to be heard and even fulfilled (cf. IV 4 [28] 26, 1-4; 41, 1 ff.); and the explanation offered by Iamblichus for the efficacy of μαντική and κλῆσις is very close to this idea (cf. *De Myst.* 3, 16 [p. 137 Parthey], 4, 10 [p. 193 Parthey]). Iamblichus knows of a similar way to explain how sacrifices are effective; he rejects it, however, by replacing ἐπιτηδεϊότης and συμπάθεια by φιλία and οἰκείωσις (cf. *De Myst.* 5, 7 [p. 207 Parthey]), 5, 9 [p. 209 Parthey]). All of these accounts of sympathy are connected with the general conception underlying the passage of Proclus, *In Remp.* Vol. II, 258, 10-15, 26-29 [Kroll]. Finally, also with regard to Proclus, *In Tim.* Vol. II, p. 53, 18-19 [Diehl] Plotinus' account of γοητεία in IV 4 (28) 40, 1-6, which purports to be a Platonic interpretation of Empedocles (V.S. 31 B 17, 19-20),<sup>2</sup> will have to be considered.

Much more could be said about the concept of sympathy as it occurs in the philosophical systems of Neoplatonism. In one way it is true, from the merely analytical point of view, that Neoplatonism appears to be “stoicizing”; but such a diagnosis does not explain, for example, how Plotinus found it possible to do so. One has to bear in mind that this Stoic idea must have been, to a large extent, developed on the basis of Plato, *Timaeus* 30A ff., *Phaedrus* 246B f., and *Laws* 903B. And as Platonism was probably aware of the systematic link between these ideas, it must not have felt at all

<sup>1</sup> *Kosmos und Sympathie*, p. 414.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. G. W. Müller, *Gleiches zu Gleichem*, p. 192, n. 53.

reluctant to adopt a concept that it found generically entailed in the philosophy of Plato himself.

Ἐνωσις

[# 83]

The question to which Plotinus pays considerable attention is how multiplicity can be derived from unity and how unity can be maintained in diversity.<sup>1</sup> From, for example, V 5 (32) 4, 1-3: "Οτι μὲν οὖν δεῖ τὴν ἀναγωγὴν ποιήσασθαι εἰς ἓν καὶ ἀληθῶς ἓν, ἀλλὰ μὴ ὥσπερ τὰ ἄλλα ἓν, ἀ πολλὰ ὄντα μετοχῇ ἐνὸς ἓν, it becomes evident that for Plotinus, differently from the Stoics, the problem of the *unity* and *one-ness* of bodily entities must be raised within the context of ontology; that is to say, whereas the Stoics would have taken into account nothing but the physical aspect of this problem and thus only had to look [on the basis of Plato, *Phaedrus* 246B, *Timaeus* 31A ff., *Laws* 903B] for an efficient principle, Plotinus was obliged to relate everything to a formal cause which, because it was at the same time the ultimate and supreme *raison d'être* of Being itself, had to be considered the axiological principle.

With regard to the Stoic distinction of different degrees of being in terms of ἔξις, φύσις, ψυχή [see above, pp. 53 in # 57], it has been said that Plotinus doubts that "disposition", "nature", and "soul" can be considered to be sufficient linking factors of the objects which they control; which is to say that the Stoics fail to posit *transcendental* formal principles (V 9 [5] 5, 25-26).

Now, it has been claimed<sup>2</sup> that in VI 9 (8) 1 Plotinus appears to make use of a Stoic opinion that differentiated between three different degrees of *unity*:<sup>3</sup> there are things that are "one" (a) in the sense of something that is ἡνωμένον [i.e., organisms and living beings]; there are others that are "one" (b) in the sense of being συναπτόμενα [i.e., ships and towers etc.]; and finally there are units

<sup>1</sup> Immensely valuable is W. Theiler's account in: *Einheit und unbegrenzte Zweiheit von Plato bis Plotin*, in: *Isonomia* (Berlin, 1964), pp. 89-109; see also H.-J. Krämer, *Der Ursprung der Geistmetaphysik*, pp. 292-396 [on the legitimacy of his historical construction see, however, K. Oehler, *Gnomon* XL (1968), pp. 641-653, and P. Merlan, *Philosophische Rundschau* XXV (1968), pp. 97-110].

<sup>2</sup> See W. Theiler, *Die Vorbereitung des Neuplatonismus*, pp. 97-98, R. E. Witt, *C.Q.* XXIV (1930), p. 203, and E. R. Dodds, *Gnomon* VII (1931), p. 528.

<sup>3</sup> See K. Reinhardt, *Poseidonios*, pp. 346-349, *Kosmos und Sympathie*, pp. 34-54, and M. Neuschwander, *Mark Aurels Beziehungen zu Seneca und Poseidonios*, pp. 17-18.

consisting of διεζυγμένα, or διαστηκότα [i.e., armies and choirs].

This classification, as found in Sextus Empiricus, *Adv. Math.* 9, 78 [see also 7, 102], is almost unanimously assumed to be Posidonian,<sup>1</sup> although it has been objected—and that correctly, I believe—that on the basis of Plutarch, *De Def. Or.* 426A this way of looking at things as units seems to have been that of Chrysippus (*S.V.F.* 2, 367),<sup>2</sup> or that Chrysippus must have distinguished at least roughly between ἡνωμένα and διαστηκότα.<sup>3</sup> It is difficult to demonstrate, however, what Posidonius' position actually was. Confining our attention to Sextus Empiricus, *Adv. Math.* 9, 78, it must seem, indeed, that Posidonius (?) "subscribes to the definition according to which only living beings, only plants and animals, can be recognized as unified bodies. Stones and wood are not unified bodies".<sup>4</sup> A little later, Sextus stated that of unified bodies some were bound together by disposition, some by nature, others by soul [i.e., ἡνωμένα] (*Adv. Math.* 9, 81).<sup>5</sup> This is not the place to discuss the problem of how this theory regarding a distinction between unified and non-unified bodies is related to the other, which accounted for a differentiation of the visible world into ἑξίς, φύσις, and ψυχή;<sup>6</sup> nor is it necessary to argue the Posidonian origin of the theory in question.<sup>7</sup>

What seems to be more important is that this concept of three kinds of unity, such as occurs in the accounts of, for example, Achilles Tatius, *Isag.* p. 41/42 Maas,<sup>8</sup> Seneca, *Nat. Quaest.* 2, 2,

<sup>1</sup> See K. Reinhardt, *R.E.* XXII, 1 (1953), col. 650, 21.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. M. Pohlenz, *G.G.A.* CLXXXIV (1922), p. 166 n., *G.G.A.* CLXXXVIII (1926), pp. 275-276, R. Philippson, *S.O.* XXI (1941), p. 22, and M. Pohlenz, *Die Stoa*, Vol. II, p. 217.

<sup>3</sup> See I. Heinemann, *Poseidonios' metaphysische Schriften* Vol. II, pp. 55. 133 [Heinemann, it should be recalled, suggested (Vol. I, p. 186) that the tripartite division had already been held by Boethos or by Panaetius (see also R. Philippson [above, n. 2])].

<sup>4</sup> L. Edelstein, *A.J.P.* LVII (1936), p. 299.

<sup>5</sup> Sextus is the only source which regards all these things as unified objects.

<sup>6</sup> J. M. Rist, *Stoic Philosophy*, p. 210 asserts that it is "quite wrong to suggest . . . that a distinction between ἑξίς, φύσις, ψυχή has anything to do with the unity of the objects these binding factors respectively control". See, however, also M. E. Reesor, "The Stoic Concept of Quality", *A.J.P.* LXXV (1954), pp. 54-55.

<sup>7</sup> The passage in Sextus Empiricus, *Adv. Math.* 9, 78, which L. Edelstein attributed to Posidonius (*A.J.P.* LVII [1936], p. 299 n. 55), has not been included in Edelstein-Kidd, *The Fragments of Posidonius*.

<sup>8</sup> For which see also O. Rieth, *Grundbegriffe der stoischen Ethik*, p. 192.

*Epist. Mor.* 106, 2<sup>1</sup> [all of which have for other reasons also been connected with Posidonius],<sup>2</sup> can be found in Plotinus. Besides VI 9 (8) 1, 6, 10-14, 32, one must consider V 5 (43) 4, 31-38 [with reference to VI 6 (34) 5], VI 2 (43) 11, 3-4 [where there is mention of unity in the sense of separate entities, such as a choir and an army], and VI 6 (34) 13, 1-5; 16, 31-32 [where stones and organisms are mentioned, as also the choir]. Typical is the statement in VI 7 (38) 14, 22: ἡ δὲ ἐν παντί [φιλία] μιμεῖται γὰρ αὕτη ἐκ διεστηκότων οὐσα φίλη.

What should be borne in mind, however, is the fact that Plotinus' allusion to this Stoic theory of different degrees of unity or oneness<sup>3</sup> (see especially VI 9 [8] 1) is not at all a draw of attention to the distinction to be employed between unified and non-unified bodies (cf. Sextus Empiricus, *Adv. Math.* 9, 78). In other words, Plotinus speaks of "bodies", "organisms", "ship", "army", and "choir" as ἕν, whereas Posidonius, we must suppose, probably held that only natural objects must be considered to be unified,<sup>4</sup> i.e., ἡνωμένον. On the other hand, it should not escape our attention that the "Stoic" examples are dealt with in passing and in just the context where Plotinus relates his discussion of the unifying formal principle of *one-ness* to the Aristotelian treatise about *Being and One* (Metaphysics I).

This being so, it is difficult to see any point in saying that Plotinus is "stoicizing". For even if it is true that Plotinus, when he is speaking about grades or higher degrees of unity in the *mundus sensibilis*, comes close to the intentions in such accounts as that, for example, of Seneca, *Epist. Mor.* 102, 5 (i.e. *S.V.F.* 3, 160, Vol. III, p. 38, 7-16);<sup>5</sup> the problem itself is, strictly speaking, still a Platonic-Aristotelian one. For it is clear that the Stoics' view of degrees of value in the *cosmos* is, in fact, to be understood as an adaptation *sui generis* of the Aristotelian "*argumentum ex gradibus entium*"<sup>6</sup> (cf. *S.V.F.* 1, 529, and also Sextus Empiricus, *Adv. Math.* 9, 88,

<sup>1</sup> See also Plut. *Conj. Praec.* 142E-F, Stob. *Ecl.* II, 94, 24 W.

<sup>2</sup> See K. Reinhardt, *Kosmos und Sympathie*, pp. 33. 38 ff.

<sup>3</sup> For which see W. Theiler, in: *Les Sources de Plotin*, p. 75, and *Die Vorbereitung des Neuplatonismus*, p. 94.

<sup>4</sup> W. Theiler, *Die Vorbereitung des Neuplatonismus*, p. 97 asserts: "Natürlich ist auch ein Heer von Poseidonios als ἕν bezeichnet worden, wie das bestimmt aus Plutarch, def. or. 426a hervorgeht". He admits, however, that *S.V.F.* 2, 367 is an "umstrittene Stelle" [see above, p. 73 n. 7].

<sup>5</sup> See R. E. Witt, *C.Q.* XXIV (1930), p. 203.

<sup>6</sup> For which see above, pp. 29. 56.

Cicero, *De Nat. Deor.* 2, 12-13, 33-36). Thus, even from this point of view, it seems correct to say that Plotinus is "stoicizing" only in so far as he reintegrates—as it must seem to him—a legitimate and Platonic way of looking at things into that distinct set of ideas from which the Stoic doctrine originated.

The same is true with regard to the question of the nature of the principle that unifies things and makes them *one*, although from a merely metaphysical point of view they are far from being really *one*. R. E. Witt finds it important that, for Plotinus, the unifying function is peculiar to soul, as in the Stoic system.<sup>1</sup> This is not, however, true without some qualification. For Plotinus, *Stoicizing* would say only that it is soul which performs this function as far as cosmology or physics is concerned. From the viewpoint of an ontologist, it is evident that the *One* itself is responsible for the qualified existence of any entity succeeding it. In fact, the first chapter of VI 9 (8) points out the formal principle [τὸ εἶν] and must be understood as a critical account of the Stoic theory [see above, pp. 72-73].

F 85 [Edelstein-Kidd]

[# 84]

*Enn.* I 6 (1) 9, 30 οὐ γὰρ ἂν πάποτε εἶδεν ὀφθαλμὸς ἥλιον ἡλιοειδῆς μὴ γεγενημένος (which Ficinus translates as: "*Neque vero oculus umquam videret solem nisi factus esset solaris.*"), together with verses of Manilius ("*Quis caelum possit nisi caeli munere nosse. . .*" [2, 115; see also 4, 907]), largely inspired Goethe's *Theory of Colours*<sup>2</sup> and is unanimously believed to be Posidonian.<sup>3</sup>

It is not the purpose of the present author to challenge this view. He merely wishes to show that, as far as the problem of adaptation itself is to be taken into account, the diagnosis "Posidonian" [in this particular case] certainly requires more qualification. For it is rather difficult to evaluate correctly what the impact of the lines quoted (?)<sup>4</sup> by Sextus Empiricus, *Adv. Math.* 7, 93 ὥς τὸ μὲν φῶς

<sup>1</sup> C.Q. XXIV (1930), p. 203.

<sup>2</sup> See F. Koch, *Goethe und Plotin* (Leipzig, 1925), pp. 31. 65; see also F. Hölderlin, *Menschenbeifall* [in: Kleine Stuttgarter Ausgabe, Vol. I], p. 251, and G. F. Hegel, *Der Geist des Christentums und sein Schicksal* [in: Theol. Jugendschriften, ed. Nohl.] (Tübingen, 1907), p. 313.

<sup>3</sup> See also K. Reinhardt, *Kosmos und Sympathie*, pp. 191 ff., and R. E. Witt, C.Q. XXIV (1930), p. 198.

<sup>4</sup> For Sextus' testimony see now K.-H. Abel, "Zu Poseidonios' literarischem Nachlass", *Rh.M.* CVII (1964), pp. 371-373.

φησὶν ὁ Ποσειδώνιος Τίμαιον ἐξηγούμενος ὑπὸ τῆς φωτοειδοῦ ὀψεως καταλαμβάνεται ἡ δὲ φωνὴ ὑπὸ τῆς ἀεροειδοῦς ἀκοῆς, οὕτω καὶ ἡ τῶν ὄλων φύσις ὑπὸ συγγενοῦς ὀφείλει καταλαμβάνεσθαι τοῦ λόγου] might have been, on what can be considered the Posidonian theory of sensation.<sup>1</sup> If it is reasonable to speak of I 6 (1) 9, 30 (and V 3 [49] 8, 19)<sup>2</sup> as being Posidonian, one would have to believe that Plotinus adhered to such a "Posidonian" theory of sensation. This, however, seems to be in no way the case.

(1) The "reconstruction" of a Posidonian theory of sensation as proposed by K. Reinhardt on the basis of resemblances he has found between Sextus Empiricus, *Adv. Math.* 7, 93 and Galen, *De Hipp. et Plat.* 625, on the one hand, and between Sextus, *loc. cit.* and the doctrine dealt with in Cleomedes, p. 222 [Ziegler], on the other,<sup>3</sup> can well be challenged on the assumption that Galen's account may be sufficiently explained on the basis of Plato, *Timaeus* 45B, and Aristotle, *De Anima* B 11.<sup>4</sup>

(2) However, confining our interest preferably to the accounts in Sextus and in Plotinus, it must seem difficult to conjecture that Posidonius' comment is meant to be taken only as a rendering of what Plato stated in *Timaeus* 45B6-7: τὸ γὰρ ἐντὸς ἡμῶν ἀδελφὸν ὄν τούτου πῦρ εἰλικρινές . . . Also Plato himself is very likely to be following the line of pre-Socratic philosophy, which is to say that something in the perceiving subject must correspond to the object perceived.<sup>5</sup> In any case, nothing in Plotinus supports the suggestion that he is here or elsewhere dependent upon Posidonius. On the contrary, even where Plotinus alludes to such a concept of sympathy as being used in the context of a Stoic theory of vision, it becomes clear that he is inclined to reject it simply because of the implied assumption that a medium is required [in I 6 (1) 9, 30, the argument "works" on the basis of the implied assumption that a medium will not be necessary].

The theory in question, which, according to K. Reinhardt, would very much resemble the position held by Posidonius, is mentioned in IV 5 (29) 1, 35 ff., 2, 15 ff., and partially in chapter four. Plotinus

<sup>1</sup> See L. Edelstein, *A.J.P.* LVII (1936), p. 318, n. 125: "no details are known".

<sup>2</sup> Pointed out by W. Theiler, in: *Les Sources de Plotin*, p. 87, n. 1.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. K. Reinhardt, *R. E.* XXII, 1 (1953), col. 730, 9-10.

<sup>4</sup> See H. F. Cherniss, *A.J.P.* LIV (1933), pp. 154-161.

<sup>5</sup> For which, especially in reference to Parmenides, see H.-G. Gadamer, *Gnomon* XII (1936), p. 84.



seems to hold that all sensation is to be understood as an instance of sympathy; however, *without* benefit of media,<sup>1</sup> for in his opinion there does not exist a medium between the object and the organ, since it is the organ itself that performs the function of a medium between soul and its objects. Differing apparently from such a theory as referred to by Cleomedes (p. 222 Z.),<sup>2</sup> which implies that the medium "air", for example, is immediately changed by mere ψαῦσις,<sup>3</sup> Plotinus would say, for example, that we—standing near a fire—are warmed even before the intervening air is warmed (cf. IV 5 [29] 4, 25-28, on the basis of 4, 16-22).<sup>4</sup>

How, then, is it possible that Plotinus took over a *dictum* of Posidonius? It depends, of course, on the question as to where Plotinus might have read it or even in what context Posidonius could have stated it. Nothing can be proved in either case; thus it might be least dangerous to assume that Plotinus "adopted" this sentence, finding it to be a *bon mot* made on the basis of Plato, *Timaeus* 46B6-7.

*Enn.* IV 7 (2) 3, 1-6

[# 85]

There is, however, one passage in which Plotinus makes use of the Stoic ideas of συμπάθεια and ἔνωσις, and that in such a way that even a Stoic philosopher could not have done it more appositely. In IV 7 (2) 3, 1 ff., where the Atomists' opinion of soul<sup>5</sup> is treated [ἀτόμους ἢ ἀμερῇ συνελθόντα ψυχὴν ποιεῖν [λέγοι] τῇ ἐνώσει καὶ ὁμοπαθείᾳ ἐλέγχοιτ' ἂν . . . καὶ τῇ παραθέσει μὴ διόλου, . . . οὐ γιγνομένου ἐνὸς οὐδὲ συμπαθοῦς ἐξ ἀπαθῶν καὶ μὴ ἐνοῦσθαι δυναμένων σωμάτων<sup>6</sup> ψυχὴ δὲ αὐτῇ συμπαθὴς ἐκ δὲ ἀμερῶν [οὐ] σῶμα οὐδὲ μέγεθος ἂν γένοιτο], Plotinus' rejection is apparently based entirely upon inferences that may be drawn from a Stoic point of view.

There is certainly a difficulty regarding the term ὁμοπάθεια [Eusebius has ὁμοιοπαθεία]. Yet, if the text suggested by R. Harder

<sup>1</sup> Cf. G. H. Clark, *P.R.* LI (1942), p. 369.

<sup>2</sup> For this theory, see K. Reinhardt, *Poseidonios*, p. 202.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. K. Reinhardt, *R.E.* XXII, 1 (1953), col. 729, 28-31.

<sup>4</sup> This has been pointed out by G. H. Clark, *P.R.* LI (1942), p. 367.

<sup>5</sup> M. V. Pistorius, *Plotinus and Neoplatonism* (Cambridge, 1952), p. 83 is seriously misled when supposing that the argument is directed against the Stoics.

<sup>6</sup> The text printed up to this point is taken from R. Harder's edition (Vol. Ia), p. 30; for the difficulties in the Mss. tradition, see H. Dörrie, *G.G.A.* CC (1938), pp. 532-533.

is to be taken as *veri simile*, it must seem that *ὁμοπάθεια* is meant to be equivalent to *συμπάθεια*. The reference to the impossibility that *ἐκ ἀμερῶν σῶμα* (οὐδὲ) μέγεθος ἂν γένοιτο (3, 5-6) must be understood on the basis of the Stoic ideas of infinite divisibility and continuity [see above, pp. 39-40]. It must, however, be borne in mind, that Plotinus rejects this doctrine decisively in II 7 (37) 1, 11, 22.

In any case, the way in which Plotinus proceeds in IV 7 (2) [which has been characterized as a *Schulvorlesung*] is quite exceptional: the Stoic doctrine of soul is met by Peripatetic argument and the Peripatetic doctrine has to meet Platonic objections (cf. 3, 6-8<sup>3</sup>, 25; 8<sup>5</sup>, 1 ff.). It must, therefore, be asked whether or not Plotinus would consider his Stoic argument to be valid. It is conceivable that his use of the Stoic terms and concepts could apply to a Platonic concept of soul, i.e., to a doctrine that does not identify soul with *σῶμα*, but regards *ψυχή* as *ἄσώματος*.

F 18 [Edelstein-Kidd]

[# 86]

When wishing to illustrate how particulars or parts are to be related either to a group or to the whole, Plotinus quite often employs the simile of a choral dance.<sup>1</sup>

In IV 4 (28) 35, 10-19 it is said that each part of the universe participates in the dance of the whole in accordance with a numerical pattern (cf. especially 35, 12-13: *καὶ οἱ σχηματισμοὶ κατὰ λόγον καὶ καθ' ἀριθμοὺς δὲ ἕκαστα καὶ τὰ χορεύοντα ζῶον μέρη*).

In IV 4 (28) 33 Plotinus speaks of the parts of the body, the movements of which must fit those of the whole, which can be compared to *οἶον μίαν ὄρχησιν ἐν ποικιλίῃ χορείᾳ* (33, 5-6). The whole context focusses on the problem of how unity can exist in diversity, and it is centred, as becomes clear above all from chapter 38 around the idea of *σύνταξις*, cf. especially III 3 (48) 1, 9 ff. [*ἐκ γὰρ ἑνὸς τινος ὁρμηθέντα πάντα εἰς ἓν συνέρχεται*].<sup>2</sup>

A slightly different shade of meaning may be observed, for instance, in VI 7 (38) 7, 15-16, where the function of the individual's soul in relation to its body is compared with the relation existing between an actor or dancer and the rôle he has been assigned; in the context of III 6 (26) 6, 12-18, Plotinus suggests that everybody has to perform his function independently of others, as he would do

<sup>1</sup> Cf. R. E. Witt, *C.Q.* XXIV (1930), p. 200.

<sup>2</sup> See also W. Theiler, in: *Les Sources de Plotin*, p. 86.

in a dance. And finally, in VI 9 (8) 8, 36-45 we read that souls, as well as the gods themselves, are involved in a dance, the movement of which tends to lead towards the center of truth.<sup>1</sup>

The material listed here is clearly of a heterogeneous nature and suggests, as it stands, that it cannot have been one and the same idea [i.e., choir] that had merely been applied to different instances. Thus, it is difficult *prima facie* to believe, as R. E. Witt apparently does, that Plotinus, whenever he uses this kind of comparison, is indebted to Posidonius.

(1) The idea expressed in VI 9 (8) 8, 36-45 has to be related directly to Plato, *Phaedrus* 247A2-7;<sup>2</sup> this becomes evident from 9, 1 ff., or from such a picture as that drawn by Proclus [above, n. 1].

(2) What is certainly more difficult is the question concerning "the typical Plotinian conception as exhibiting unity in diversity".<sup>3</sup> R. E. Witt argues that this idea must ultimately be related to Posidonius, to whom, in his opinion, the author of *De Mundo* seems to be indebted for the comparison of the heavenly harmony and symphony with a choir (cf. e.g., 399A12-28). The matter would seem to be more complex than this, however. The idea is explicitly made use of by Xenophon, *Oec.* 8, 3, and is attested for the older Stoics by Dio Chrysostomus (*S.V.F.*, Vol. II, pp. 227, 23, 284, 15, and 89, 23);<sup>4</sup> and the only testimony suggesting that Posidonius employed the image of a choir [as Plato did, and even Pythagoreans before him] is that of Simplicius, *In Phys.* 292, 27<sup>5</sup> [the context of which, in many respects, points to Aristotle].<sup>6</sup> The other passage R. E. Witt cites to prove his case is Sextus Empiricus, *Adv. Math.* 9, 27, which he assumes to be Posidonian. With the same "right", however, one may claim that the passage 9, 26-27 must be related to a text from Aristotle's lost *De Philosophia* (R. Walzer and Sir David Ross regard it as Fr. 12b).

In any case, the ἡγεμῶν in *De Mundo* 399A30 points back—as

<sup>1</sup> For the image, see also Proclus, *Plat. Theol.* 1, 1 [p. 8, Saffrey-Westerink].

<sup>2</sup> Cf. also *Timaeus* 40C; for a Pythagorean version preceding Plato see *Dox. Graec.* 337B5.

<sup>3</sup> R. E. Witt, *C.Q.* XXIV (1930), pp. 199-200.

<sup>4</sup> These places have been pointed out by R. Helm, *Lucian and Menipp* (Leipzig, 1906), p. 93.

<sup>5</sup> = F 18, Edelstein-Kidd.

<sup>6</sup> See L. Edelstein, *A.J.P.* LVII (1936), p. 320.

does Plotinus' III 3 (48) 2, 13-14—to Plato, *Phaedrus* 246E4. And the analogy between the ἡγεμῶν and the general in *De Mundo* 399A35 ff., is of the same kind as the comparison drawn in Sextus Empiricus, *Adv. Math.* 9, 21-27, so that—in order to make a case for the assumption that it could have been Aristotle himself who provided the archetype of this simile—one may think of *Metaph.* 1075A11. For Plotinus these comparisons, which were also employed by Hierocles,<sup>1</sup> Seneca (*Epist. Mor.* 84, 10), and Epictetus (Fr. I 16 [Schenkl]), have considerable importance, as has been correctly observed by R. E. Witt. Some of the most lucid images [not mentioned by R. E. Witt] are to be found in II 3 (52) 13, 29 and in IV 8 (6) 2, 30, in particular, since the latter of these comes very close to the account in *De Mundo* 397B22.

This is not the place to estimate the importance of the choir-imagery for Posidonius. The account in Simplicius (*In Phys.* 291, 21-292, 31, and more especially 292, 27), which suggests considerable influence from Aristotelianism, cannot support R. E. Witt's point of view. Bearing in mind, however, the fact that Posidonius' view of God differed from the older Stoics' opinion to the extent that it comes closer to the Platonic-Aristotelian idea (cf. *Dox. Graec.* 324, 29), one may well point to the statement in D.L. 7, 139, according to which Posidonius must have held that the divine, heavenly sphere functioned as the ἡγεμονικόν of the world (= F 23 Edelstein-Kidd); such an idea is likely, of course, to have become blended with the metaphor of "the pilot of the world".

To sum up this section: R. E. Witt's suggestion that Plotinus shared in a common tradition which can be traced back to Posidonius, cannot be maintained without some qualification. Whatever the latter's share in this literary commonplace, originating with Menippus,<sup>2</sup> might have been, the philosophical intention guiding Plotinus suggests, rather, indebtedness to the Aristotelian-Platonic view of the finality inherent in the structure of things within the physical world.<sup>3</sup>

### (3) The rational substratum underlying the choir-imagery in VI

<sup>1</sup> See K. Praechter, *Hierokles* (Leipzig, 1901), p. 37.

<sup>2</sup> See R. Helm, *Lucian und Menipp*, p. 93.

<sup>3</sup> Even more "platonizing" than Plato himself is the account given by Marcus Aurelius 5, 5, for which see M. Neuschwander, *Mark Aurels Beziehungen zu Seneca und Poseidonios*, p. 68.

7 (38) 7, 15-16, III 6 (26) 6, 12-18, and particularly in III 2 (47) 17, 24-91; 18, 6-13 is foreshadowed in Plato, *Laws* 904A6: man is an actor who has been assigned a rôle to perform.<sup>1</sup> The other Platonic element, which had been integrated into the notion held by Plotinus, is the marionette-image (cf. Plato, *Laws* 644D7-645C6).<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> With regard to Plotinus and the tradition of this particular topic, see E. R. Dodds, *Pagan and Christian in an Age of Anxiety*, pp. 8 ff.; the theatre-comparison was analysed by M. Wundt, *Plotin* (Leipzig, 1919), pp. 34 ff.

<sup>2</sup> For which see H. Rankin, "Plato and Man the Puppet", *Eranos* LXVI (1962), pp. 80-92.

## CHAPTER THREE

### PLOTINUS AND EPICTETUS

*Diss.* I, 6, 24

[# 87]

In a famous passage (I 6 [I] 8, 16), referred to by St. Augustine (*Civ. Dei* 17, 17), Plotinus compares the soul's *apostrophe* away from the mundane world to a return to its native country, and quotes a line from Homer (*Iliad* 2, 140).<sup>1</sup>

It seems that Plotinus is indebted to Epictetus. The Stoic philosopher likes to speak of man as ἀποδημητικός (3, 24, 4, 60, 105); in 2, 22, 36, 38 he says that the “inn” must not be confused with the destination of the journey. Moreover, death is regarded as ἀποδημεῖν (I, 6, 24; 3, 24, 8, 88; *Ench.* 16).

*Diss.* I, 28, 14

[# 88]

When discussing the nature of things conducive to happiness, Plotinus has to deal with the widespread opinion that great misfortunes, *etc.*, must be considered evils that affect man's very existence.

By raising [and denying] the question of whether the Σοφός would consider ἐκπτώσεις δὲ ἀρχῶν καὶ πόλεως αὐτοῦ κατασκαφὴν (ἡγήσεται) τί εἶναι μέγα (I 4 [46] 7, 21-22), Plotinus is apparently following an example such as that given by Epictetus in *Diss.* I, 28, 14: τίνα δὲ καὶ λέγεις τὰ τηλικαῦτα; πολέμους καὶ στάσεις καὶ ἀπολείας πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων καὶ κατασκαφὰς πόλεως, καὶ μέγα ἔχει ταῦτα; Οὐδέν.

*Diss.* I, 28, 26

[# 89]

Another example referred to by Plotinus in I 4 (46) 7, 31-33 concerns the idea commonly acknowledged to be the greatest of all conceivable misfortunes, viz. the case where blood relatives are made prisoners of war and are carried away, or even killed. The wording in 7, 31-33 suggests intimate acquaintance with a passage in Epictetus (I, 28, 26: ὅταν γυναῖκες ἄγωνται καὶ παῖδια αἰχμαλωτίζεται καὶ ὅταν αὐτοὶ κατασφάζωνται ταῦτα οὐκ ἔστι κακά).

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<sup>1</sup> Cf. VI 9 (8) 9, 25-39.

Diss. 2, 1, 1-33

[ # 90]

It seems that Plotinus, when asserting that, for a Platonist, courage [τὸ θαρραλέον] has to be linked with εὐλάβεια, is generally adhering to a Stoic doctrine which must have assumed that εὐλάβεια, though being an εὐλογος ἔκκλισις in respect of φόβος (cf. *D.L.* 7, 115 [= *S.V.F.* 3, 431]), need not be opposed by τὸ θαρραλέον.

The most comprehensive account of this, expressly asserting that εὐλάβεια and θαρρεῖν are by no means mutually exclusive, is that in Epictetus, *Diss.* 2, 1, 1-33. Yet there is no evidence that Plotinus (*II* 9 [33] 14, 41 ff.), shared the Stoic opinion according to which εὐλάβεια is the attitude towards ἀπροαίρετα, whereas θαρρεῖν is that towards προαιρετά.

Diss. 2, 1, 5

[ # 91]

In *I* 4 (46) 8, 25-27, Plotinus compares the “so-called” evils to πᾶσι φοβερά. In doing so, he may be following Epictetus, who said that men worry about things that deserve no more consideration than do such φοβερά in which children reputedly believe (2, 1, 5). This comparison can be traced back to the Socratic dialogues (cf. *Crito* 46C, *Phaedo* 77E).

Diss. 2, 5, 18-20

[ # 92]

Plotinus quite often adopts the attitude of a Stoic-Cynic Σοφός, particularly in those contexts in which he offers criticisms of “Gnostic” attitudes. When saying that men must not pay attention to things that do not merit their concern (*III* 2 [47] 15, 53 ff.), he describes Socrates as a man who took the “outside world” [τὰ ἔξω] to be an object of “sport”. Plotinus’ portrait of Socrates may well be indebted to Epictetus, *Diss.* 2, 5, 18-20, who was inspired by Plato’s *Apology* 26E, 27C-D.

Diss. 3, 20, 16-19

[ # 93]

When arguing against the Gnostic objections to theodicy (*III* 2 [47] 5, 3 [τὶ ποί]), Plotinus is apparently “stoicizing”, in that he asserts that souls are entirely free to achieve happiness. The *protreptic* examples offered in 5, 5 ff., although they are probably *loci communes*, suggest acquaintance with Epictetus, *Diss.* 3, 2, 16-19.

Diss. 3, 26, 28

[ # 94]

When stating that, for a good man, there is no such thing as evil

(III 2 [47] 6, 2-3), Plotinus approximates Epictetus, *Diss.* 3, 26, 28 (cf. *Ench.* XXXI); both may be relying on Plato's *Apology* 41D.

*Diss.* 4, 1, 127

[# 95]

Plotinus believes that wicked men will be punished by being turned into wolves (III 2 [47] 8, 26-27). This is exactly the opinion expressed by Epictetus, *Diss.* 4, 1, 127.



PART TWO

ESSAYS



## CHAPTER FOUR

### PLOTINUS ON THE STOIC CATEGORIES OF BEING

The most comprehensive and, from the systematic point of view, even the most coherent treatment of a Stoic doctrine ever elaborated by Plotinus is the argument developed in VI 1 (42) 25-31. It concerns their doctrine of the "four categories of Being": <sup>1</sup> ὑποκείμενον, ποιόν, πῶς ἔχον and πρὸς τι πῶς ἔχον.

In order to evaluate both the Stoic doctrine referred to by Plotinus <sup>2</sup> and the kind of critical reply, which is given within the particular context in which they occur, it may be worth-while to outline the general scope <sup>3</sup> of the extremely long investigation περὶ τῶν γενῶν τοῦ ὄντος (VI 1 [42], VI 2 [43], VI 3 [44]).<sup>4</sup>

It is Plotinus' chief concern to fill a gap which he thinks has been left open by his predecessors. That is to say, Plotinus attempts a coherent account of the ontological structure of both the *mundus sensibilis* <sup>5</sup> and the *mundus intelligibilis*,<sup>6</sup> for the Stoics and Aristotle had dealt only with categories that were meant to apply to the

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<sup>1</sup> That this term cannot be assumed correct without qualification is clear from *S.V.F.* 2, 183-184; the numbers (# 369-375) referred to in *S.V.F.* Vol. II, pp. 124-126 concern what von Arnim calls the 'quattuor categoriae'. The account given here will refer to the passages listed by von Arnim as *S.V.F.* 2, 314-315, 319, 320, 326, 371, 373, 375, 376, 400, 402.

<sup>2</sup> This is not the place to discuss the difficulties involved in the reports of Seneca, *Epist. Mor.* 58, 15 (= *S.V.F.* 2, 332 [for which see especially W. Theiler, *Die Vorbereitung des Neuplatonismus*, p. 4]), or Simplicius, *In Cat.* 165, 33 (= *S.V.F.* 2, 403 [for which see e.g. E. Elorduy, *Die Sozialphilosophie der Stoa* (Leipzig, 1936 [*Philologus Suppl.* XXIII]), pp. 90 ff.]). More recent accounts of the Stoic categories are those of P. DeLacy, "The Stoic Categories as Methodological Principles", *T.A.P.A.* LXXXVI (1945), pp. 246-263, M. E. Reesor, "The Stoic Categories", *A.J.P.* LXXVIII (1957), pp. 63-82, and J. M. Rist, *Stoic Philosophy*, pp. 152-172.

<sup>3</sup> See also the discussion by G. Nebel, *Plotins Kategorien der intelligiblen Welt* (Tübingen, 1929), pp. 13-14.

<sup>4</sup> A fourth section, so it must seem from the concluding words in VI 3 (44) 28, 11 ff., was to be expected.

<sup>5</sup> For VI 3 (44) see G. Nebel, "Terminologische Untersuchungen zu Οὐσία und Ὀν bei Plotin", *Hermes* LXV (1930), pp. 422-455, and C. Rutten, *Les Catégories du Monde sensible dans les Ennéades de Plotin*, pp. 43-112.

<sup>6</sup> For VI 2 (43), see G. Nebel, *op. cit.* [above, n. 3], and in part K.-H. Volkman-Schluck, *Plotin als Interpret der Ontologie Platons*<sup>2</sup> (Frankfurt, 1957), pp. 93-118.

sensible world (cf. VI 1 [42] 1, 27-29 ἀλλὰ περὶ τῶν νοητῶν κατὰ διαίρεσιν οὐ λέγουσιν. οὐ πάντα ἄρα τὰ ὄντα διαιρεῖσθαι ἐβουλήθησαν ἀλλὰ τὰ μάλιστα ὄντα παραελόιπασαν). Although the Stoics' division of ὄν into four kinds, falling under the class of τὸ τί [i.e., anything that can be spoken about has existence],<sup>1</sup> had certainly been developed from a very critical reply to Aristotle's approach<sup>2</sup> [i.e., his treatment of ten aspects], there is, however, a fundamental difference between the intentions of the two, viz. the Stoics, and Aristotle and his school.<sup>3</sup> For, whereas Aristotle was interested in the question "what (or 'how many') meaning(s) does 'be' possess of", the Stoics—being more interested in the problem of organizing the surrounding world in terms of the disposition of [universal] matter—proposed an *apparatus* of differentiation, which was supposed not to account for a metaphysical constitution,<sup>4</sup> but to "guide the enquirer into the status of particular things".<sup>5</sup> Thus, what ought to be considered the fundamental difference between the two is the fact correctly observed by Plotinus that Aristotle spoke of categories as οὐ μόνον γένη ταῦτα εἶναι ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀρχὰς τοῦ ὄντος ἀμα ὑπάρχειν (VI 2 [43] 2, 11, or VI 1 [42] 1, 12), whereas the Stoics meant their categories of Being to be taken as αὐτὰ τὰ ὄντα τῷ γένει τοσαῦτα (I, 13-14, cf. the résumé in VI 2 [43] 1, 2-3: εἴρηται δὲ καὶ περὶ τῶν εἰς ἓν ἀγόντων γένος τὰ πάντα τέτταρα ὑπὸ ἓν οἶον εἶδη τιθεμένων).

We must understand that Plotinus, when speaking of γένη τῶν ὄντων, will principally<sup>6</sup> be following such a line as was indicated by the ontological approach of Aristotle. Nevertheless, there are

<sup>1</sup> This is the explanation given by Alexander, *In Top.* 309, 19.

<sup>2</sup> For the material concerning this discussion, see O. Rieth, *Grundbegriffe der stoischen Ethik* (Berlin, 1933), pp. 55 ff., and A. Schmekel, *Die positive Philosophie in ihrer geschichtlichen Entwicklung*, Vol. I (Berlin, 1938), pp. 623 ff.

<sup>3</sup> See especially E. Elorduy, *Die Sozialphilosophie der Stoa*, pp. 97-101; also M. Pohlenz, *Die Stoa*, Vol. I, p. 69.

<sup>4</sup> For Aristotle's intention, see P. Merlan, *Beiträge zur Geschichte des antiken Platonismus*, *Philologus* LXXXIX (1934), pp. 35-55.

<sup>5</sup> See J. M. Rist, *Stoic Philosophy*, p. 171 [referring to J. Christensen, *An Essay in the Unity of Stoic Philosophy* (Copenhagen, 1962), p. 52]. This is also the opinion of P. DeLacy, *T.A.P.A.* LXXVI (1945), pp. 246-263.

<sup>6</sup> As Plotinus is interested in the question whether there are several supreme levels or one only, he need not care too much about the fact that, for Aristotle, Being in respect to the categories is not really to be understood homonymously, but in the sense peculiar to the function of analogy. That is probably the reason why Plotinus mentions together κατ' ἀναλογίαν καὶ ὁμωνύμως (Cf. VI 3 [44] 5, 1-7, or 1, 6 and 3, 26).

two reservations to be made by Plotinus: (i) Aristotle meant his categories to be applicable to the *mundus sensibilis* only, (ii) Aristotle attributes Being, in its specific sense, to the lower level. Plotinus, as is clear from VI 2 (43) 2, 25 [ἡ ἔσται καὶ κεῖνα ἐφ' αὐτῶν καὶ καθαρὰ καὶ τὰ μιχθέντα οὐκ ἀπολεῖ αὐτά], intends to attribute to the upper level of classes the same kind of existence as he does to the indivisible ideas.<sup>1</sup>

What characterizes and determines Plotinus' attitude towards the Stoics' attempt at classification is chiefly one consideration. Since their approach (as well as that of the Eleatics, so Plotinus understands, cf. VI 1 (42) 1, 1) is confined to the *mundus sensibilis*, Plotinus' discussion of it will turn out to be an analogous transference, or rather, application of the latter's ontology to the criteria set up for the *mundus intelligibilis*. Thus, the whole matter in question concerns the problem whether the Stoics' principles can be employed for his own purpose.

Plotinus' criticism, accordingly, runs as follows:

[I] With regard to the  $\tau\acute{\iota}$ ,<sup>2</sup> which is considered to be the κοινὸν γένος ἐπὶ πᾶσιν, Plotinus' objection is concentrated on the fact (1) that not only is the term itself not understandable, but (2) that it cannot apply to *corporeals* as well as to *incorporeals*.

It is somewhat difficult to conjecture what Plotinus intends when he charges the Stoics with a category-mistake. He may be calling attention to their viewpoint that  $\tau\acute{\iota}$  covers Being as well as Non-Being,<sup>3</sup> that is to say, that the Stoics take  $\tau\acute{\iota}$  to have reference to everything, whether it has real existence [i.e., subsistence] or not. Real existence, in the sense in which a Platonist would understand such a concept, can, for the Stoics, apply to the concrete, material entity only, which is—in Stoic terms—οὐσία. There are *incorporeals*, however, assumed by the Stoics to have existence.<sup>4</sup> For example, a

<sup>1</sup> Cf. G. Nebel, *Plotins Kategorien der intelligiblen Welt*, pp. 13-14.

<sup>2</sup> For the discussion of  $\tau\acute{\iota}$  by other authors, see Sextus Empiricus, *Adv. Math.* 10, 234, Seneca, *Epist. Mor.* 58, 11, Philo, *Leg. Alleg.* 2, 86, and Proclus, *In Tim.* Vol. I, p. 224, 82 [Diehl], all of which have been taken into account (partially) by J. M. Rist, *Stoic Philosophy*, pp. 153-157.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. S.V.F. 2, 329, 333, 334, 371, and Seneca, *Epist. Mor.* 58, 15.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. S.V.F. 2, 331. The whole question as to what extent it is appropriate to speak of the 'being' of the Stoic incorporeals in terms of 'existence' or 'subsistence' deserves more detailed attention than can be paid to it here. Extremely interesting is G. Watson's discussion of 'The *Lekton* and Russell' (*The Stoic Theory of Knowledge* [Appendix], pp. 92-96) [calling particular

λεκτόν is τι, although not in the sense in which οὐσία<sup>1</sup> has to be considered as really existent, for λεκτόν is a mental construct and therefore merely a *nomen* which has reference to a mental concept of a concrete particular and thus has a quasi-existence i.e., οἶον τὸ ὄν<sup>2</sup> or ὥσαντί τι ὄν.<sup>3</sup>

In any case, τί as such in any application cannot be intelligible (1), nor do the Stoics, Plotinus claims (25, 7 f.), (3) provide criteria by which τί could appear to have meaningful reference. (4) Moreover, if it is supposed to have reference to "something", τί must be considered to be either among existing things, or else among those things that are not.

This hypothesis is based, again, on the Stoics' premise that τί may refer to "existing" things [i.e., corporeals], as well as to things that do not have real subsistence [i.e., incorporeals], or even, as Alexander says specifically, to μηδέτερον (cf. S.V.F. 2, 339). However, to infer, as Plotinus does, that τί, if it is to be, must be ἐν τι τῶν εἰδῶν (25, 9) and, if not, Being would equal τὸ μὴ ὄν, is, firstly, to confuse reference and predication, and secondly, to conflate the predicative and existential function involved in the usage of the *copula*.<sup>4</sup>

[II] With regard to the ὑποκείμενον (25, 12 ff.), Plotinus objects that the Stoics class the principle of the existent particulars among "kinds of Being" which are generically derived from it, i.e. ὑποκείμενον.

This objection, which is a formal one, resembles very closely, of course, the Platonists' view that it is illegitimate to speak of οὐσία in an absolute sense i.e., without distinguishing between substances that are existent primarily and those that have a kind of derived subsistence (25, 27 ff.). Thus, Plotinus feels entitled to point out that (1) within the same class nothing can possibly have ontological priority to anything else, for the principle of derivation

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attention to Russel's review of Meinong's *Untersuchungen zur Gegenstandstheorie und Psychologie*, in: *Mind* XIV (1905), pp. 531 ff.].

<sup>1</sup> See, however E. Bréhier, "La Théorie des incorporels dans l'ancien Stoicisme", *A.G.P.* XXII (1909), p. 121.

<sup>2</sup> For D.L. 7, 61, see O. Rieth, *Grundbegriffe der stoischen Ethik*, p. 70.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. S.V.F. 1, 65; see, however, S.V.F. 2, 339, where Alexander says that ἐννοήματα would be considered neither corporeals nor incorporeals [for which in reference to S.V.F. 1, 484, see M. Pohlenz, *Die Stoa*, Vol. II, p. 24].

<sup>4</sup> The earliest occurrence of the latter confusion is that in the 'destructive argument' of Gorgias (Cf. *MXG* 979A25-26).

entails the postulate that the existence of one thing must be based, or be dependant, upon the subsistence of another entity belonging to a class prior [and superior] to the one in question. Yet a class itself, since it is definable through its generic identity, guarantees the same degree of Being [i.e., existence] to all its members. (2) Moreover, by emphasizing (25, 23 ff.) the prior position of ὑποκείμενον *qua* matter within one and the same class of existing things, the Stoics fail to observe that in doing so they are actually enumerating principles rather than the existing things themselves. This, however, must be contrary to the intentions of the Stoics (cf. 1, 13).

(3) Since the Stoics customarily employ Aristotelian terms (cf. e.g. *Metaph.* 989B10 and *Enn.* II 4 [12] 1, 9) when they speak of particulars as being affections of the substratum, they ought to distinguish between οὐσία and πάθη instead of placing them on the same ontological level. (4) The objection concluding this section (25, 29 f.), once more tries to call attention to an inconsistency inherent in the Stoic system. The Stoics, Plotinus claims, were guilty of confusion when speaking of a ὑποκείμενον and of the *other things* that, so one infers, come into being by a division of the ὑποκείμενον, whereas they should have spoken of ὑποκείμενον as of something which does not allow any division [συνεχῆς οὐσία]. It is difficult, however, to see what Plotinus is aiming at. For the doctrine of the divisibility of matter, as reported in *S.V.F.* 2, 482-491 (which is relevant to the Stoics' views concerning the relation of Soul, Body, God, and Fate [cf. *S.V.F.* 2, 45], and their theory of the συμπάθεια ἔλων [cf. *S.V.F.* 2, 543-546]) does not, from the Stoics' point of view, account for the generation of particulars. In any case, the fact that a Platonist expects the principle from which all existing things derive their Being to be unaffected by the process of creation is not at all surprising.

[III] In the section following (26, 1 ff.), Plotinus turns to a fundamental attack upon the Stoics' view of God. The argument, which is based entirely on the [Aristotelian] concept of δύναμις and ἐνέργεια (cf. e.g. *Metaph.* 1049B11, 25), accuses the Stoics of confusing the natural scale of ontological priority [see above, pp. 28-29 in # 14]. That is to say, the Stoics' opinion is not tenable, since it is inconceivable that something that must be considered only a *potentialiter* being should be placed at the beginning of existing things (τάξεως ἀρχὴν ἔχοντος ἐν τοῖς οὖσιν τοῦ δυνάμει

[26, 4]). (1) Matter itself, which is without quality, cannot produce form (26, 9 ff.), i.e., something that has a *ποιόν*. (2) The Stoics' deity, Plotinus claims, since it is a body and thus a compound of form and matter, must be subsequent to *ἔλη*. And yet, whence did the deity get "form"? That matter, which is a body and thus a *σύνθετον* cannot be a principle for a Platonist is evident. (3) A few lines later (26, 15 ff.) Plotinus says: "If, then, God is without matter and *a priori* in his essence not a compound, they will have to introduce a new kind of matter which is different from the one in question, i.e., the body of God" (26, 15-17). This draws attention to an interesting phenomenon. For the Stoics, if they speak of a kind of body that does not fall under the concept *πᾶν σῶμα ἐξ ἔλης καὶ ποιότητος* [= S.V.F. 2, 315], must apparently be confused: *ὁμωνύμως λέγουσιν σῶμα τὴν ἔλην*. In fact, Plotinus points out a problem:

(i) From the cosmological point of view, "God" may be considered an *ἰδίως ποιόν* which is identical with the world <sup>1</sup> and contains the whole of substance in itself; the *ἰδίως ποιόν*, however, being neither identical with its *οὐσία* nor intrinsically different from it, must be a part of *οὐσία*.<sup>2</sup>

(ii) From the ontological point of view, "God" is the surviving *πῦρ τεχνικόν* [and thus a body, though the "finest"],<sup>3</sup> must be not only different from the *ὑποκείμενον* <sup>4</sup> but also prior to it.

(iii) Yet—with regard to the cosmogonical process—Zeno appears to have stated that "God" is *σύγχρονος τῇ ἔλη*.<sup>5</sup> Plotinus himself understands, as is clear from 27, 10 ff., that the Stoics held "God" to have come into existence together with matter.

(iv) The passage concluding this paragraph (26, 20 ff.) touches on some technical, or rather, ontological problems involved in the Stoics' attempt to define body in respect to matter.

[IV] In the subsequent section (27, 1 ff.) Plotinus resumes the criticism offered in 26, 11 ff., saying that the Stoics make the

<sup>1</sup> Cf. D.L. 7, 138, Arius Didymus, *Phys. Fr.* 29 = *Dox. Graec.* 464, 14.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Arius Didymus, *Phys. Fr.* 27 = *Dox. Graec.* 463.

<sup>3</sup> *καθαρώτατον* according to S.V.F. 1, 155.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. Tertullian, *Adv. Nat.* 2, 4 and *Adv. Herm.* 44, for which see the discussion by C. Bäumker, *Das Problem der Materie in der griechischen Philosophie*, p. 359, n. 4.

<sup>5</sup> According to Epiphanius, *Adv. Haer.* 1, 5, 6 = *Dox. Graec.* 588, 17.



principle of all that is *ἄμορφον, παθητικόν, σκοτεινόν* and *ἀνόητον* (these are attributes which a Platonist understands as peculiar to "absolute Non-Being" [cf. 28, 1-5]).

Plotinus' inference that God must, accordingly, be posterior to the principle itself is based on the assumption referred to above [p. 90], where it was said that anything that is a compound of matter and form must be considered posterior to that which is *ὕλη ἄποιος*. In saying that the Stoics held God to be *ὕλη πως ἔχουσα*,<sup>1</sup> Plotinus seems to be neither right nor wrong, for the Stoics indeed held that any particular can be qualified as an "affection" of the substratum. Thus God, being looked upon as the substantial reality of this *cosmos*, may well be called an *ἰδίως ποιόν*. Yet the *ἰδίως ποιόν* and its substratum are neither simply identical nor different from each another. If one is right in considering the *ἰδίως π.* to be a part of the *οὐσία*, however, in which case the part must be *ὁμοειδὲς τῷ ὅλῳ*,<sup>2</sup> it is difficult to imagine how the Stoics might have applied such a scheme to their conception of the deity. From what we know of the range of application of the *πως ἔχον* it must seem that the Stoics probably restricted the kind of reference expressed by *πως ἔχον* ["being in a certain state"] to only those particulars that had already been qualified, which is to say that: "*das bestimmte Befindliche fügt der schon qualifizierten Substanz einen besonderen Aggregatzustand zu*".<sup>3</sup> It seems, therefore, that Plotinus was not right so far as the terminology is concerned. He is probably right, however, in understanding that God, according to the Stoics' point of view, is actually a peculiar disposition of the substratum; although his opinion that the Stoics must hold God to be later than *ὕλη* is apparently a Platonic-Aristotelian inference based on their notion that body is a compound of matter and form. From this, a Platonist or Aristotelian must infer that the Stoic deity, as it is a body, is posterior to *ὕλη*.

The criticism that follows the polemics against the nature of the Stoic deity is directed against their notion of *ὑποκείμενον* itself (27, 7 ff.). Thinking of substrate in the Aristotelian sense, Plotinus

<sup>1</sup> See above, pp. 28 f. in *¶* 14, and II 4 (12) 1, 13-14.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Sextus Empiricus *Adv. Math.* 7. 130, for which see above, p. 31 and n. 2 in *¶* 15.

<sup>3</sup> See W. Theiler's commentary (Vol. IVb), p. 457, and similarly O. Rieth, *Grundbegriffe der stoischen Ethik*, pp. 77 ff.; see, however, J. M. Rist, *Stoic Philosophy*, p. 169, who points out that: "Dispositions do not act on the substrate that is qualified entity; they are states of that entity".

attacks the Stoic opinion that things come to be from this ὑποκείμενον. They fail to see the necessity for something that makes matter into the ὑποκείμενον, and God, having come into existence together with ὕλη, cannot be considered for the prime active principle in question (27, 9-12). Conversely, Plotinus finds it impossible to believe that the Stoics' concept of ὑποκείμενον can itself serve the function attributed to it, for how could matter become in one case "body" and in another "soul" (27, 40-47)?<sup>1</sup> The Stoics, as Plotinus understands, would have said that "soul" comes into being if a certain quality is applied to matter (27, 44-45), whereas Plotinus himself believes that, in the way proposed, what comes into existence are σώματα ἄψυχα, so that the Stoics would have to grant the existence of a soul prior to ὕλη, which can cause matter to produce soul.

It is obvious that the kind of reasoning applied to the Stoics' notion is dependent upon the Aristotelian concept of δυνάμεις and ἐνέργεια, as well as upon the Platonists' belief that the soul itself must be ἀσώματος.

Apart from the fact that Plotinus' objection is based firmly on premises that are, *a priori*, entirely different, and thus cannot really meet the Stoics' position, it is unlikely that Plotinus made any effort to explain the meaning of ποιότης, which is peculiar to the doctrine developed by the Stoics. He points out correctly their opinion that ποιότης must be considered responsible for the coming into being of a particular; but ποιότης, though occasionally also referring to the concrete ποιόν (cf. e.g. S.V.F. 2, 390), is supposed to be the formal cause by which an instance of the prime matter becomes a particular [i.e., ἰδίως ποιόν]. From Simplicius, *In Cat.* 212, 10 ff., it appears that the fundamental difference between Aristotle and the Stoics with regard to this particular problem is that, while Aristotle considered the rational forms to be constituent of the essence itself, the Stoics separated quality from the notion of οὐσία, since they held that quality is a property of λόγος. That is to say, for Aristotle "qualities" are to be related to the potentiality of matter, whereas the Stoics held that λόγος imposes the forms on matter. In this the Stoics came closer to Plato than Plotinus was aware. Nevertheless, it is a fact that their rather confused under-

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<sup>1</sup> The Plotinian inference is actually built upon the Stoics' notion of ὕλη πως ἔχουσα.

standing of the scale of ontological priority precluded the Platonists from seeing this attitude in a favourable light. Strictly speaking, Plotinus' inference that, if ποιότης is applied to matter, the only things that can come into being are σώματα ἄψυχα, is not after all correct but is understandable, for no Platonist can derive soul from a prime matter, even if the latter is supposed to be ἄποιος and ἄσώματος.<sup>1</sup>

[V] The criticism which is continued in 28, 1 ff.,<sup>2</sup> summarizing to a certain extent what has already been said, looks rather Aristotelian (cf. *Metaph.* Γ) in some respects. Plotinus maintains that the whole series of misconceptions is to be explained by the fact that the Stoics rely on sense-perceptions only and relate to them the criteria of truth and the doctrine of the first principles. However, the Stoics are here somewhat inconsistent, since they do not hesitate to ascribe to Being properties that cannot be verified by sense-perceptions [i.e., τὸ ἀντιτυπές].<sup>3</sup> It is here that Plotinus seems to be almost ironical with regard to the Stoics' conception of mind (28, 20 ff.). For it must be some kind of ἄτοπος νοῦς that, although being posterior to prime matter, so Plotinus understands, is presumed to possess some knowledge about the first principles.

[VI] With regard to the ποιόν (29, 1 ff.), which is the second member of the four categories, Plotinus is quick to point out, as he had done before,<sup>4</sup> a confusion inherent in the Stoics' concept of ὕλη πως ἔχουσα. (1) For, in the case where ποιόν has reference to something belonging to a class that is different from ὑποκείμενον, the ποιόν [which resembles in some way the Aristotelian εἶδος], must be *simple*, i.e., not composite. That is to say, the ποιά would have to be considered as entities without matter [ἄσώματα] and, moreover, as agencies acting upon the underlying substrate. (2) In the case where the characteristics mentioned here [i.e., as they are derived from Aristotelian premises] do not apply to what the Stoics hold to be a ποιόν, it is a mistake to include the ποιά within

<sup>1</sup> See above, p. 13 in # 1.

<sup>2</sup> See above, pp. 28-29 in # 14.

<sup>3</sup> Plotinus' interpretation of the Stoic concept of body must seem questionable, because to the Stoics "the term [scil. ἀντιτυπές] seems to have designated a capacity to act or to be acted upon and not a three-dimensional body" (M. E. Reesor, *The Stoic Concept of Quality*, *A.J.P.* LXXV [1954], pp. 42, 57, see also *A.J.P.* LXXVIII [1957], p. 81).

<sup>4</sup> See above, p. 90.

the same class of "Being" referred to by ὑποκείμενον (29, 8).

The argument is similar to the *modus procedendi* observed above [p. 90-92]. The second objection is based on the assumption, not explicit here, that the λόγοι are to be considered formal causes. Thus, the first inference (3) concerns the fact that the Stoic λ. ἔνυλοι [following Arist. *De Anima* 403A25, but conceived as the λόγοι σπερματικοί] cannot function as rational forms if the ποιὰ are to be identical with ὕλη πως ἔχουσα. For, in this case, the "causes" ought to share the characteristics proper to the generated thing [ιδίως ποιόν] since the λόγοι are inherent in matter (29, 10-14). (4) In the case that the Stoics would then speak of these λόγοι as being nothing but ὕλη πως ἔχουσα, Plotinus correctly infers that they ought to regard the ποιὰ in their relation to the substrate itself, which is to say that the Stoics would have to include them in the class of πως ἔχοντα [i.e., the third *genus*].<sup>1</sup> At this point, however, the Stoics would have had to face the problem that the kind of σχέσις<sup>2</sup> peculiar to each of the members<sup>3</sup> must in both cases [i.e. (3), and (4)], have different degrees of reality and subsistence [ὑπόστασις].<sup>4</sup> Thus the ποιόν and the πως ἔχον would be μᾶλλον οὐκ ὄντα, since the only thing that has real subsistence is ὕλη.

Neither of the points that Plotinus makes really applies to the Stoic position, for the ποιόν is no more identical with ὕλη πως ἔχουσα, (3) than the Stoics would ever have considered the λόγοι to be ὕλη πως ἔχουσα. Rather it is that a qualifiable particular [ιδίως ποιόν] may be taken as ὕλη πως ἔχουσα, since that which makes matter an instance of ὕλη πως ἔχουσα is a distinct quality which is applied to ὕλη ἄποιος. The λόγοι, although for some reason being always inherent in matter, constitute the particular<sup>5</sup> in the sense that a certain instance of the πνεῦμα-stream, which bears recognizable and qualifiable features, blends with the substratum, so that what comes into being is a distinct compound which we conceive as an ιδίως ποιόν.

(5) It is not at all surprising that Plotinus, who in "stoicizing"

<sup>1</sup> For the textual problem in this passage see O. Rieth, *Grundbegriffe der stoischen Ethik*, p. 80, and W. Theiler's commentary (Vol. IVb), p. 457.

<sup>2</sup> For σχέσις, see S.V.F. 2, 390, and M. Pohlenz, *Die Stoa*, Vol. II, p. 39.

<sup>3</sup> It is difficult to say whether Plotinus understands correctly the Stoic notion of σχέσις.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. the argument in 25, 9.

<sup>5</sup> Cf. S.V.F. 2, 378 [ . . . ἀλλὰ τῇ ἐξ αὐτῆς τοιουτότητι καθ' ἣν ποιοῦ ὑφίσταται γένεσις ].

language would say that the ποιότης of intelligible matter (cf. II 6 [17] 1, 13 ff.) constitutes the definable difference between essences, asks the Stoics whether πως ἔχόν, which is a property of the substratum, is among existent things or not [i.e., whether it is ἀσώματον or of a bodily nature]. According to his own viewpoint, σωματότης has to be considered an λόγος τις or εἰδός τι [see above, p. 19 on # 4], rather than τι ἐκ πάντων συγκείμενον. This implies that the qualities which account for the distinct character of an ἰδίως ποιόν are entailed by the rational form (cf. II 7 [37] 3, 1 ff.). Hence, the distinct character of a ποιόν that the Stoics would regard as ἰδίως ποιόν is for Plotinus some sort of perishable “*quale*” derived from the self-subsistent ἀρχέτυπον (cf. II 6 [17] 3, 23). Πως ἔχον must then be a meaningless connotation (cf. VI 1 [42] 29, 22 ff., see also IV 7 [2] 4, 8-18).<sup>1</sup>

The section concluding this paragraph again shows a rather ironical consideration of the Stoics’ evaluation of ὕλη, to which, though it is without any quality, they attribute real existence. Again he claims that the Stoics invert and confuse everything by allowing the inference that mind is an instance of ὕλη πως ἔχουσα, whereby πως ἔχουσα, must be considered a προσθήκη κενή (cf. already 29, 24), so that mind is actually merely ὕλη.<sup>2</sup>

For Platonists, this must mean that mind, of which self-knowledge is the essential capacity, is *a priori* incapable of knowing the “truth” (29, 30-35).

This objection, which again, however, is a typically Platonic-Aristotelian inference, does not answer the point at which the Stoics were aiming, for on the basis of their ontology they may well claim that mind, which is an instance of Being, “is and knows *potentialiter* everything”, as Aristotle would have put it (cf. *De Anima* 430B, also *Rhetorics* 1335A15-17).

[VII] The analysis of the third category πως ἔχον, which was mentioned already in 25, 2 and 29, 16, starts by pointing out that the Stoics would not have considered the πως ἔχον as having reference to a class different from the ὑποκείμενον itself: all instances of πως ἔχον occur in relation to matter (30, 1-3). Thus it does not really matter, so Plotinus believes, whether the Stoics speak of

<sup>1</sup> For which see above, p. 36 in # 26.

<sup>2</sup> See above, pp. 28-29 in # 14.

πως ἔχον as simply a reference either to a disposition of the substrate or to things [πως ἔχοντα περὶ τὰ ὄντα].

Perhaps the most interesting point made by Plotinus is that the Stoics take the special πως ἔχοντα to occur in relation to the ποιὰ (30, 6). It appears that this remark represents Stoic opinion [see above, p. 93 n. 3]. One might well say that, for the Stoics: "Things are differentiated from one another in so far as they are different dispositions of the underlying matter",<sup>1</sup> since matter itself is the subject [ὑποκείμενον] in respect of the quality, whereas the ποιότης of an ἰδίως ποιόν must be considered subject to *accidental qualities*. Thus the suggestion that, for the Stoics, this scheme fulfilled the same function within the explanation of change and becoming as did the Aristotelian doctrine of actuality and potentiality—*mutatis mutandis*—for the Neoplatonist tradition, is not too far fetched.

Nor is Plotinus' observation that God, Mind etc., are nothing but ὕλη πως ἔχουσα incorrect. For as "virtue" is ἡγεμονικόν πως ἔχον,<sup>2</sup> so soul is πνεῦμά πως ἔχον.<sup>3</sup> Therefore, the entire sum of existing particulars can be reduced to an *Aggregatzustand* of matter.

The detailed criticism that Plotinus offers in the following lines (30, 10-21) is, in a way, close to the one that Simplicius elaborates. The latter wanted to prove that the number of categories employed by the Stoics is, as such, insufficient (*In Cat.* 66, 32 ff., 67, 1); and his main point is that the Stoics, by assigning to the πως ἔχον the function of explaining all the differences which the Peripatetics take into account under separate categories, actually consider the πως ἔχον equivalent to the category of quantity, time etc., when they should have introduced a new subject of the categories in question.<sup>4</sup> In a similar way, Plotinus proceeds by trying to find the Peripatetic categories (excluding οὐσία and πρός τι) in the Stoics' πως ἔχον. The examination is supposed, of course, to show once more that the Stoic theory, as such, must be self-contradictory and thus *a fortiori* inconsistent. Πως ἔχον only has reference to the category of κεῖσθαι and ἔχειν, whereby the latter, as Plotinus remarks, has to be taken simply in the sense of ἔχειν and by no means in that of πως ἔχον.<sup>5</sup>

<sup>1</sup> P. DeLacy, *T.A.P.A.* LXXVI (1945), p. 262.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Seneca, *Epist. Mor.* 113, 7. 11 = *S.V.F.* 3, 75.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. *S.V.F.* 2, 443. 806.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. also E. Elorduy, *Die Sozialphilosophie der Stoa*, p. 94.

<sup>5</sup> Boethius (referred to by Simplicius, *In Cat.* 373, 7) argued against the reduction of ἔχειν to the πως ἔχον by the Stoics.

It seems that Plotinus, in following his customary line of argument [i.e., trying to prove that the system itself is confused and inconsistent], does not do justice to the concept of *πῶς ἔχον*, for, from Simplicius' account (see *S.V.F.* 2, 369), one might infer that the Stoics considered *πῶς ἔχον* to have some function equivalent to Aristotle's category of quantity: the latter category is as it were the subject of those qualities that have reference to the body, for quantity itself is the main accident of a body.

Those differences that the Peripatetics thought were included under the remaining categories are claimed by the Stoics to be taken into at least partial consideration by the question of the relative disposition [i.e., *πρός τι ἔχον* or *πρός τι πῶς ἔχοντα*].

It is not really clear, however, what this distinction amounts to. From Simplicius, *In Cat.* 165, 32 ff. [= *S.V.F.* 2, 403] we learn that the Stoics spoke of qualities such as "bitter" and "sweet" as "relative", which are to be distinguished from "quasi-relative" characteristics such as "to be father" or "to be in the right". Thus, relation is not entailed in the *κατά τι εἶδος χαρακτηριζόμενον*, as Simplicius puts it (*S.V.F.* 2, 404), but "Relative dispositions are the relations of an individual thing to other individual things which are associated with it in the world, but on which its continuing existence as an entity does not depend".<sup>1</sup> It is very likely that the Stoics, believing more and more in the reality of a process that is definable by active and passive responses, came to think of qualities and properties in terms of *ποιεῖν* and *πάσχειν*. In any event, Plotinus, offering (30, 22 ff.) a brief criticism of the fourth category, can confine himself to two objections.

(1) The first concerns the fact indicated above that the Stoics are hesitant about attributing real subsistence [*ὑπόστασις*] to things referred to by the term *πρός τι*.<sup>2</sup>

(2) The second concerns the fact that the Stoics place *ἐπιγενόμενον* *πρᾶγμα* within the same class as those properties that ought rightly to be prior to it. The reasoning underlying this kind of criticism is exactly the same as that employed previously [see above, pp. 90-92].

<sup>1</sup> J. M. Rist, *Stoic Philosophy*, p. 170.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Sextus Empiricus, *Adv. Math.* 8, 453 *ἐπειὶ οἱ μόνον σώζεται τὰ πρὸς τί πῶς ἔχοντα, ὑπαρξίς δὲ οὐκ ἔστιν αὐτοῖς*.

Plotinus' view that the Stoic categories follow each other in a fixed order and that they are so related to one another "that every preceding category is contained in, and more accurately determined by, the next succeeding one"<sup>1</sup> is basically correct.<sup>2</sup>

But is Plotinus' criticism significant? Many of his arguments can hardly be considered "arguments", since Plotinus throughout uses concepts which the Stoics themselves did not use.<sup>3</sup> In so doing, Plotinus continually departs from Stoic doctrine, for example, in that he advocates the Platonic-Aristotelian distinction between matter and form, whereas the Stoics considered matter and quality to be inseparable, or in that he, when accusing the Stoics with confusion of the natural scale of ontological priority, thinks in terms that do not apply to the Stoic notions. Many of the objections raised against the Stoic system of the categories of Being are intelligible only to some one who adheres to Aristotle's ontology. This "attitude" is interesting, not least because Plotinus, when criticizing the Aristotelian categories, adopts a kind of nominalist position in Logic as opposed to the realism of Aristotle.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> B. Mates, *Stoic Logic* (Berkeley 1953), p. 18.

<sup>2</sup> See, however, J. M. Rist, *Stoic Philosophy*, pp. 170-172, who makes a case for the thesis: "Category four does not depend on category three . . ." (*op. cit.* p. 172).

<sup>3</sup> Cf. M. E. Reesor, *A.J.P.* LXXVII (1957), p. 79.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. A. Rich, [pointing out the main result of C. Rutten's *Les Catégories du Monde sensible dans les Ennéades de Plotin*] *A.G.P.* XLVI (1964), p. 128. A valuable account of Neoplatonic logic is given by A. C. Lloyd, "Neoplatonic Logic and Aristotelian Logic", *Phronesis* I, 1 (1955), pp. 58-72, I, 2 (1956), pp. 146-160.



## CHAPTER FIVE

### SOME ASPECTS OF PLOTINUS' SYSTEM OF CAUSATION

There is something *Stoic*, not to say paradoxical, about Plotinus' way of differentiating the totality of existence: Dualism and Monism converge.

Following a certain type of interpretation of Plato's philosophy, Plotinus singles out two "worlds" from the all-sustaining sphere of the *One*. These worlds, their *modus essendi* being incompatible, differ from one another in that contrary value-predicates are applied to them.<sup>1</sup>

Nevertheless, in trying to relate the mundane sphere to the intelligible pattern in the same way as the copy is related to its model, Plotinus, "anti-Gnosticizing", tries to accomplish two things. First, he attempts to bridge the radical gap that separates the ideal universe from its empirical image. Secondly, he wishes to reconcile "identity" and "diversity", as well as "unity" and "plurality", on the horizontal scale no less than on the vertical one: the *One*, being the origin of Being,<sup>2</sup> is regarded as the "Law of everything".

Apparently there is an attempt to keep *Dualism* and *Monism* reconciled in a sort of "dialectical balance".<sup>3</sup>

This is not the place to discuss the various implications of this complex relation,<sup>4</sup> but rather to call attention to a more particular problem. This concerns the questions as to how Monism and Dualism are connected in view of Plotinus' system of universal

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<sup>1</sup> The fundamental difference from Plato's system has been correctly pointed out by H. Blumenberg, *Die Legitimität der Neuzeit* (Frankfurt, 1966), p. 79: "In den neuplatonischen Systemen korrespondiert der Dämonisierung der Materie die Theologisierung der Ideen".

<sup>2</sup> For some good accounts of V 2 (11) 1, 1; III 8 (30) 9, 38 f., see G. Huber, *Das Sein und das Absolute* (Basel, 1955), p. 38.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. J. Hirschberger, *Geschichte der Philosophie*<sup>7</sup> Vol. 1 (Freiburg, 1964), p. 303.

<sup>4</sup> This problem has been well stated by G. Huber, *Das Sein und das Absolute*, p. 58: "Das, wovon das Absolute in seiner Transzendenz verschieden ist, ist also wesentlich Alles; es hat den Charakter der Totalität und itsals diese das Sein. Die Transzendenz des Absoluten bedeutet Transzendenz gegenüber dem Sein als dieser Totalität; es hat nicht zur Folge, den Totalitätscharakter des Seins aufzuheben".

causation. In other words: how does Plotinus' "Law of everything" compete with the Stoics' "Law of Being"?

At the beginning of his treatise *On Fate* Plotinus states five propositions concerning causation: <sup>1</sup>

"Both the kinds that become and the things that always are [i.e., that are not involved in a spatio-temporal process] either (1) do, or (2) do not have causes; or (3) in both groups some do and some do not have causes; or (4) those that become do have causes while of those that always are either some or none do have causes; or (5) all the things that always are do have causes while of those that become either some or none have causes"

[Transl. by J. Katz] <sup>2</sup>

Supposing that only one of these propositions can express his viewpoint, one might expect Plotinus to explain his position in some detail. But he does not do so. From the context one may infer however, that he held

- [a] all things that are involved in a process have causes, while
- [b] of those that are not involved in a process some have causes.

As regards [a], one might refer to the statement in 10, 2 . . . και γίνεσθαι κατ' αἰτίας πάντα. Concerning [b], the alternative suggested in the fourth proposition, we get some clarification from 1, 8-10: 'Επὶ μὲν οὖν αἰτίων τὰ μὲν πρῶτα εἰς ἄλλα αἴτια ἀνάγειν οὐχ οἶον τε πρῶτα ὄντα. ὅσα δὲ ἐκ τῶν πρώτων ἡρτῆται ἐξ ἐκείνων τὸ εἶναι ἐχέτω.

What still remains unclear is the notion of πρῶτα. Whatever they are supposed to be, Plotinus asserts that *quia* first beings they cannot be reduced to other causes. This seems difficult to understand, however, for in other [i.e., later] treatises Plotinus quite frequently asserts that there is one "absolutely-absolute" cause,<sup>3</sup> which transcends the other νοεραὶ αἰτίαι [μειζόνως ἄρα οἶον αἰτι-ατώτατον καὶ ἀληθέστερον] and contains all future causes in itself.<sup>4</sup> Thus πρῶτα ὄντα has to be taken either as a kind of Aristotelian *façon de parler*, in which case they would not oppose the notion of

<sup>1</sup> III 1 (3) 1, 1-8.

<sup>2</sup> *The Philosophy of Plotinus* (New York, 1950), p. 50.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. VI 9 (8) 6, 17-18 ἰκανώτατον, αὐταρχέστατον, ἀνδεέστατον.

<sup>4</sup> VI 8 (39) 18, 38-41.

the *One* which actually is the ultimate cause of all existent things, or as standing for the Platonic ideas, while *ὅσα δὲ τῶν πρώτων ἡρτῆται ἐξ ἐκείνων τὸ εἶναι ἐχέτω* might have reference to the immanent form which, as in some Neoplatonic systems, so also in Plotinus, accounts for the empirical instantiation of transcendent ideas. The latter assumption may, perhaps, be supported by a statement in Albinus, *Isagoge* 155, 34: *τῶν νοητῶν τὰ μὲν πρώτα ὑπάρχει ὡς αἱ ιδέαι, τὰ δὲ δεύτερα ὡς τὰ εἶδη τὰ ἐπὶ τῇ ὕλῃ ἀχώριστα ὄντα τῆς ὕλης*. Yet if this assumption is correct, which cannot be proved, we would have to ask again how Plotinus found it possible to speak of the ideas as *ultimate causes*, even though it is quite clear that they are neither causes of themselves nor causes of Being. What constitutes Being, the intelligible reality as well as the mundane sphere, is the *One*. By applying the [Stoic] law-metaphor<sup>1</sup> to the one and saying that everything comes into being according to its will,<sup>2</sup> he wishes to point out the logico-metaphysical dependence in terms of which we have to think of the relation between the *ιδέαι* and their spatio-temporal instantiation. But the fact that Plotinus, for example, following Plato, *Laws* 713E-714A, 957E, speaks of Intelligence as the νομοθέτης πρῶτος shows that the *One* functions differently from the Stoics' "Law of Being", i.e., εἰμαρμύνη: "In Physics the word fate is used to describe both the relationship of the principal cause to its substratum, and the chain or series of initiating causes which might cause the predicate derived from a principal cause to be realized or which might prevent it from being realized".<sup>3</sup> The Plotinian *One*, being in a way more akin to the Aristotelian *Unmoved Mover*, is not a device to account for the way in which natural processes are presumed to happen. Being ἐπέκεινα τοῦ ὄντος the *One* is a set of logico-metaphysical devices, but is itself no more involved in Being and in that which is derived from it than the meta-spatial God in Aristotle's *Metaphysics*, who is regarded as the ultimate final cause.

There is no doubt, however, that the *πρῶτα* are dependent upon the meta-subsistence of the *One*, which is their *cause* as well as their *principle* and *origin*; in other words, they do have causes. Yet, would it be correct to speak of the intelligible incorporeals in terms

<sup>1</sup> See E. Zilsel, *P.R.* LI (1942), p. 251.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. VI 8 (39) 18, 41.

<sup>3</sup> M. E. Reesor, "Fate and Possibility in Early Stoic Philosophy", *Phoenix* XIX (1965), p. 296.

of an *event* or of being *involved in a process*? Certainly not. However, Plotinus, combining Aristotle's νόησις νοήσεως and his conception of ἡ τοῦ νοῦ ἐνέργεια ζωή with what he understood to be Plato's "besouled universe",<sup>1</sup> accomplished something remarkable, which may well be considered a kind of *Dynamisierung des Seins*.<sup>2</sup> A notion such as this not only applies to the creative or active aspect<sup>3</sup> of the intelligible sphere *qua* original of its copy, but also points in the reverse direction, i.e., to the fact that Being is in monistic terms a kind of passivity of the *One's* meta-subsistence. In a way ideas are, indeed, necessary events, though certainly in a merely meta-spatial and meta-temporal sense. The "Monist" Plotinus would not lay emphasis on the fact that the *πρῶτα ὄντα* are actually *πρῶτα qua* ultimate causes, but would emphasize that they are *πρῶτα* in a logico-metaphysical sense, i.e., *qua ὄντα*. The "Dualist" can certainly say that the ultimate causes of empirical particulars are *πρῶτα αἴτια*. It would seem that both ways of looking at the *πρῶτα* converge, although not without difficulty. Yet Plotinus, speaking here only of *ὄντα*, is entirely consistent in saying that they [i.e., the transcendent ideas] are *πρῶτα*. For the *One*, being the supreme principle, ἐπέκεινα τῆς οὐσίας, and thus constituting οὐσία and that kind of existence which other entities posterior to the ideas derive from them, does not fall into the class of *ὄντα*.

As regards the things that are involved in a process, Plotinus repeatedly says that they all have causes.<sup>4</sup> There are apparently two main types of causes that are supposed to account for cosmic processes: καὶ τὰ μὲν ὑπὸ τῆς ψυχῆς, τὰ δὲ δι' ἄλλας αἰτίας τὰς κύκλω (III 1 [3] 10, 3).

<sup>1</sup> Cf. *Sophist* 248E-249A.

<sup>2</sup> G. Huber, *Das Sein und das Absolute*, pp. 35-38.

<sup>3</sup> Plotinus, when interpreting Plato's *Timaeus* 48E seems to be departing somewhat from the Neoplatonist tradition, which regarded the ideas as thoughts in the mind of God [cf. e.g. Albinus, *Isagoge* 163, 13, 17, Seneca, *Epist. Mor.* 58, 19 f.] and correctly considered them to be *exemplaria* [cf. Albinus, *Isagoge* 163, 18, and Seneca, *loc. cit.*], in that he tends to regard the ideas as creative powers (cf. e.g. VI 2 [43] 21, 8 [following a tendency peculiar to a stoicizing interpretation of Plato's philosophy, as in, for instance, Philo, *Spec. Leg.* 1, 46 ff., 329]).

It is not really surprising that Plotinus' account of the series of principles (III 2 [47] 2, 23) can well be understood as an implicit criticism of the pre-Neoplatonic scheme: ἐξ οὗ, πρὸς ὃ, ὑφ' οὗ (cf. e.g. Albinus, *Isagoge* 163, 10, 35); see H. Dörrie, "Präpositionen und Metaphysik", *M.H.* XXVI (1969), p. 217, n. 2.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. III 1 (3) 1, 15-16, 24-25; 8, 1-2; 10, 1-2.

[1] The *psychic cause* which is supposed to "involve everything" is a being, which is to say that it transcends in itself any of the inner-cosmic processes necessitated by physical causes.<sup>1</sup> In Plotinus' system, this cause, although being itself transcendent, functions as the immanent principle of coming into being. From the conceptual point of view it equals the Stoic εἰμαρμένη, which, being a stream of πνεῦμα, penetrates the sum of material subsistence. Yet Plotinus, who correctly regards the Stoics' world-soul as a cosmic cause, would certainly object to any assimilation of his *psychic cause* with the Stoics' πνεῦμα, which he took to be equivalent to *physical necessity*.<sup>2</sup> [As a matter of fact, in order to keep man's *self* free from the environment of external events, Plotinus emphasizes the fact that even the individual soul must be considered a transcendent principle equivalent to the world-soul].<sup>3</sup>

[2] It is not quite clear what Plotinus understands αἰ . . . κύκλω to stand for. From what follows in 10, 2 ff., we have to infer that he is thinking of those causes that concern the necessitation of the "things around us".<sup>4</sup> These causes appear to be of such a kind that they obstruct the *psychic causes*.<sup>5</sup> In fact, Plotinus suggests that these "obstacles" might well be related to καθ' εἰμαρμένην, if it is correct to make use of this [Stoic] term in reference to the things that are not in our power.<sup>6</sup>

In offering his own account of causation, Plotinus appears to be hesitant about attributing a specific function to εἰμαρμένη within his Platonic system. This sort of reluctance is quite understandable if one keeps in mind that fate, in the Stoic system, explicitly expressing the legal and causal impact of the deity's will, cannot easily be integrated into Platonic theodicy. Εἰμαρμένη, in order to be applicable to Plato's ontology of becoming, has to have a function different from the one implied in the theological concept developed by the Stoics. It is therefore not at all surprising to learn that Plotinus, roughly equating the Stoics' εἰμαρμένη with what he calls *physical causes*, takes it to be equivalent to the "necessity" of which Plato speaks in the *Timaeus* when saying that this *cosmos* is a blend

<sup>1</sup> Cf. III 1 (3) 8, 4-10.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. III 2 (47) 11, 1.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. III 1 (3) 8, 5-6.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. III 1 (3) 8, 12.

<sup>5</sup> Cf. III 1 (3) 10, 4 ff.

<sup>6</sup> Cf. III 1 (3) 10, 9-10

of *Intelligence* and *Necessity* (cf. 47E5-48A2).<sup>1</sup> In doing so, Plotinus does some violence to both the Stoics' concept of εἰμαρμένη and Plato's realm of secondary causes. For Plato, when distinguishing between a "primary cause", which is "divine", "intelligent", and "productive of what is good and fair",<sup>2</sup> and a "secondary cause", which is "necessary", "irrational", "fortuitous", and "disorderly",<sup>3</sup> makes it clear "that the mechanical cause, mistakenly accepted by the Ionians as the ruling cause, is actually only a slave cause".<sup>4</sup> Thus the point Plato makes is that material necessity is to be considered a "servant",<sup>5</sup> "incapable of any λόγος and νοῦς about anything".<sup>6</sup>

Plotinus, although he understands the Platonic cosmos correctly as some sort of meeting-ground of Necessity and Intelligence, does not for some reason make any use at all of the Platonic differentiation in so far as understanding ἀνάγκη as the realm of secondary causes is concerned.<sup>7</sup> Thinking in terms of a theological dualism, he understands ἀνάγκη as a residuum of "brute fact"<sup>8</sup> and takes it to be close to what he considers to be the Stoics' realm of necessity.<sup>9</sup> To Plotinus, as well as to other Platonists, εἰμαρμένη, as it is confined to inner-cosmic processes,<sup>10</sup> equals ἀνάγκη, whereas πρόνοια and λόγος<sup>11</sup> represent what the Stoics regard as the legislation of Nature.

<sup>1</sup> For which see G. Vlastos, "Slavery in Plato's Thought", *P.R.* LI (1944) esp. pp. 294 ff., and G. Morrow, "Necessity and Persuasion in Plato's *Timaeus*", in: *Studies in Plato's Metaphysics*, pp. 421-437.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. *Timaeus* 46D, E, 47E, 68E.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. *Timaeus* 46E, 47E, 48A, 56C, 68E.

<sup>4</sup> See G. Vlastos, *P.R.* LI (1944), p. 295; Professor Vlastos points out that the notion "of persuading necessity and the implications of compulsory necessity make sense only if one steadily keeps in mind the slave metaphor. Persuading the law of gravitation does not make sense, persuading a slave does" (*op. cit.*, p. 298). This point has been entirely overlooked e.g. by H. Schreckenberg, *ANANKH, Untersuchungen zur Geschichte des Wortgebrauches* (Munich, 1964), esp. pp. 121 f., see *Gnomon* XLIII (1971), 34S.

<sup>5</sup> Cf. *Timaeus* 46C7, 684E.

<sup>6</sup> Cf. *Timaeus* 46D4.

<sup>7</sup> Plotinus, when making use of the Aristotelian *acts in nature* (cf. Alexander, *De Fato* c. 4; III 1 [3] 6, 1 ff.), speaks of ἡ τοῦ παντός φορὰ as an auxiliary cause to those events that happen κατὰ φύσιν. Yet from the general account in chapter 1, it is clear that Plotinus knows the common distinction to be employed between *sufficient causes* and *proximate causes* (cf. 1, 25).

<sup>8</sup> This wording is borrowed from W. C. Greene, *Moira. Fate, Good, and Evil in Greek Thought*, p. 305.

<sup>9</sup> See Plutarch's account, *De Comm. Not.* 1051B-C.

<sup>10</sup> See W. Theiler, in: *Phyllobolia*, pp. 88-89.

<sup>11</sup> Cf. e.g. III 2 (47) 4, 25; 8, 37; 9, 6 f.

Generally speaking, it appears that the Stoic doctrine, in which providence is in a way subordinate to fate,<sup>1</sup> was reversed in the Platonist tradition.<sup>2</sup> At the beginning of his treatise *De Providentia et de Fato et eo quod in Nobis* [Cousin<sup>2</sup>, pp. 148 ff.],<sup>3</sup> Proclus emphasizes the point that providence is prior to fate in so far as everything that happens according to fate had already been determined by providence; and whereas many things that happen are not events in accordance with fate, there is nothing of this kind that escapes providence. On the contrary, what falls under providence need not be an event according to fate [p. 158 Cousin]. This doctrine also occurs in Boethius, *Cons. Phil.* 4, 6, 14 [*quo fit ut omnia quae fato subsunt providentiae quoque subjecta sint . . . quaedam vero quae sub providentia locata sint fati seriem superent*], 6, 11 [*quaelicet diversa sint alterum tamen pendit ex altero: ordo namque fatalis ex providentiae simplicitate procedit*]; but it can be traced back at least to the source of Nemesius, *De Nat. Hom.* c. 38, c. 44, and to the account of Ps. Plutarch, *De Fato* 573A-B.<sup>4</sup>

What strikes one as most interesting, however, especially in respect to Plotinus' anti-Stoic system of universal causation, is the fact that all of the accounts referred to, but those of Nemesius and Ps. Plutarch in particular, allow the inference that in the Platonist tradition there was also a distinction to be made between the notions of *fate* and *nature*. Yet, "*leider ist nicht zu ermitteln, wie sich das Schicksal oder Naturgesetz zur Natur (φύσις) verhalten sollte*".<sup>5</sup> According to orthodox Stoic doctrine, God was to be regarded as identical with nature and fate.<sup>6</sup> Thus, the latter represents not only the legal device in accordance with which the total sum of existing things is administered<sup>7</sup> but also, being identical with God and thus actually being the *πνεῦμα*-stream which penetrates the sum total of things, performs the rôle of the executive that enforces all the

<sup>1</sup> See above, pp. 51-52.

<sup>2</sup> For Plotinus, see III 3 (48) 5, 15. 24 ("*Die εἰμαρμένη ist . . . auch erst die Folgeerscheinung der πρόνοια*"<sup>59</sup> [W. Theiler, in: *Les Sources de Plotin*, p. 85]).

<sup>3</sup> = pp. 109 ff. in *Procli Diadochi, Tria Opuscula* (Berlin, 1960).

<sup>4</sup> These resemblances were pointed out by A. Gercke, "Eine platonische Quelle des Neuplatonismus", *Rh.M.* XLI (1886), pp. 266-291, especially p. 281.

<sup>5</sup> A. Gercke, *Rh.M.* XLI (1886), p. 281.

<sup>6</sup> Cf. *S.V.F.* I, 176.

<sup>7</sup> For a description of the notion of fate in Stoic Physics, see the quotation, from M. E. Reesor, *Phoenix* XIX (1965), p. 296 [above, p. 103, n. 3].

laws that have been enacted since eternity. Plotinus, who, like the Stoics, is attached to the Law-metaphor, attributes the legislative function to *Intelligence*, which institutes those logico-metaphysical dependences [see above, p. 103] as entailed in the *One*, which is also called the "Law of everything". The executive rôle, however, is assigned to *Soul*, although Plotinus occasionally also says that *Intelligence* acts through *Soul*.<sup>1</sup> But what about *Nature*? From Plotinus' ontology it is quite clear that *Nature*, since it may be considered the immanent aspect of a transcendent entity [i.e. *Soul*], cannot easily be equated with what Plotinus chooses to call εἰμαρμένη. In fact, unlike the later Peripatetics, who held that the *fated* and the *natural* were the same,<sup>2</sup> so that "Fate is to be found among acts existing in nature, and is indeed equated with nature in all but the name",<sup>3</sup> Plotinus appears to have distinguished between the κατὰ φύσιν from the καθ' εἰμαρμένην. This must be inferred from the passage where it is said that the necessitation of the things around us is of such a kind that it obstructs the *psychic causes*<sup>4</sup> and that one might use the term εἰμαρμένη in reference to those things that are not in our power.<sup>5</sup> At least natural processes, for example, the continuation of species,<sup>6</sup> apparently fall, for Plotinus, under what he regards as τὰ κατὰ λόγον γιγνόμενα.<sup>7</sup> That is to say, they must be considered as events due to *psychic causation*. It is the *Soul*, one has to assume, that initiates those processes that are κατὰ λόγον and thus κατὰ φύσιν. The same is presumably true for Plotinus in respect to those natural events which *Nature* performs by contemplation.<sup>8</sup> It has to be borne in mind that since, according to Plotinus, almost everything partakes in the "*raisonable Grundkraft der Welt*"<sup>9</sup> [i.e. *Soul* is the immanent aspect of the transcendent *Intelligence*, ergo its λόγος], most<sup>10</sup> of the inner-cosmic events are preferably explained as κατὰ λόγον γιγνόμενα.<sup>11</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Cf. e.g. IV 7 (2) 13, 17, also 9, 1 and IV 3 (27) 12, 32.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Alexander, *De Fato* 169, 18-23, *De An. Mant.* 182, 4-11, and Aetius I, 29, 4 [= *Dox. Graec.* 325B30-32].

<sup>3</sup> W. C. Greene, *Moirai. Fate, Good and Evil in Greek Thought*, p. 373.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. III 1 (3) 8, 12; 10, 4 ff.

<sup>5</sup> Cf. III 1 (3) 10, 8-10.

<sup>6</sup> Cf. III 1 (3) 6, 1 ff.

<sup>7</sup> Cf. e.g. VI 8 (39) 10, 8 ff.

<sup>8</sup> See above, pp. 108-111.

<sup>9</sup> W. Theiler, in: *Les Sources de Plotin*, p. 100.

<sup>10</sup> See the paradoxical statement in IV 3 (27) 11, 13 that God could not come down to everything, although nothing was prevented from partaking in God. This reflects the problem raised by Plato when speaking of God's finite potency (cf. *Timaeus* e.g. 29E3, 31C3).

<sup>11</sup> Cf. III 2 (47) 15, 13.



But why does Plotinus not follow the later Peripatetics in regarding those definitely natural processes as *fated* ones? One might be tempted to find the answer in the assumption that Plotinus probably objected to the notion of *necessitation*. But this is not entirely true. Apparently, Plotinus thinks of every event which is *κατὰ φύσιν*, as *ἀναγκασίον*. In fact, there is at least one passage where Plotinus speaks of natural events [such as the growth of plants and the behaviour of animals] in terms of *εἰμαρμένη*,<sup>1</sup> which is subordinate, however, to the legislation of *Intelligence*. To Plotinus the notion of being "necessarily of such and such kind" does not refer simply to the "*Eigenschaft eines jeden äusseren Vorganges, der in Bezug auf seine ἀντίστα verstanden wird*".<sup>2</sup> In thinking of *κατὰ λόγον* as *ἀναγκασίον*, Plotinus assumes "*ein höheres vertikales Gesetz der Ananke, durch das jeweils das Sein des niederen Princips auf das des höheren zurückgeführt wird. Diese Ananke ist es, die aus dem Höheren das Niedere hervorgehen lässt*".<sup>3</sup> What makes Plotinus hesitate to adopt the Peripatetic equation of the *natural* and the *fated* is rather a kind of metaphysical reservation. To him, as to other Neoplatonists, a "Law of Nature", if it was to account for a process *κατὰ λόγον*, could not possibly be understood as a device which acts of its own accord, that is to say, independently of transcendental principles. Yet this was exactly the concept of the "law of nature" as developed by the Peripatetics in accordance with Aristotle's conception of *φύσις* and which then was adopted by Epicurus and Lucretius.<sup>4</sup>

In any case, Plotinus apparently distinguishes between fate and providence, the latter being the realm of psychic causes, and it must appear that nature, too, is not related to the level of *fate* in Plotinus' system. The assumption that Plotinus, in doing so, must be indebted to a source such as Ps. Plutarch, *De Fato* is attractive. Yet from the statement "... all things are done according to *Fate* and *Providence* but not according to *Nature*",<sup>5</sup> it is not at all clear

<sup>1</sup> IV 3 (27) 13, 1-32, esp. 21-23.

<sup>2</sup> P. O. Kristeller, *Der Begriff der Seele in der Ethik Plotinus*, p. 44; he continues: "Diese Ananke, die dem Anankaion objectiv zugrunde liegt, ist in dem Sein und der Beschaffenheit des Gegenstandsbereiches Kosmos enthalten" (*op. cit.*, p. 47).

<sup>3</sup> P. O. Kristeller, *Der Begriff der Seele in der Ethik Plotins*, p. 49.

<sup>4</sup> See K. Reich's excellent account, "Der historische Ursprung des Naturgesetzbegriffes", in: *Festschrift E. Kapp* (Hamburg, 1955), pp. 112-134.

<sup>5</sup> Ps. Plutarch, *De Fato* 573A-B.

exactly what the relation between nature and fate, and, we may add, the law of nature, was supposed to be. On the other hand, although Plotinus employs a formal division such as the one referred to in the "anti-stoicizing" account of *De Fato* c. 9, he is not likely to share with the idea behind the distinction between fate and providence, on the one hand, and between fate, providence and nature, on the other. To him, nature and providence are connected in the sense that natural processes must be regarded as κατὰ λόγον γιγνόμενα. It seems rather persuasive to try to relate Plotinus' division to the threefold classification of Zeus, Nature, and Fate as proposed by Posidonius ("Fate is the third place from Zeus. The first is Zeus, the second is Nature, the third Fate" <sup>1</sup> [F 103 a.b Edelstein-Kidd]). But does this proposition really allow the inference that Posidonius took Zeus, Nature, and Fate as three separate powers, "differing in the matter of which they are composed"? <sup>2</sup> Since the definition of none of the three instances referred to is preserved, it is impossible to say in what respect Zeus differed from Nature. It seems possible, however, to suggest that God need not be identical in Posidonius' system, as it is in the orthodox Stoic doctrine, with the seminal reason, and that Posidonius, in distinguishing reason from the creative power of the world, comes rather close to Plato and Aristotle.<sup>3</sup> Yet all this certainly does not permit the inference that natural processes *etc.*, are not fated ones, and that there is a hierarchy of powers. What can be assumed is that Posidonius, when trying to establish Mantics and Divination as reasonable sciences, found such a three-fold classification relevant to his methodological purposes.<sup>4</sup> *Zeus* might have been taken in reference to Theology, *Nature* as expressing reference to the realm of prognostic sciences, whereas *Fate* represented a discipline of its own kind. Thus, as far as Mantics and Divination are concerned, investigation and explanation of phenomena can be derived from these three instances, representing disciplines *suorum generum*. What makes it difficult to assume that Posidonius might have thought in terms of three distinct powers is the fact that there is attested evidence to show

<sup>1</sup> *Dox. Graec.* 324A4 (transl. by L. Edelstein, *A.J.P.* LVII [1936], p. 292).

<sup>2</sup> L. Edelstein, *A.J.P.* LVII (1936), pp. 292-293.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. *Dox. Graec.* 324, 29; see also the account in D.L. 7, 139 (Where God is held to be the pilot of the universe) = F 23 Edelstein-Kidd.

<sup>4</sup> See Cicero, *De Div.* 1, 125, and his account in 1, 117 [for which see K. Reinhardt, *R.E.* XXII, 1 (1953), col. 644, 5-35].

(1) that all things happen according to fate,<sup>1</sup> (2) that the *cosmos* is administered by reason and providence,<sup>2</sup> and (3) that the hypothesis according to which the three-fold classification is meant to be taken as a hierarchical structure becomes, of course, even more difficult when one considers that the sequence of instances, as recorded by Cicero, differs from the other (F 103 a.b.) in that fate takes second place, whereas nature is mentioned third.

However different Posidonius' puzzling division may be from the position held by Zeno and Chrysippus, there is little evidence for saying that Plotinus, opposing the orthodox equation of *God, Nature, Providence, and Fate*,<sup>3</sup> is likely to be related to a kind of criticism which might have been made by Posidonius of some of the orthodox Stoic views concerning the question of how Divination and Mantics ought to proceed.

Thus, the question to what extent such a distinction as that drawn by Plotinus between natural processes and fated ones might be indebted to either some earlier attempt on the part of Platonism or to Posidonius himself, must remain unanswered.

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<sup>1</sup> D.L. 7, 149.

<sup>2</sup> D.L. 7, 138.

<sup>3</sup> In Ps. Arist. *De Mundo*, Zeus is equated with *Ananke, Heimarmene, Peptomene* etc. (401B8 ff.); this passage has been declared to be Chrysippean by J. P. Maguire, *Y.C.S.* VI (1939), p. 162.

## CHAPTER SIX

### PLOTINUS ON MAN'S FREE WILL

Has Plotinus to be considered a determinist in the sense of the word which is applicable to the Stoics's idea of universal causation?

As far as the question of *empirical responsibility*<sup>1</sup> is concerned, the answer to this must be on the affirmative,<sup>2</sup> although Plotinus would have objected strongly to any assessment of his views which might bring them too close to the position held by the Stoic school. There is no question, however, that Plotinus considered man's empirical self not to be the "ultimate principle" of his actions, however voluntary they might be. Neither did the Stoics. But both, when claiming that man's will must be in accordance and conformity with external reason, which is incorporated into principles that account for our understanding of the life of the Whole as well as that of its parts, would have agreed with each other in the presumption that *man ought to be free* in the sense that he *must not be prevented from attaining what is really good for him*.

In other words, both to the Stoics and to Plotinus, "liberty", if it is understood in terms of "having the power of choice" and being capable of "acting independently", can be assumed to mean being capable of implementing a kind of categorical imperative, for example, to act in such a way that the maxims of one's conduct are at any time in accordance with the principles entailed in the rational order of Being.<sup>3</sup>

Admittedly, Plotinus would also agree with the Stoics that there is absolutely no external cause that could prevent an agent, who has the free choice between X and not-X, from making his principles of moral conduct conform with the maxims that are inherent in the κοινή φύσις or in the κόσμος νοητός, respectively.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> I borrow this wording from G. H. Clark, "Plotinus' Theory of Empirical Responsibility", *P.R.* XVII (1943), pp. 16-31.

<sup>2</sup> T. Wittaker would seem to be quite right when saying in *The Neo-Platonists*, p. 76 "he is without the least hesitation a determinist", [see also n. 1].

<sup>3</sup> Cf. W. Himmerich, *Eudaimonia*, p. 143.

<sup>4</sup> I agree with A. A. Long, *P.Q.* LXX (1968), p. 340 in that "nothing suggests that the Stoics thought assent in the moral sense was necessarily determined by external causes".

Generally speaking, freedom *qua* having the power of choice between X and not-X does not in the Stoics' and in Plotinus' viewpoint so much concern the capability of accomplishing<sup>1</sup> a good to be carried out in any action whatever, since "ethical conduct is the demonstration of their theory of knowledge in action";<sup>2</sup> it has to do rather with the intentionality of an act of moral decision.

In the case of the Stoics, who thought of liberty explicitly in terms of "power of choice" or "what is in our power", this is rather more apparent than it is in the case of Plotinus. To the Stoics, to exercise the power of choice cannot simply mean, as it does in the *Nicomachean Ethics*, to choose a good that is supposedly conducive to happiness.<sup>3</sup> Since the Stoics did not make any distinction between knowing what is right and doing it, the situation of choice indicates to them the possibility of implementing the principles maintained in the categorical imperative. Thus, an agent either adapts himself to the universal principles of conduct to be explicated in the notion of κοινὴ φύσις [of which man is a part, regardless of whether he is happy about it or not], or he refuses to do so.

From what has been indicated, one cannot but receive the impression that a Stoic philosopher, when facing a situation in which a decision must be taken, took what actually functions as the *heuristic criterion* [τὸ κατὰ φύσιν] of his decision in favour of either X or not-X to be also the end for the sake of which a decision has to be taken.<sup>4</sup>

Another fact now becomes rather obvious. The Stoics, although they seem to have been well aware of the fact that any situation in which a decision must be taken is, in fact, necessitated by preceeding events, which they take to function as auxiliary and proximate causes, do not like to acknowledge the compulsory character of this

<sup>1</sup> O. Rieth, in *Grundbegriffe der stoischen Ethik*, p. 156 (and p. 136) is quite right in pointing out that the Stoics were concerned with establishing moral responsibility rather than 'freedom of will'.

<sup>2</sup> See G. Watson, *The Stoic Theory of Knowledge*, p. 59.

<sup>3</sup> For some valuable observations, see J. M. Rist, *Stoic Philosophy*, p. 12.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. S.V.F. 3, 57; A. A. Long, in *Phronesis* XII (1965), pp. 78 ff. asserts that Antipater could not have held simultaneously that the goal is both rational behaviour in the selection of the τὰ κατὰ φύσιν and doing everything in one's power to obtain τὰ κατὰ φύσιν, for to be rational in the choice of X is quite different from making every effort to obtain X. A. A. Long's point deserves more particular attention than can be paid to it here.

necessitation to which man is subject.<sup>1</sup> Even after allowance is made for such different suggestions as were proposed by various Stoics either to link or to separate propositions about πρόνοια and εἰμαρμένη, the fact remains that the latter is always considered some sort of manifestation of the causal aspect of God's will. And man himself, since human soul shares consubstantial identity with the world-soul, accordingly functions as εἰμαρμένη. At all events, no Stoic could ever think of necessitation as an imposition, for it is this necessitation that provides the material, in view of which man can successfully prove that his principles of conduct are in accord with those of universal reason.

As regards Plotinus' ideas of human autonomy and the intentionality of man's decision there is—from the conceptual point of view—much “stoicizing”, or should one rather say anticipation of Kantian ethics?

What makes it difficult, however, not to overlook those significant characteristics which his account has in common with the opinion held by the Stoic school are mainly two points. First, the *metaphysical self*, to use the Kantian term, does not express itself on the level of the (Aristotelian) βίος πρακτικός, whereas the empirical self does. By now relating the difference between the latter and the former to that which exists between the *mundus intelligibilis* and its image, the *mundus sensibilis*, one will become aware of the peculiar antinomy concerning man's *self-determination*. This is not the place to outline all the implications relevant to the matter in question, which has to be viewed on two levels.<sup>2</sup> One of the major concerns of Plotinus' discussion of man's free will, for example, in VI 8 (39), is to dissociate and yet to reconcile what he took to be different aspects of τὸ ἐφ' ἡμῖν. Attributing to man's true self the function of θεωρία, Plotinus finds it impossible to think of men as beings whose actual liberty can be sufficiently described in terms of “action” [πρᾶξις] or “power of choice”, “what depends upon us”, and “what is in our power” [τὸ ἐφ' ἡμῖν], not, at least, without any qualification. Secondly, Plotinus is for some reason attached to the idea that the

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<sup>1</sup> The portrait of the Stoic Σοφός drawn by M. E. Reesor in *Phoenix* XIX (1965), p. 289 as “struggling against or unwillingly following the fate which may involve his own suffering or sorrow, but which will form part of the total good” is based on a misinterpretation of Seneca, Epist. Mor. 107, 11 (following Cleanthes); see also J. M. Rist, *Stoic Philosophy*, pp. 127-128.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. e.g. G. H. Clark, *New Scholasticism* XVII (1943), p. 16.

Stoics not only did not give an adequate account of those problems which arise from the premises to which only a Platonist subscribes, but also that they distort the whole matter, since they integrate man into the process of external causation and by doing so leave no room for man's "τὸ ἐφ' ἡμῶν", but make it an external event.

To what extent Plotinus may have been aware of the hypothetical nature of his criticism must remain doubtful. The tenor of his approach to the Stoics in III 1 (3), and especially in 4. 7, is quite different from that in VI 8 (39) 2-5. It is in the latter treatise that Plotinus makes some effort to point out that the Stoics [they alone can be the ones addressed] overestimated the extent of empirical freedom in attributing to τὸ ἐφ' ἡμῶν those characteristics that actually apply to the metaphysical self only. It is strange that in the other treatise Plotinus does not hesitate to misrepresent the Stoics' views of man's autonomy to the extent of making them hold positions that, according to VI 8 (39), are not entirely wrong. Much could be said of Plotinus' method of criticism. All that is necessary for the present, however, is to bear in mind the fact that the scope of the two treatises is not identical.

With respect to the question "what makes an action *voluntary*"<sup>1</sup> Plotinus holds, as did Aristotle,<sup>2</sup> that there are two criteria to be fulfilled. First, the action must be made without external compulsion; and secondly, the agent must possess knowledge of what he is doing: ἐκούσιον μὲν γὰρ πᾶν, ὃ μὴ βίβη μετὰ τοῦ εἰδέναι.<sup>3</sup>

Before pointing out some problems involved in this understanding of "voluntary", attention should be called to the fact that Plotinus, when qualifying "knowledge" as οὐκ ἐν τοῖς καθ' ἑκάστα μόνον εἶναι, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅλως,<sup>4</sup> apparently challenges the Aristotelian proposition, according to which the agent must not be ignorant of some important particulars pertaining to the circumstances of his

<sup>1</sup> Translators and commentators of the *Nicomachean Ethics* have often pointed out that there are no equivalents for the Greek ἐκών, ἄκων, ἐκούσιον, ἀκούσιον. On the other hand, F. A. Siegler, "Voluntary and Involuntary", *Monist* LII (1968), pp. 268-269 is certainly right in refuting G. Ryle's contention that the ordinary use of the word 'voluntary' applies only when an act ought not to be done and that the English rendering of the Aristotelian classification involves a misuse of the word.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. e.g. E. N. 1109B35, or 1111A21-24.

<sup>3</sup> VI 8 (39) 1, 33-34.

<sup>4</sup> VI 8 (39) 1, 39-41.

action.<sup>1</sup> By doing so, Plotinus already turns away from the position held in the *Nicomachean Ethics*, in order to implement the Platonic requirement of "universal knowledge", i.e., the knowledge of what is always and under any circumstances right *etc.*; consequently Plotinus must consider an action to be "involuntary" if the agent fails to recognize the evil nature of his deed.<sup>2</sup> For the "mind confronted with the truth would never be unwilling to adhere to it".<sup>3</sup> There can be no question that Plotinus subscribes to the Socratic paradox.<sup>4</sup>

One problem that arises in this connection concerns the notion of ἐκούσιον. For Plotinus, when asserting that for any action to be "voluntary" the fulfilment of both criteria is required, must consider it to be the absence of "universal knowledge" that makes an action, the principle of which is still the agent, to be "involuntary" although it is done, indeed, intentionally, deliberately, on purpose, and wilfully [such a case falls, for Aristotle, under the category of acting *in ignorance*, which is to be distinguished from the case where some one's action is *due to ignorance*].<sup>5</sup> As regards Plotinus, can a Platonist indiscriminately say that absence of "universal knowledge", which in the [Aristotelian] practical syllogism he would hold to account for the statement expressed in the major proposition, is not man's fault? In view of Plotinus' eschatological speculations, there can be little doubt that man [i.e., his immortal soul] must assume the entire responsibility for any action that was his own. This is certainly also true of an action which, since it was done in ignorance, can be regarded as an involuntary one. On the other hand, is it appropriate for a Platonist to say that in such a case the subject is really the principle of his action? From a different passage it is clear that "acting in ignorance" is due to external causes.<sup>6</sup> Thus, Plotinus should rather say that such an action is "involuntary", since it is not ἐφ' ἡμῖν.

Since the time of Aristotle, the notion of ἐκούσιον was closely related to that of τὸ ἐφ' ἡμῖν, i.e., "what is in our power", "what depends upon us".

<sup>1</sup> See *E.N.* 1111A23-24 and 1135A24-26, for which cf. P. Henry, "Le Problème de Liberté chez Plotin", *R.N.P.* XXXIII (1931), p. 186.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. J. M. Rist, *Plotinus: The Road to Reality*, p. 131.

<sup>3</sup> M. T. Clark *Augustine. Philosopher of Freedom* (New York, 1956) p. 26.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. e.g. III 3 (48) 10, 1-7.

<sup>5</sup> Cf. *E.N.* 1110B25.

<sup>6</sup> III 1 (3) 10, 4-8.



Plotinus, when defining τὸ ἐφ' ἡμῶν as ὁ τῇ βουλήσει δουλεύει<sup>1</sup> and ὁ καὶ κύριοι πράττει,<sup>2</sup> basically agrees with Aristotle that an action, in order to be ἐκούσιον must be ἐφ' ἡμῶν, whereas the opposite need not be true. It seems, however, that Plotinus, although indicating that both terms do have different references,<sup>3</sup> apparently has little concern for this distinction either in what follows or elsewhere. [On the contrary, there are at least two instances where the two function as interchangeable synonyms].<sup>4</sup>

Moreover, by rendering "what depends upon us" by ὁ τῇ βουλήσει δουλεύει καὶ παρὰ τοσοῦτον ἂν γένοιτο ἢ μὴ παρὰ ὅσον βουληθείημεν,<sup>5</sup> Plotinus comes close to the definition proposed by the Stoics, who understood that ταῦτά ἐστιν ἐφ' ἡμῶν ὧν καὶ τὰ ἀντικείμενα δυνάμεθα.<sup>6</sup> It is rather interesting to observe that Plotinus found it possible—and he is right in doing so—to take both the Aristotelian account and the definition given by the Stoics as conceptually identical and thus to let the latter serve as an explanation of the Aristotelian proposition. Alexander, when ridiculing the Stoics because they allow the inference that there is no such thing as τὸ ἐφ' ἡμῶν, did not see that the "Stoic formula" was apparently inspired by Aristotle himself.<sup>7</sup>

Accordingly, man can be supposed to be the fully responsible principle of his actions only if the opposite not-X is also in his power [i.e., in terms of power of choice].

Nevertheless, it must seem that, for Plotinus, the notion of τὸ ἐφ' ἡμῶν requires some serious modifications with respect to the conception of man's autonomy. To a larger extent, these modifications concern the area of empirical responsibility, which is to say that they concern the question whether or not man can be viewed as the ultimate principle of his actions. What is this supposed to mean? Plotinus appears to be challenging the Stoic notion of

<sup>1</sup> VI 8 (39) 1, 30-31.

<sup>2</sup> VI 8 (39) 1, 34.

<sup>3</sup> VI 8 (39) 1, 34 ff.

<sup>4</sup> See III 1 (3) 9, 11-13 and VI 8 (39) 5, 1-2.

<sup>5</sup> VI 8 (39) 1, 31-33.

<sup>6</sup> Cf. *S.V.F.* 2, 984. 1007.

<sup>7</sup> Cf. *E.N.* 1113B5-6, where Aristotle is talking about actions which produce virtue or vice [i.e. actions which do not proceed from a fixed disposition]. Later in the same chapter in 1114A14 he discusses the case of somebody who has a fixed bad character, I think he would say in a sense this character could not act otherwise than badly, but yet that his actions were not forced.

*sufficient cause*.<sup>1</sup> Admittedly, the question whether, for example, αἰτία αὐτοτελής is equivalent to what the Neoplatonist would take ἀρχὴ αὐτεξούσιος<sup>2</sup> to mean is nowhere answered. And yet, the entire discussion makes sense only if Plotinus presumes that the Stoics were liable to the charge of confusing "principal [or sufficient] cause" and "independent cause", or—to put it in other words—were accustomed to speak of the empirical self's autonomy in terms that really apply to an ἀρχὴ αὐτεξούσιος.

One problem pointed out by Plotinus concerns the fact that man is not κύριος of his φαντασίαι.<sup>3</sup> If by this it is meant (a) that man cannot be held responsible for his φαντασίαι, since he is not the cause of them, neither Aristotle nor the Stoics object. If it is meant to be taken in the sense (b) that man cannot be supposed to master his φαντασίαι [so that an opinion, such as man alone is to be made responsible for an action subsequent to a φαντασία, could not be maintained], Plotinus would find it difficult to prove his case to Aristotle or the Stoics. Neither of them held indiscriminately that an action subsequent to a situation in which a decision must be taken is necessitated by a φαντασία, except in the sense that a proximate or auxiliary cause is supposed to function.

It has been pointed out that Plotinus, when arguing against the Stoics' ideas of εἰμαρμένη, apparently misrepresents their viewpoint of man's autonomy, for he fails to take into account the fact that a φαντασία was not thought by the Stoics to determine the *assent*.<sup>4</sup> Admittedly, the contention of Plotinus' criticism in the earlier treatise is that the Stoics' ἐφ' ἡμῶν is a mere name. Things are quite different, however, concerning the purpose of the discussion in the later treatise. It seems that Plotinus is not primarily interested in the question whether action or moral assent is determined by a φαντασία or whether man's desires cause reasoning or *vice versa*. All that he wishes to show is that the notion of autonomy generally applied to

<sup>1</sup> Cf. e.g. the account by Plutarch, *De Stoic. Repugn.* 1056B [see above, p. 53].

<sup>2</sup> αὐτεξούσιος is, as was pointed out by G. Verbeke, "Aristotelisme et Stoicisme dans *De Fato* d'Alexander d'Aphrodisias" *A.G.P. L* (1968), p. 89, n. 56, used by later writers such as Clement *Strom.* 1, 17, Tertullian, *De An.* 21; also see H. Koch, *Quellenforschungen zu Nemesios von Emesa* (Berlin, 1921), p. 38.

<sup>3</sup> VI 8 (38) 2, 8 [see above, p. 66].

<sup>4</sup> For this alleged conception, see III 1 (3) 7, 14 ff. The Stoic viewpoint has been well rendered by A. A. Long, *P.Q. LXX* (1968), p. 340 [above, p. 112, n. 4].

τὸ ἐφ' ἡμῶν is, as such, questionable. "Many of those things", Plotinus contends, "that were just considered as being dependent upon us would be beyond ourselves. . .".<sup>1</sup> Whether Plotinus is thinking of what the Stoics would consider to be an *impetus compositus* or *impetus simplex* has no bearing on the case. Even if man can be regarded as the principal cause of his actions [which is the contention of the Stoics], the origin of those elements that constitute an act of decision and subsequently the action does, in fact, not entirely depend upon us.<sup>2</sup>

There is a rather strong feature of determinism which should not be overlooked. In addition, it is not at all surprising to find Plotinus also expressing doubt with regard to the soul's capability of accomplishing what has to be carried out in action. For after having posed the question whether the notion of τὸ αὐτεξούσιον καὶ ἐπ' αὐτῷ applies to the autonomy of the morally acting soul, Plotinus contends πρῶτον μὲν οὐ πρὸς τεῦξιν ἴσως χρὴ διδόναι· οὐ γὰρ ἡμεῖς τοῦ τυχεῖν κύριοι.<sup>3</sup>

It is, thus, in respect to the level of *πραξις* that Plotinus holds that one must not speak of man's autonomy as though man were a really independent agent, that is to say, really ἐπ' αὐτῷ and αὐτεξούσιον.<sup>4</sup> There is an aspect of *πραξις*, however, to which the notion of αὐτεξούσιον applies. For example, "to fight *with courage*" or "to behave *bravely*" depends upon the agent himself. Thus, speaking of an action in terms of ἐκούσιον and ἐφ' ἡμῶν [for Aristotle they are related to each other as *species* and *genus*], Plotinus contends that man himself is not capable of originating a *πραξις*, for it takes war as an external, i.e., auxiliary cause to fight or not to fight. What actually is in man's power in the sense that it depends entirely upon him *qua* subject of choice is the quality of his conduct [τὸ καλῶς].<sup>5</sup>

Similarly, the Stoics contended that morality is in our power. There is certainly no sign or indication whatever that the Stoics would have considered man to be the "ultimate principle" of his actions in the way that Plotinus presumes someone to speak of man

<sup>1</sup> VI 8 (39) 2, 15-16, also see III 1 (3) 9, 4-16.

<sup>2</sup> In III 1 (3) 9, 1-2 Plotinus says 'Αναγκαῖα μὲν ταῦτα, ὅσα προαιρέσει καὶ τύχαις κραθέντα γίνονται. That is to say, τύχη provides the situation in which a decision must be taken.

<sup>3</sup> VI 8 (39) 5, 4-5.

<sup>4</sup> VI 8 (39) 5, 1-2.

<sup>5</sup> VI 8 (39) 5, 6.

as the ἀρχὴ ἐλεύθερα of whatever he does. On the contrary, the Stoic school, since one of its major concerns was to clarify the amount of "liberty" in the events that bring about a situation in which a decision was to be taken, was very well aware of the means of differentiation that are now dealt with by Plotinus. It is in such contexts that their distinction between sufficient and proximate causes is of considerable importance. Following the line indicated by Aristotle, the Stoics articulated their idea of ἐφ' ἡμῖν by taking into account the most significant characteristics of an entity that was to be examined as a subject that has something in its own power. That sufficient causes are *by definition* connected with the particular characteristics that make an object what it is,<sup>1</sup> just as is the notion of τὸ ἐφ' ἡμῖν, becomes clear from the famous example given by Chrysippus. He called the "rollability" of a cylinder the sufficient cause of the cylinder's movement when it actually moves. That is to say, the notion of "what depends upon us" in the sense in which Plotinus speaks, for example, of "fighting *with courage*" as being entirely dependent upon us would correspond to the Stoics' understanding of what a sufficient cause accounts for, i.e., for a certain kind of action [rollability certainly is a kind or species of mobility]. Since the Stoics asserted that "morality is in our power", they would certainly be in agreement with Plotinus when he says it is this distinct quality of our action that depends entirely upon us, whereas the action, for example, "to fight" does not, since it takes the situation of war to supply the auxiliary cause in the sense in which Chrysippus spoke of the man who actually pushed the cylinder as a proximate cause.

What is not yet clear, however, is whether the Stoics took into account that kind of distinction of sufficient causes as suggested by Plotinus, when he pointed out that not the action, for example, "to fight" depends upon us as an ἐφ' ἡμῖν, but only its quality. Yet, it seems that the Stoic school—in the context of exercising the power of choice—did not positively distinguish between "to X" and "to X *well*", as did Plotinus:<sup>2</sup> to imagine that the Stoic sage chooses "to X" without doing it *well* is a kind of absurdity, for "to X *well* [i.e., καλῶς]" is actually his only possible choice; the action would be senseless otherwise. In fact, for a Stoic philosopher there is no such thing as an action

<sup>1</sup> Cf. M. E. Reesor, *Phoenix* XIX (1965), p. 286, and J. M. Rist, *Stoic Philosophy*, p. 121.

<sup>2</sup> VI 8 (39) 5, 6. 10 ff.

which is incomplete as regards intentionality. Either X is done well or it is not done at all. To a Platonist, who believes in degrees of reality, both in the ontological and in the epistemological sense of the word, the situation is not quite so. Since he does not hold the opinion that "all sins are equal" *etc.*, the distinction drawn between "to X" and "to X well" is meaningful, however insignificant the difference between an action accomplished by means of ἐπιστήμη and the same one accomplished by means of δόξα ἀληθής might be with regard to the actual course of performing the deed.

So far, it must seem that Plotinus and the Stoics are basically in agreement with each other. Both are convinced that man *qua* man is integrated in a process of events and thus is acted upon. But it is on the basis of their propositions concerning this *cosmos* as the best one possible that they also would agree that there is no such thing as a situation necessarily determining the assent to one's principles of conduct. Moreover, there is no situation in which a decision has to be taken that could not be meaningful in one way or another. Plotinus makes this quite clear when he points out that everybody, when aware of "having the choice", must be aware that the intentional objects of his choice, as well as the possible results of this act of decision and the act itself, do matter *sub specie aeternitatis*. That is to say, they express a meaningful reference in respect to the relation that exists between the individual agent and the Whole as a part of which he functions.<sup>1</sup> Apart from the eschatological implications that are significant for Plotinus, this could have been expressed similarly by a Stoic philosopher.<sup>2</sup>

What must be kept in mind, however, is the fact that Plotinus is apparently not inclined to consider the term ἐφ' ἡμῶν a proper kind of reference to man's empirical autonomy; as far as the level of παρὰ ζῆιν is concerned, the terms ἐκούσιον and ἐφ' ἡμῶν make sense only if they are meant to apply to what Plotinus considers to be the distinct moral quality of a man's virtuous acts;<sup>3</sup> but this no longer concerns what he understands to be only the empirical self. To Plotinus τὸ ἐφ' ἡμῶν, since ἐπ' αὐτῷ *by definition* expresses reference to the mode of being peculiar to the particular in question, must mean something different from what it does to the Stoics.

<sup>1</sup> Cf. III 3 (48) 3, 1 ff.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. e.g. IV 3 (27) 16, 17-25; the idea expressed there resembles in some way the tenor of Cleanthes' *Hymn to Zeus*.

<sup>3</sup> Apart from VI 8 (39) 5, 6, see III 2 (47) 10, 18-19.

A Platonist, if he had to express his contention in terms of the Stoic doctrine of *οἰκειώσεις*, would have held that the self must conform to the principles of that whence it derives its existence. Accordingly, the empirical world cannot, *sub specie aeternitatis*, be a concern of the real self, for the metaphysical self, to use this Kantian term, is not intrinsically related to *πρᾶξις*, i.e., situations externally necessitated<sup>1</sup> in which a decision has to be made. The soul, so it seems, would rather not act at all and not commit itself to any further state of alienation but would prefer to actualize its genuine state of being through contemplative acts.<sup>2</sup>

A Stoic sage living in an almost irreversible state of self-sufficiency would raise no objections to the suggestion that virtue need not be practised in virtuous acts.<sup>3</sup> There is a point, however, that is critical for a dialogue between Stoics and Plotinus. For unlike the Stoics, who would still agree wholeheartedly with the Neoplatonists that there is no distinction to be made between knowing what is right and doing it, and that ethical conduct is in a way only a particular demonstration of one's knowledge in action,<sup>4</sup> Plotinus would contend that man attains his "universal knowledge" by actualizing his *a priori* potential. However, the Stoics firmly held that both knowledge and the virtuous disposition of the soul come into their proper state by means of a continuous striving after virtuous acts. However, despite some similarities in the philosophical attitudes towards ethical conduct, the problem that remains unsolved between the two concerns the fact that Plotinus "répugne visiblement à reconnaître dans la *πρᾶξις* une vraie et entière liberté".<sup>5</sup>

By saying οὐ γὰρ μόνον ὁ πεποιήται ἔστι [scil. man] ἀλλ' ἔχει ἀρχὴν ἄλλην ἐλευθέραν,<sup>6</sup> Plotinus abandons the basis on which such a discussion was supposedly meant to centre. From the moment that

<sup>1</sup> Cf. VI 8 (39) 4, 9 'Ἀλλὰ καὶ οἷς πρᾶξις, ἡ ἀνάγκη ἔξωθεν, and see particularly 5, 13-19.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. VI 8 (39) 5, 35-36 πάλιν αὖ ἡκεῖ οὐκ ἐν πράξει τὸ ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἀλλὰ ἐν νῷ ἡσύχῳ τῶν πράξεων, III 1 (3) 9, 9 ff. λόγον δὲ ὅταν ἡγεμόνα καθαρὸν καὶ ἀπαθῆ τὸν οἰκεῖον ἔχουσα ὁρμᾷ ταύτην μόνον τὴν ὁρμὴν φατέον ἐφ' ἡμῖν καὶ ἐκούσιον, καὶ τοῦτο εἶναι τὸ ἡμέτερον ἔργον, ὃ μὴ ἄλλοθεν ᾗλθεν . . . .

<sup>3</sup> What I mean to say is that the Stoic sage, who differs from everybody else not in degree but in kind (cf. Cicero, *De Fin.* 3, 34), need not practise virtue in acts — that he actually performs virtuous acts does not mean that he is doing so in order to be virtuous.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. G. Watson, *The Stoic Theory of Knowledge*, p. 59.

<sup>5</sup> P. Henry, *R.N.P.* XXXIII (1931), p. 195.

<sup>6</sup> III 3 (48) 4, 6-7.

he takes "voluntary" and "what depends upon us" to be identical, he distorts that generally acknowledged notion of "voluntary". Thus, instead of presuming that there is no such thing as "voluntary action", since there is also nothing "that depends upon us", Plotinus—considering that not everything that depends upon us is necessarily voluntary—ought rather to have said that there is no such thing as a voluntary action, since the first condition [μὴ βίαια] can never be entirely fulfilled.

The reasoning behind this is quite obvious. Plotinus was convinced that "what is really voluntary" is what it is, first, because it really lies in our power and, secondly, the latter is what it is because it is the most proper function. What follows from this is that when man performs his most proper function he does it most voluntarily. Admittedly, the purely intellectual activity, which is incompatible with the principles of practical conduct<sup>1</sup> [i.e., to acknowledge that there is a situation in which a decision has to be taken and the power of choice exercised], is no longer applicable. Plotinus is apparently aware that he must avoid using terms<sup>2</sup> the connotation of which entails what was essential to the Stoics' and Aristotle's understanding of liberty, i.e., "power of choice".<sup>3</sup> The word αὐτεξούσιος corresponds, indeed, to the Plotinian understanding of τὸ ἐφ' ἡμῖν, which with respect to man's non-empirical self may well be rendered by *self-determination*.<sup>4</sup>

Whether Plotinus' final suggestion solves all the problems that arise within the framework of his own system is quite a different problem, and therefore it will not be discussed in the present work. What he was really aiming at is not difficult to see: the human soul, in order to function as the independent principle that it is supposed to be, must be *prior* to all the preceding events necessitated by εἰμαρμένη. Consequently, it is Plotinus' concern to make the metaphysical self an independent cause, an ἀρχή prior to the on-

<sup>1</sup> It should not be overlooked that the contemplative ideal, however much it might be modelled on Plato's δμολωσις θεῶν, bears strong Aristotelian traces (cf. *E.N.* K 8-10) in that the two types of life are meant to be mutually exclusive.

<sup>2</sup> See III 1 (3) 9, 9 ff.

<sup>3</sup> There is a systematic difficulty, however, for the first incorporation of human soul was due to an autonomous act [αὐτεξούσιος] similar to that in which the world came into existence, by an 'impudent act' [τόλμα] of the soul.

<sup>4</sup> Also see W. Himmerich, *Eudaimonia*, p. 151.

tological level of εἰμαρμένη itself, which in the Platonist tradition was held responsible for only the intra-mundane events.<sup>1</sup> But is it reasonable to speak of the non-empirical self as an ἐλεύθερον and αὐτεξούσιον, when even this state of freedom *qua* the most proper mode of being is still determined by providence and is thus subject to an intelligible power-structure? <sup>2</sup> Plotinus does not see any problem here. On the contrary, to Plotinus, to be subject to this intelligible environment is evidently a guarantee of liberty.

Thus, it is clear why, in Plotinus, "the problem of free will must be viewed on two levels",<sup>3</sup> levels which are connected in the same way as the real world is the model of its copy. But how do Plotinus' two propositions concerning man's ἐφ' ἡμῖν and ἐκούσιον coincide? Let us suppose that his propositions are (1) *Man is entirely free to determine the quality of the action, the choice of which does not really depend upon him*; (2) *Man is entirely free not to be subject to situations in which decisions have to be taken*. From this it must seem that there is no point in saying: "*Dieser zweite Freiheitsbegriff liegt über den Gegensatz des guten und schlechten Verhaltens hinaus und ist deshalb in Bezug auf diesen Gegensatz indifferent*".<sup>4</sup> Is it not rather so that man is entirely free [αὐτεξούσιος] to determine the quality of his action only when he has *already chosen* to be free (i.e., in the sense of the second proposition)? Holding that "*Handeln am Sein im ethisch relevanten Sinne nicht möglich ist ohne vorgängiges Denken am Sein*",<sup>5</sup> Plotinus takes the intentional quality of a virtuous πράξις to be the empirical instantiation of man's metaphysical consciousness.

This idea appears to be a striking anticipation of the thought of Immanuel Kant who, knowing that his "guter Wille" is an ideal which, although it has real existence in the mind, cannot easily be incorporated into reason in such a way as to determine one's moral

<sup>1</sup> This 'Platonic' doctrine (for which see e.g. Proclus, *In Tim.* Vol. III, p. 274, 10 [Diehl]) was modelled on the Stoic archetype.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. III 3 (48) 4, 7-8.

<sup>3</sup> G. H. Clark, *New Scholasticism* XVII (1943), p. 16.

<sup>4</sup> P. O. Kristeller, *Der Begriff der Seele in der Ethik Plotins*, p. 79. From his discussion [*op. cit.* pp. 79 ff.] the impression is obtained that sufficient attention is not paid to the fact that the "*Freiheitsbegriff*" in III 3 (48) 4, 6-7 [see above, p. 122, n. 6] fits the statement in VI 8 (39) 5, 6.

<sup>5</sup> I suppose that W. Himmerich, *Eudaimonia*, p. 144, is correct, although the [Heideggerian?] idea of '*Handeln am Sein*' would not make very much sense for Plotinus.



conduct, considered it to be an instantiation of the intelligible act.

When drawing such comparisons, however, the nature of the rather marked differences between the propositions of Kant and Plotinus concerning the "reality of this world" and the moral claim it is supposed to have upon its inhabitants must not be overestimated. There are similarities, however, as regards the approach to the question of man's autonomy from the conceptual point of view. The same is true, *mutatis mutandis*, with regard to Plotinus and the Stoics. Regardless of the differences between the two, for example, the Stoics could not speak of a non-empirical self in the way Plotinus is accustomed to think of man's metaphysical self, and they did not see any reason to point out something which Plotinus finds it important to know [i.e., that εἰμαρμένη does not affect the non-empirical self], the "stoicizing" in Plotinus' conception of man's moral autonomy should not be overlooked.

## CHAPTER SEVEN

### PLOTINUS ON ΣΥΝΑΙΣΘΗΣΙΣ

It seems to be a commonly acknowledged fact that Augustine was the first to develop the idea of philosophical self-consciousness.<sup>1</sup> In view of some recent works on this topic and of relevant studies in the writings of Plotinus,<sup>2</sup> this thesis cannot be maintained without qualification. On the contrary, there is some evidence for the suggestion that it was Plotinus' conception of the self-thinking Intelligence, whereby the reflexive activity of consciousness presents the subject as the object of his own immediate awareness",<sup>3</sup> which was the basis for subsequent theories of philosophical self-consciousness such as those put forward by René Descartes or Edmund Husserl.

Moreover, it seems justifiable to say that Plotinus' accomplishment, though it seems in a way to be closely related <sup>4</sup> to Aristotle's idea of νόησις νοήσεως,<sup>5</sup> would not have been possible without some of those basic views that the Stoics had anticipated in the course of their discussion of συναίσθησις with reference to their theory of οἰκείωσις.<sup>6</sup>

The term which is most relevant to the idea aimed at by Plotinus is συναίσθησις. It is not found earlier than in Arist. *E.E.* 1245B24, where it has to be understood as "*offenbar das Mitfühlen mit dem Nebennmenschen, nicht im Sinne von Mitgefühl oder Mitleid, sondern im Sinne von gemeinsamen Denken und Trachten*" <sup>7</sup> [that is to say, its

<sup>1</sup> See, e.g., G. Krüger, "Die Herkunft des philosophischen Selbstbewusstseins", *Logos* XXII (1933), pp. 225-272, and A. C. Lloyd, "Nosce teipsum and Conscientia", *A.G.P.* XLIV (1964), pp. 188-200.

<sup>2</sup> O. Becker, *Plotin und das Problem der geistigen Aneignung* (Berlin, 1940), esp. pp. 21-40, and H.-R. Schwyzer, in: *Les Sources de Plotin*, pp. 343-390.

<sup>3</sup> H. v. d. Zandt Cobb, "The Concept of Self-Consciousness in Plotinus", *T.A.P.A.* LXIX (1938), p. xxxii [Abstract].

<sup>4</sup> A. C. Lloyd contends: "... they [i.e. the Neoplatonists] were only repeating Aristotle's unsatisfactory solution ... of the traditional aporia" (*A.G.P.* XLVI [1964], p. 192); see, however, F.-P. Hager, "Die Aristotelesinterpretation des Alexander von Aphrodisias und die Aristoteleskritik Plotins bezüglich der Lehre vom Geist", *A.G.P.* XLVI (1964), pp. 174-187.

<sup>5</sup> For Plotinus' adaptation of this doctrine, see A. H. Armstrong, in: *Les Sources de Plotin*, pp. 392-413.

<sup>6</sup> Cf. Cicero, *De Finibus* 3, 5, 16.

<sup>7</sup> H.-R. Schwyzer, in: *Les Sources de Plotin*, p. 355.

meaning is not essentially different from that assumed for Democritus' ὁμόνοια]. The verb συναίσθάνεσθαι, as it occurs in *E.N.* 1170B4, suggests a meaning such as "*an sich spüren*".<sup>1</sup>

Now, it seems that the term συναίσθησις may have been relevant to the so-called οἰκείωσις doctrine of self-preservation. There is no evidence, however, as far as the older Stoics are concerned, for συναίσθησις in D.L. 7, 85 [instead of συνείδησις] is an emendation recommended by M. Pohlenz.<sup>2</sup>

The important step towards the issue relevant to Plotinus' discussion of "self-consciousness"<sup>3</sup> seems to have been made by the younger Stoics. In col. 3, 56 of Hierocles' *El. Eth.*, it is said that a living being gets συναίσθησις ἑαυτοῦ. With this may be compared 4, 58 [συναίσθάνεται δ' ἑαυτοῦ τὸ ζῶον]. And from Arius Didymus [at Stob. *Ecl.* II, 47, 13 W.] it must be assumed that συναίσθησις was attributed to a living being, even if it was still in the state of being ἄλογον. This Stoic position is best elucidated by a passage in Hierocles: διὸ πρώτη πίστις τοῦ αἰσθάνεσθαι τὸ ζῶον ἅπαν ἑαυτοῦ τῶν μερῶν καὶ τῶν ἔργων ὑπὲρ ὧν ἐδόθη τὰ μέρη (col. 2, 3). Here συναίσθησις is apparently meant to be taken as an inner awareness of subjective states and functions, for the sake of which any living being is furnished by nature with proper limbs etc. This kind of awareness may be rendered by the German term "*Selbstgefühl*", although the exact meaning implicit in *selbst*, as well as that in *self*-consciousness, does not really apply to what is expressed by συν-αίσθησις. For ἑαυτοῦ, which is supposed to point to the intentional object of this *Mitgefühl*, merely functions as a substitution of "one's own properties" [in the sense of e.g., τὰ ἑαυτοῦ]. Neither does it have any reference—to indicate a modern point of view—to Edmund Husserl's "putting the world in parentheses" as to be aware that the consciousness which must be interrogated and which gives value to its responses, is precisely that which is mine. Nor does it indicate, for example, as Martin Heidegger would say, the awareness that the

<sup>1</sup> H.-R. Schwyzler, in: *Les Sources de Plotin*, p. 356.

<sup>2</sup> See M. Pohlenz, "Grundfragen der stoischen Philosophie", *Abh. Gött. Ges. [phil. hist. Kl.]* III, xxvi (1940), p. 7, see also his *Die Stoa*, Vol. II, p. 65. A. C. Lloyd, *A.G.P.* XLVI (1964), p. 295, when discussing D.L. 7, 85 [= S.V.F. 3, 178], does not mention this emendation.

<sup>3</sup> The present author agrees with H.-R. Schwyzler's view in: *Les Sources de Plotin*, p. 367, viz. that H. v. Zandt Cobb, (*T.A.P.A.* LXIX [1938], p. xxxii) is not entirely correct in asserting that ἀντίληψις is the term generally employed by Plotinus for expressing "consciousness".

existent which we must analyze is ourself and that the Being of this existent is mine.<sup>1</sup>

Admittedly, although the Greeks could have relied on the kind of "phenomenal reduction" that was anticipated by Plato and to a certain extent by Aristotle (cf. *Metaph.* Z), they were for some reason not prepared to speak or even think of the "self" in terms that avoided an externalization of the intentional object.

This tendency becomes even more obvious in some passages in Epictetus.<sup>2</sup> In *Diss.* 1, 4, 10 Epictetus speaks of the awareness [συναίσθησις] of one's own moral defects, and in 2, 11, 1 it is said that awareness of one's own ἀσθένεια and ἀδυναμία, in respect of the things that are necessary, is the first step towards philosophy; and in 2, 21, 10 the Socratic knowledge of one's own ignorance is characterized by the term συναίσθησις [ἔχω ἣν δεῖ συναίσθησιν τὸν μηδὲν εἰδότες ὅτι οὐδὲν οἶδα].

It seems that it is no longer the knowledge of one's own ignorance to which Epictetus wants to call attention but rather, as H.-R. Schwyzer correctly puts it, to "*das Gefühl des Nichtwissens oder das Bewusstsein des Nichtwissens*".<sup>3</sup> Yet in what respect does this kind of consciousness differ from what the Socratic "self-knowledge" is supposed to mean? Unfortunately, H.-R. Schwyzer does not make a case for his point [this is all the more regrettable since it is Plotinus—as we shall see—who speaks of a συναίσθησις of one's own δύνανμις, which must be compared to Epictetus, *Diss.* 2, 11, 1].

In any case, is it really correct to say that Socrates' knowledge of his own ignorance, which was the result of a process of ratiocination, did not amount to a reflexive awareness of his subjective state and activity? Or is it legitimate to say that Epictetus' inner awareness of his ignorance was not the result of a process of ratiocination but that it resembled an intuition far removed from ratiocination?

After all, one may well assume that συναίσθησις in the case referred to by Epictetus [in *Diss.* 2, 21, 10] need not be anything else but an [inadmissible] expression of what a process of ratiocination usually amounts to, i.e., an affirmative proposition in the sense in which René Descartes would have spoken of "*ergo sum*", whether

<sup>1</sup> Cf. M. Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*<sup>12</sup> (Tübingen, 1964), pp. 41-43.

<sup>2</sup> I do not think that H.-R. Schwyzer is quite correct in asserting that "*bei Epictet scheint συναίσθησις geradezu ein Modewort geworden zu sein*" (in: *Les Sources de Plotin*, p. 358), for the word occurs only four times.

<sup>3</sup> In: *Les Sources de Plotin*, p. 359.

achieved by means of inference or not, as an elementary truth of consciousness [for it is "I" who am fully aware of the fact that "I" can doubt anything, but "I" cannot doubt that it is "I" who questions].

Moreover, it is clear from the examples quoted from Epictetus, as well as those from Hierocles, that the reference implicit in *συναίσθησις*, though expressing a more or less reflexive awareness of subjective states and activities, in fact concerns the relation that exists between a judging subject and its various activities. All of these have some relation to the surrounding world and so need not be looked upon as an integral part of one's self. That is to say, *συναίσθησις*, in whatever way it is supposed to have *ἑαυτοῦ* as an intentional object, has the function of synthesizing various *αἰσθήσεις*, as may be inferred from Alexander's account in *De Sensu* 148, 10 and from the general description which Plotinus gives, when he says that *συναίσθησις* is πολλοῦ τινος αἰσθησίς ἐστι, καὶ μαρτυρεῖ καὶ τοῦνομα (V 3 [49] 13, 21-22). Moreover, it must be understood as an attempt to "internalize" the perceptions of what has been called the intentional object.

In Plotinus the term *συναίσθησις* occurs in those discussions that concern [I] Intelligence and its self-knowledge, [II] the One and its *νεῦσις* towards itself, [III] the Soul and its perception of psychosomatic phenomena, on the one hand, of intelligible objects, on the other, and [IV] the World and its parts.

[I] It is only within the context of his discussion of the "self-thinking" Intelligence that Plotinus develops what at the beginning of this chapter was called philosophical self-consciousness. In fact, Plotinus does not merely point out that Intelligence *qua* the [only] intentional object of its thinking (V 3 [49] 5, 45) "thinks itself", but he asserts that Intelligence is aware of its "self-thinking". That is to say, the divine mind has a reflexive awareness of its "self-thinking" (V 3 [49] 6, 33). This act of unification of Intelligence and its objects, which is an act of self-apprehension, is "accompanied" (?) by some kind of *Selbstgefühl*:<sup>1</sup> κινδυνεύει γὰρ ὅλως τὸ νοεῖν πολλῶν εἰς αὐτὸ συνελθόντων συναίσθησις εἶναι τοῦ ὅλου, ὅταν αὐτό τι ἑαυτὸ νοῇ (V 3 [49] 13, 12-14).

<sup>1</sup> This is the meaning suggested by O. Becker, *Plotin und das Problem der geistigen Aneignung*, p. 30.

How does Plotinus relate self-consciousness to "self-thinking", and how does it come about that in this particular instance of an act of self-apprehension Plotinus would not speak of "*Selbstgefühl*", but rather of "*Selbstbewusstsein*"? The answer is simply that, since in this particular instance the intentional object, to the perception of which the synthesizing function of συναίσθησις in the subject has reference, is the subject itself, the term "*Selbstgefühl*" [as expressing some kind of awareness of the subjective state or activity which is definable within the context of the self's externalization] can be substituted by self-consciousness. For "true self-consciousness emerges only at the level . . . which the reflexive activity of consciousness presents the subject as the object of his own immediate awareness".<sup>1</sup>

Thus, Plotinus, when speaking of the self-consciousness of the "self-thinking" Intelligence, does not think of συναίσθησις as some sort of concomitant or concurrent consciousness in the sense that Intelligence becomes aware of the act which it is performing. Συναίσθησις, in this particular case, is meant to refer to the self which has reference to itself and is aware of itself as subject—and so is "subject-object" of *both* αἴσθησις and συναίσθησις.

It is this distinction which has considerable bearing on the contention expressed above [n. 4]: Plotinus is not simply repeating "Aristotle's unsatisfactory solution . . . of the traditional *aporia*":<sup>2</sup> For Aristotle himself could have said that such a distinction does not make sense; and from Alexander (*In De Sensu* 148, 10) one has to infer that someone who perceives is aware of the fact that he exists and perceives. As Plotinus is concerned, it is obvious that he did not simply rely on such a position as was held by Arist. *E.N.* 1170A29 ff. [ὁ δ' ὁρῶν ὅτι βαδίζει καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὁμοίως ἔστι τι τὸ αἰσθανόμενον ὅτι ἐνεργοῦμεν], nor was he likely, although subscribing to Aristotle's νόησις νοήσεως (*Metaph.* 1074B34), to overlook the systematic difficulties in which he became involved when confronted with such Platonic statements as are expressed in *Char-*

<sup>1</sup> See H. v. Zandt Cobb, *T.A.P.A.* LXIX (1938), p. xxxii. See also O. Becker (*Plotin und das Problem der geistigen Aneignung*, p. 33) whose opinion that "*Die volle Verwirklichung des Selbstbewusstseins wird erst dann erreicht, wenn es mit dem Gegenstandsbewusstsein zusammenfällt*" does not seem correct to me. It would be more exact to say, 'if the objects of the *Gegenstandsbewusstsein*, [which is *per definition* a συναίσθησις, i.e. an αἴσθησις of an αἴσθησις] coincide with the self'.

<sup>2</sup> A. C. Lloyd, *A.G.P.* XLVI (1964), p. 192.

*mides* 166E ff.<sup>1</sup> and in *Sophist* 248 D10-E5. This is not the place to discuss the various implications relevant to the issue raised by Plotinus as they emerge against the background of the Platonic-Aristotelian tradition. Bearing in mind, however, (i) that Plotinus, as is apparent from the distinction that he draws between συναίσθησις and παρακολούθησις,<sup>2</sup> does not seem to take συναίσθησις to have reference to the *act* the self performs, and (ii) that he definitely distinguishes between self-knowledge and self-consciousness,<sup>3</sup> one has therefore to consider the passage in II 9 (33) 1, 49 f. [ὁρῶν δ' ἑαυτὸν οὐκ ἀνοηταίνοντα ἀλλὰ νοοῦντα ὁρᾷ].

From this statement, which should be considered in relation to the other in V 3 (49) 13, 12-14 [see above, p. 129], it must appear that it is only in this particular case that Plotinus can employ both terms, self-knowledge and self-consciousness. For συναίσθησις, whose function consists, according to Alexander, *In De Sensu* 148, 10, in synthesizing the αἴσθησις that one has and the αἴσθησις that one has of this αἴσθησις, happens to be not only a reflexive activity of consciousness or rather a self-reflexive one. Consequently, there seems to be justification for holding that self-consciousness is, in this case, self-knowledge.

Thus, with regard to this kind of synthesizing function that is ascribed to συναίσθησις the following distinction must be made between: (a) That kind of αἴσθησις in question in the first instance by which Intelligence *perceives itself as thinking itself*. (b) The other kind of αἴσθησις, by means of which a subject achieves an inner awareness of what it is doing: in the case of the "self-thinking" Intelligence, however, one cannot say that this αἴσθησις acquires something which was not perceived by the "former" one. To say that Intelligence *perceives itself as being Intelligence perceiving itself as "self-thinking"* implies a regress of the kind that Plotinus him-

<sup>1</sup> H.-R. Schwyzer (in: *Les Sources de Plotin*, p. 360) points out that there is no passage in Plotinus that suggests acquaintance with the discussion in *Charmides*, 166E.

<sup>2</sup> This can be inferred from I 4 (46) 10, 28; II 9 (33) 1, 41 ff.; III 9 (13) 9. Most interpreters, however, overlook this distinction and assert that Plotinus considers both terms to be identical or interchangeable. Cf. H. v. Zandt Cobb, *T.A.P.A.* LXIX (1938), p. xxxii, H.-R. Schwyzer, in: *Les Sources de Plotin*, p. 374, and J. M. Rist, *Plotinus: The Road to Reality* p. 40; see, however, O. Becker, *Plotin und das Problem der geistigen Aneignung*, p. 35, n. 1.

<sup>3</sup> Only Intelligence is capable of achieving both, whereas συναίσθησις can be supposed to apply, although with different degrees of intensity, to all levels.

self rejects. Thus, in the case of νοῦς there is no point in speaking of συναίσθησις in terms of a synthesizing function, for “the reflexive activity of consciousness presents the subject as the object of his own *immediate* [the italics the present author’s] awareness”.<sup>1</sup>

Incidentally, there is no reason to suggest that Plotinus, in view of the rather peculiar implications of his own metaphysical and epistemological positions, would have done better to avoid such a term as συναίσθησις, the exact reference of which appears to be incompatible with the ontological and epistemological *status* of νοῦς. Admittedly, the divine mind has no perception [i.e., αἴσθησις] whatsoever, but has only pure νόησις, and it is thus not conceivable that Plotinus meant this term to express any epistemological reference [to perceive as opposed to think], which in fact it does not have [see above, pp. 129-131].

The reason why Plotinus might have thought it necessary to employ the term συναίσθησις in reference to the “self-thinking” of Intelligence is presumably the obligation he felt to say something about the nature of the divine ὑποστάσεις.

Relying on what he took to be the meaning of Plato, *Sophist.* 248D-249A, Plotinus wished to assert two things. First, the *mundus intelligibilis* [i.e., the sphere of νοῦς] is not something “awful and holy . . . fixed and immovable”, on the contrary, it must have life. Secondly, the One, although it exists as “awful and holy . . . fixed and immovable” and stands in “august pose” (VI 7 [38] 39, 20-28, 29),<sup>2</sup> is not at all ἀνάλισθτον in the sense in which one speaks of inorganic things: οὐκ ἔστιν οἷον ἀνάλισθτον (V 4 [7] 2, 15 [cf. the question raised in V 3 (49) 13, 6]). Thus, Plotinus has a reason for pointing out that even the *One* might have a *quasi* συναίσθησις [see below, II]. In any case, Plotinus, needing a way to surmount the limits imposed by his negative theology, seeks means of description or characterization applicable even to the *One*. The Stoics’ conception of συναίσθησις did not suit such a purpose.

[II] According to his own definition of συναίσθησις, as given in V 3 (49) 13, 21-22, Plotinus must have felt reluctant about attributing

<sup>1</sup> Cf. H. v. Zandt Cobb, *T.A.P.A.* LXIX (1938), p. xxxii.

<sup>2</sup> J. M. Rist in: *Plotinus: The Road to Reality*, p. 48, is quite right in pointing out that Plotinus [in the latter case] draws an inference from *Sophist.* 248D-249E which must be considered an incorrect assessment of Plato’s thought.



συναίσθησις to the *One*. In fact, there is a passage which makes his point quite clear: "Ἐτι τὸ πολὺ ζητοῖ ἂν ἑαυτὸ καὶ ἐθέλοι ἂν συννεύειν καὶ συναισθάνεσθαι αὐτοῦ . . . . Ποῦ δ' ἂν δέοιτο συναισθήσεως καὶ πάσης κρεῖττον νοήσεως (V 6 [24] 5, 1-5). This opinion is in a similar manner expressed in VI 7 (38) 41, 25-28, where, however, it is said that if anything *does* belong to the *One*, it is far beyond γνῶσις and συναίσθησις ἑαυτοῦ.<sup>1</sup> This very general statement need not be in opposition to the view expressed in V 4 (7) 2, 15 [i.e., that the One is not, in a sense, ἀναίσθητον.<sup>2</sup>

There are two places where Plotinus seems to attribute even to the One a kind of συναίσθησις and νόησις which exceeds that peculiar to the self-thinking Intelligence. It is not at all surprising that both these passages concern the *descensus*<sup>3</sup> of Intelligence from the One. That is to say, Intelligence is derived from the One which is in a state of ἐπιστροφή πρὸς αὐτό (V 1 [10] 7, 5) and thus in οἷον ἐκ συναίσθησει (V 4 [7] 2, 18). Such an ἐπιστροφή or νεῦσις (VI 8 [39] 16, 25) presupposes, strictly speaking, some kind of reflexive state on the part of the One.<sup>4</sup> And even though he never tires of asserting that the One is an absolute unity and in no way differentiated in itself, Plotinus indicates that the One performs this kind of spontaneous act while having, in a sense, συναίσθησις of its own power [δύναμις, which I should like to render by *Seinsmächtigkeit*]: ἐπεὶ καὶ παρ' αὐτοῦ ἔχει ἡδὴ οἷον συναισθήσιν τῆς δυνάμεως, ὅτι δύναται οὐσίαν (V 1 [10] 7, 11-13).

What can this passage be supposed to assert? Scholars have tried not to admit that there is a systematic difficulty inherent in Plotinus' conception of the spontaneous act of the One's creation, a difficulty of which Plotinus himself must have been aware.<sup>5</sup>

<sup>1</sup> O. Becker in: *Plotin und das Problem der geistigen Aneignung* p. 30, n. 2, misrepresents the argument when translating VI 7 (38) 41, 25-26 [εἰ δὲ τί ἐστὶν αὐτῷ]: "Wenn das Absolute etwas für sich selber wäre." (apparently following E. Bréhier, *Ennéades*, Vol. VI, 2 p. 117 ["quelque chose pour lui-même"]).

<sup>2</sup> This point has been misrepresented by G. Huber, *Das Sein und das Absolute*, pp. 66-68.

<sup>3</sup> In preferring this term to 'emanation' I am following J. Hirschberger, *S.B. Univ. Frankfurt VIII* (1969), p. 8.

<sup>4</sup> See also K. Oehler, *Gnomon XLI* (1969), p. 587 [incidentally, the subject in V 1 (10) 7, 8 is not νοῦς, but the One; see, however, Henry-Schwyzler, *Plotini Opera*, Vol. II, p. 277, and G. Huber, *Das Sein und das Absolute*, pp. 66-68].

<sup>5</sup> O. Becker, *Plotin und das Problem der geistigen Aneignung*, pp. 30-31, although aware of this systematic difficulty, asserts that it does not have

As far as the conception of συναίσθησις in this particular case is concerned, the only distinction that can be drawn between the kind of apprehensive awareness of one's own ἀσθένεια, of which Epictetus speaks (*Diss.* 1, 4, 10), and the unreflexive feeling of its *Seinsmächtigkeit* that Plotinus ascribes to the Absolute, is that in the first case awareness is the result of an externalization of the self, whereas in the second case it is not. Plotinus would object vigorously of course, to any interpretation which leads to a questioning of the One's absolute unity. He denies that there is anything *besides* the Absolute,<sup>1</sup> for the One is prior to the instantiation of essences. It is somewhat difficult, however, to concede that an act of introversion [i.e., of ἐπιστροφή<sup>2</sup> or νεῦσις], which in Plotinus' opinion is responsible for the spontaneous creation of multiplicity in unity,

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a bearing on Plotinus' philosophical system since it occurs only in the earlier treatises. I disagree with this diagnosis, which seems objectionable for two reasons: (1) There is no evidence that Plotinus ever abandoned the idea of the Absolute's ἐπιστροφή [see above, n. 24] or νεῦσις towards itself; (2) The opinions expressed in VI 7 (38) 41, 25-27 and in V 6 (24) 5, 1-5 are by no means incompatible with οἶοναι συναίσθήσει or οἶον συναίσθησιν in V 4 (7) 2, 18 and V 1 (10) 7, 11-13 (see also V 4 [7] 2, 15 and V 3 [49] 13, 6), if it is borne in mind that this *quasi* συναίσθησις is supposed to express that the Absolute, although standing in an 'august pose' (VI 7 [38] 39, 20-29), is by no means οἶον ἀναισθητον (V 4 [7] 2, 15). That is to say, συναίσθησις, as it is thought of in this particular case, is *a fortiori* not meant to compete with the kind of self-consciousness attributed to the second ὑπόστασις.

Also, it ought to be said that O. Becker's diagnosis relies on a textual conjecture put forward by Vitranga [see Henry-Schwyzzer, *Plotini Opera*, Vol. II, p. 278]. The systematic difficulty becomes polarized, of course, if, e.g., γεννᾶν must be considered an intentional object of the One. However, I do not see why the reading of all the MSS should be disregarded on account of an emendation which affects the content of several lines.

Strangely enough, whereas Henry-Schwyzzer agreed in their edition that the One must be considered the subject of ἔχει (V 1 [10] 7, 12) and αὐτός that of the sentence following (. . . γούν [7, 13 ff.]), P. Henry has subsequently remarked that νοῦς is the subject of ἔχει (in: *Les Sources de Plotin*, p. 387), on the ground that the One cannot have consciousness (cf. already O. Becker, *Plotin und das Problem der geistigen Aneignung*, pp. 30-31); H.-R. Schwyzzer (in: *Les Sources de Plotin*, p. 389) holds that the qualification expressed by οἶον removes the difficulty. I agree with him. Recently, J. M. Rist, *Plotinus: The Road to Reality*, pp. 46-47, confirmed the line of interpretation suggested by P. Henry (in: *Les Sources de Plotin*, p. 387): -See also P. Hadot, *Porphyre et Victorinus* (Paris, 1965), I p. 320 ff. and H.-R. Schwyzzer, *Mus. Helv.* XXVII (1969), p. 260, who apparently changed his mind. — In my opinion, the problem has been solved by W. Theiler, *R.I.P.* XXIV (1970), pp. 295-296.

<sup>1</sup> This does not contradict VI 7 (38) 41, 25-27, for which see above, n. 22.

<sup>2</sup> For which see P. Hadot, "Epistrophe et metanoia dans l'histoire de la Philosophie", *Actes du XIème congrès international de Philosophie* XII (1953), pp. 31-36.

must necessarily presuppose the state of the One's externalisation.<sup>1</sup> In fact, "*Das Bild des sich-Zurückwendens impliziert das Moment des Standfassens in der absoluten Bewegtheit des Überfließens*";<sup>2</sup> Plotinus himself, however, has put it better: τὸ δὲ γενόμενον εἰς αὐτὸ ἐπεστράφη καὶ ἐπληρώθη καὶ ἐγένετο πρὸς αὐτὸ βλέπον καὶ νοῦς οὕτως (V 2 [11] 1, 9-11).

Much could be said with regard to the fact that Plotinus considered the One's externalisation to be an instantaneous reflex of its introversion and *vice versa*. Nevertheless, in view of the purpose given, there has emerged some evidence to support the assumption that Plotinus may, in fact, have attributed to the *One* some sort of συναίσθησις.<sup>3</sup>

[III] That human beings can be supposed to have συναίσθησις of themselves is clearly expressed in IV 4 (28) 24, 21-22: ἀλλὰ συναίσθησιν μὲν αὐτοῦ ὥσπερ καὶ ἡμεῖς ἡμῖν συναισθανόμεθα, δοτέον]. There is another passage, however, where it is said: τὰ δὲ ἡμῶν καὶ ἡμεῖς ἀναίσθητοι (V 8 [31] 11, 31). Are the two propositions mutually

<sup>1</sup> By taking νοῦς to be the subject in V 1 (10) 7, 8, Henry-Schwyzzer (*Plotini Opera*, Vol. II, p. 277), and, e.g., G. Huber (*Das Sein und das Absolute*, pp. 66-68 [see above, n. 133]) tried to escape this consequence. Yet the very same inference must be drawn from VI 8 (39) 16, 25 [νεῦσις πρὸς αὐτό].

<sup>2</sup> H.-R. Schlette, *Das Eine und das Andere*, p. 80.

<sup>3</sup> J. M. Rist (*Plotinus: The Road to Reality*, pp. 36-52), when attempting to make a case for his thesis that Plotinus could not possibly have attributed any kind of consciousness to the *One*, calls attention to III 9 (13) 9 in particular. Here it is said that God has no need of consciousness of himself; 'consciousness' is here a rendering of the Greek παρακολούθησις. (Moreover, J. M. Rist [*op. cit.* p. 40] compares this passage with V 3 [49] 13, 21 and with V 6 [24] 5, 4).

It seems to me that Professor Rist's contention is based on the presumption that παρακολούθησις and συναίσθησις are simply identical (see above, n. 18, with reference to H. v. Zandt-Cobb, *T.A.P.A.* LXIX [1938], p. xxxii, and H.-R. Schwyzzer, in: *Les Sources de Plotin*, p. 374). This is not entirely true, however, for παρακολούθησις (= the *Begleitbewusstsein* [cf. O. Becker, *Plotin und das Problem der geistigen Aneignung*, p. 35, n. 1]) is indeed a kind of concomitant consciousness (as anticipated by Arist. *De Sensu* 455A16); cf. I 4 (46) 10, 28: man has a concomitant consciousness of the act which he is performing, and this awareness may well diminish the quality of his action (see also IV 4 [28] 4, 10). In III 9 (13) 9, 12-16 Plotinus points out that the *One* cannot have any concomitant consciousness of, for instance, its being good. For had the *One* consciousness of its being good, one would have to assume the existence of 'another idea' after which the goodness of the Absolute could be named; and this idea must be prior to the *One*. Thus, the assumption that the *One* has some kind of concomitant consciousness of its ἐνέργεια would imply a regress of the kind that Plotinus himself rejects (see also VI 7 [38] 41, 28-29).

exclusive? Certainly not. For συναίσθησις is definitely meant to express reference to "something else" (cf. IV 4 [28] 24, 22). All that Plotinus intended to say was that we do not have any immediate perception of ourselves, but that any self-awareness that we do achieve must be explained in terms of the synthesizing function of συναίσθησις. That is to say, one cannot have an αἴσθησις of one's sense-organs, but one has a συναίσθησις of their *perceiving*, [i.e., of the act or process]. Plotinus does not say this expressly, but there is no other sensible way of eliminating this *prima facie* discrepancy.<sup>1</sup>

Something else becomes obvious. As far as the empirical self is concerned, Plotinus, considering his proposition that we cannot have immediate perception of ourselves, was not able to attribute self-knowledge to the soul. (This question is raised in V 3 [49] 2, 1-2 and dealt with in the following chapters). To be more precise, the soul cannot achieve self-knowledge in so far as the soul is meant to represent the empirical self. This qualification seems to be essential to Plotinus, for example, when discussing the question whether or not the soul can attain self-knowledge through the function of its νοῦς, he calls special attention to the fact that the mind can know only the objects that are in itself (3, 17-18).

This statement is apparently reconsidered<sup>2</sup> in 4, 20-29. Therefore, it must seem that, although a soul cannot have true self-knowledge, man may be assumed to attain true self-knowledge after having been transferred into νοῦς.<sup>3</sup> Thus the soul, when it is involved in such a process of becoming one with its objects, is supposed to attain συναίσθησις: ἀλλὰ ἔχει ἂν ἀτρέπτως πρὸς νόησιν ὁμοῦ ἔχουσα τὴν συναίσθησιν αὐτῆς ὡς ἐν ἅμα τῷ νοητῷ ταῦτόν γεγόμενον (IV 4 [28] 2, 30-32). Συναίσθησις here, as well as in V 3 [49] 13, 12-14 [with regard to the mind], does not apparently refer, as does παρακολούθησις, to any kind of *Begleitbewusstsein*, but rather to the inner relationship that exists between the soul and its intentional objects.

Moreover, Plotinus asserts that the soul may have a συναίσθησις of τῶν ἔνδον ἐν τῷ σώματι γινομένων (V 3 [49] 2, 4), which is to say

<sup>1</sup> E. Bréhier was apparently irritated when he remarks [*ad loc.*]: "Toute élévation est, chez Plotin, une diminution de conscience".

<sup>2</sup> This passage has not been taken into account by H.-R. Schwyzer in: *Les Sources de Plotin*, pp. 366-367.

<sup>3</sup> See P. Merlan, *Monopsychism, Mysticism, Metaconsciousness* (The Hague, 1963), p. 83.

that the soul has a kind of “*innere Wahrnehmung*”<sup>1</sup> of psychosomatic events (cf. also IV 4 [28] 8, 20). This faculty is said to be a property peculiar to the soul itself (IV 3 [27] 26, 45). This proposition is not at all surprising; however, it is in a way rather interesting, particularly from the systematic viewpoint of Plotinus’ philosophy. For Plotinus, although he definitely rejected the materialistic implications of the Stoic διαδόσει-theory, which accounted for the transmission of the body’s αἰσθήσεις to the ἡγεμονικόν [see above, pp. 46 in # 50], seems to be subscribing to an earlier Stoic account.<sup>2</sup> It is in such contexts that the notion of συναίσθησις comes close to the meaning of συμπάθεια: in IV 5 (29) 1, 8-9, Plotinus says that soul must συναφῇ γενομένην τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς διὰ τῶν προσομοίων κοινωνίαν, and from 5, 29 it is clear that συμπάθεια can be replaced by συναίσθησις.<sup>3</sup> It is quite obvious that Plotinus is, in a way, Stoicizing.

[IV] Finally, attention should be drawn to the opinion already mentioned [see above, pp. 53-58 in # 58], viz. Nature is supposed to be a silently contemplating soul: στάσα δὲ ἐν ᾧ ἔστιν, ἐν τῇ αὐτῆς στάσει καὶ οἷον συναισθήσει, τῇ συνέσει ταύτη καὶ συναισθήσει τὸ μεθ’ αὐτὴν εἶδεν (III 8 [30] 4, 18-20). The kind of awareness in question [R. Harder translates “*innewerden*” and “*sich selbst gewähren*”] is very similar to the unconscious apprehension of himself that a man has when asleep (III 8 [30] 4, 24). This viewpoint apparently links up with what Plotinus says about the world-soul in III 4 (15) 4, 8 ff., IV 3 (27) 4, 26, and IV 4 (28) 13, 7 ff. Moreover, there is to a certain extent a striking resemblance between the συναίσθησις attributed to the *Natura artifex* and the kind of “*Selbstgefühl*” which must be assumed to be a property of the *One*. Both create without deliberation or purpose [ἀπροαιρέτως], and each of them is aware that it is what it is, although this kind of dim awareness is far from being close to the “self-reflexive consciousness” which is peculiar to the “self-thinking” of *Intelligence*. Hence, it is not at all surprising that Plotinus grants the *World* a kind of συναίσθησις (IV 4 [28] 24, 1), for there exists such a thing as συναίσθησις παντὸς πρὸς πᾶν (IV 4 [28] 45, 8). In the latter case, the meaning of συναίσθησις again approximates that of συμπάθεια.

<sup>1</sup> For the term, see O. Becker, *Plotin und das Problem der geistigen Aneignung*, p. 29.

<sup>2</sup> See W. Jaeger, *Nemesius von Emesa*, pp. 52 ff. on Galen, *De Hipp. et Plat. Plac.*

<sup>3</sup> Cf. also H.-R. Schwyzer, in: *Les Sources de Plotin*, p. 367.

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